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Abstract 
The representation of a perceptual scene by a computer is usually limited 
to numbers representing dimensions and colours. The theory of affordances 
attempted to provide a new way of representing an environment, with respect 
to a particular agent. The view was introduced as part of an entire field of 
psychology labeled as 'ecological,' which has since branched into computer 
science through the field of robotics, and formal methods. This thesis will 
describe the concept of affordances, review several existing formalizations, 
and take a brief look at applications to robotics. The formalizations put 
forth in the last 20 years have no agreed upon structure, only that both 
the agent and the environment must be taken in relation to one another. 
Situation theory has also been evolving since its inception in 1983 by Barwise 
& Perry. The theory provided a formal way to represent any arbitrary piece 
of information in terms of relations. This thesis will take a toy version of 
situation theory published in CSLI lecture notes no. 22, and add to the given 
ontologies. This thesis extends the given ontologies to include specialized 
affordance types, and individual object types. This allows for the definition 
of semantic objects called environments, which support a situation and a set 
of affordances, and niches which refer to a set of actions for an individual. 
Finally, a possible way for an environment to change into a new environment 
is suggested via the activation of an affordance. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
James J. Gibson spent his life researching vision, in an attempt to explain how 
humans and other animals perceive their environment. One of the concepts 
he is most famous for is the creation of affordances. He described what they 
are, the information in the environment which is available to pick them up, 
and the process by which we pick them up, namely a direct process. Though 
the theory is contrary to those who believe our brains act as computers, 
performing complex operations on the sensory input it receives, there are 
those who have embraced the idea, and attempted to formalize the notion 
in some way. Many suggestions have been presented, but each attempt was 
responded to with a major critique. 
In chapter two, this thesis provides a background overview of James Gib-
son's early career which leads into a review of his first, and last books. The 
last book he wrote, "The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception," was 
the culmination of his career which· expertly described what he believed to 
be the problem with experimental psychology at the time, and what sort of 
direction should instead be pursued. This included what he described as op-
portunities for action afforded to an animal by its surrounding environment. 
The term affordances was applied to these opportunities. Gibson did not 
however, specify a formal definition, so his successors in the field of ecologi-
cal psychology attempted to publish formal definitions but have never agreed 
upon anything except that both animal and environment be taken in relation 
to each other as Gibson proclaimed. A review of the existing attempts at 
formalization is given in chapter three. 
Gibson's revolutionary ideas were not restricted to psychology however. 
The term 'ecological' which he branded to many of his theories such as 'eco-
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logical optics' and 'ecological information', also found its way into the field 
of robotics. Simulations can be done to represent Gibson's notions of affor-
dances and how they are perceived, but they do not allow for the so-called 
unboundedness of the visual world for the agents, or the idea of persistence 
underlying change. Computer science has provided a basis with which to 
test some of Gibson's thoughts in a real world environment rather than a 
simulation. As computing power increases, computations on the go become 
easier to perform and robots can begin to demonstrate some of the simple 
affordance 'perceiving and acting upon' techniques in a real world environ-
ment. Chapter four will review some work performed in the field of ecological 
robotics and demonstrate how it has emerged from Gibson's work. 
Situation theory, just like a portion of Gibson's writings, was introduced 
as a new theory of information. Situation theory provided the mathemati-
cal foundations to situation semantics which provided a theoretical way of 
reasoning in real world situations. Essentially it allows for the description 
of, and possibly the transitions between, situations found in the real world, 
which can be arbitrarily complex or simplistic depending on what must be 
represented or conveyed. A review of situation theory is provided to be-
gin chapter five, and subsequent mathematical background is discussed next. 
The toy version of situation theory we have chosen to use in the modeling of 
affordances is described. Then the formal description we have used to add 
the two types of objects to the toy version of situation theory is provided, as 
well as the definition of two more semantic objects, and one possible method 
of having situations change into new situations through the enact ion of an 
affordance available in the first. 
Further work still needs to be done in modeling how situations change, 
and more notations could be added to simplify the specification of states, or 
situations. If a full version of situation theory were used instead of the toy 
version, examples would be much more complex, the dynamics would involve 
parameters and anchors, and it would allow for the possibility of defining 
arbitrary types. 
2 
Chapter 2 
Gibson's Early Career 
James Jerome Gibson was born January 27th, 1904 to a railway surveyor 
and a country school teacher. He started university in 1921 in the field of 
philosophy but after a course in experimental psychology in his senior year, 
he transferred to psychology, which he would complete all of his degrees in. 
He completed his B.S. in 1925, his M.A in 1926, and in 1928 he published 
his Ph.D. which refuted a recent thesis by Wulf [61]. Wulf, according to 
Gibson, concluded that a human's reproduction of perceived images show a 
change either towards sharpening or leveling-the exaggeration or weakening 
of characteristics. Gibson did not believe this distinction to be useful, so 
he suggested that if one was to consider 'nearly equal' sized figures, and a 
subject were to reproduce them as equal, reproduction could be considered 
sharpening of the 'nearly equal size' characteristic, but leveling of the char-
acteristic 'unequal size', thus rendering Wulf's publications quite ambigu-
ous. Gibson found in his experiments that subjects' memories spontaneously 
changed toward simpler or more compact configurations [38]. Within a year 
of his Ph.D. he published an article entitled, "The Reproduction of Visually 
Perceived Forms." An extension of his doctoral thesis, it examined how hu-
mans store and reproduce figures, with focus on changes made unbeknownst 
to the perceiver. This was the first of many works by Gibson to examine 
how the human brain perceives and stores information. In what follows, I 
will attempt to review most of Gibson's work, however due to time and space 
constraints, I will focus on articles written before his three books, as well as 
the books themselves. 
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2.1 Gibson (1929) 
The Reproduction of Visually Perceived Forms [17] 
In an attempt to "observe the ways in which the reproduction of visually 
perceived forms varies from the original stimuli," James Gibson performed 
studies which tested how subjects perceived and reproduced, certain images 
[17]. Randomly produced images were used, yet these images contained 
resemblances and differences which were not intended in their design. They 
were simply randomly created shapes, not necessarily closed or regular, one 
category made of straight lines, and the other curved lines. One such example 
involves four lines arranged in roughly a trapezoid, yet none of the corners 
were joined. Subjects still assimilated the image with a lampshade, both 
completing the gaps at the corners subconsciously, and at the same time 
attributing an everyday item to an abstract image. Another example is a 
triangle with a rectangle placed so that it overlaps part of the top of the 
triangle. Several different images were noted by observers. A pyramid with 
a top on it, an axe, an anvil, and a bell were all listed as possibly depicted 
items. Upon use in these studies, many such abstract images were given a 
significance by each subject. Everyone, it seems, performs some perceptual 
compensations we are unaware of, thus meaning no two people derive the 
exact same meaning from an image. Gibson might suggest that this is because 
no two people have exactly the same perceptual history, though he may not 
have made this claim in the early stages of his career, as his beliefs continued 
to evolve throughout his academic work. A common tendency of the mind, 
is to adjust perceived images when they are being stored or recalled. These 
adjustments are presumably in the interest of easing the work the mind must 
do, or to allow it to perform the work at all. 
Object assimilation and verbal analysis are examples of the mind's ten-
dencies which Gibson defined. They occur when a subject perceives a figure, 
and encodes that figure to more closely resemble a familiar object, or a ver-
bally given description. Other properties or features the mind seems to alter 
without our awareness are the closing of gaps in figures, or the straightening 
of lines in figures. Gibson observed that the mind does not, however, curve 
already straight lines, and if gaps in an image are widened, as was occasion-
ally noted, instead of closing the gaps, the mind may have perceived each 
side of the gap as its own figure and simplified each side. In determining 
frequencies, Gibson found that object assimilation and figure assimilation 
occur most frequently as the most prominent effect taking place. Secondary 
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effects within the same instance were not surveyed, as they are assumed to 
be less important having been dominated by the primary effect. It is not 
hard to believe that humans perceive the world with a bias toward images 
they have already encountered. It is obviously only possible to know what 
an object is, if you have come across this object before, either physically, 
verbally, pictorially, descriptively, or in some other way. Otherwise through 
relating it to other familiar objects which form the bias. 
The final question posed by Gibson in this early article asks, "Is the 
change in a reproduction of a perceived form caused by the influence of past 
perceptions on the perception and memory of that form, or is the change 
cause by the nature of the form itself?" [17J. He replies that no evidence 
was observed in support of forms which cause a change by nature, and all of 
his experiments can be explained by the supposition that the experience of 
the individual brought about habitual modes of perception whiCh condition 
the changes observed. 
2.2 Gibson (1933) 
Adaptation, After-effect, and Contrast in the Perception of Curved 
Lines [18] 
Gibson continued to investigate how humans' minds modify perceived fig-
ures and in 1933 put forth another publication. This was the second article 
he wrote for the Journal of Experimental Psychology entitled "Adaptation, 
after-effect, and contrast in the perception of curved lines" [18]. In it he 
describes an experiment in which the participant wears prism glasses which 
shift the entire visual field 15° to the right. Vertical lines were also perceived 
as curved as a result of the prisms. The conclusions drawn from the exper-
iment suggest that though human perception does perform subtle constant 
adaptations we are unaware of, it is also quite adaptive to permanent changes 
(and reversals of those changes). It is also important to note the experiments 
performed by Ivo Kohler shortly following Gibson's publication of his first 
book([24]), which also investigated the eyes remarkable ability to compen-
sate for distortions [44]. Kohler's publications were in German however, and 
did not receive as much attention, but have since been cited as quite similar 
to Gibson's by Johansson [41]. After experiencing the world shifted to the 
right for several days, the participant in Gibson's experiment reported that 
the shift was becoming more natural each day. After four days, totalling 45 
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hours, the prism glasses were removed, and the subject reported that verti-
cal lines and edges were now unmistakably curved in the opposite direction. 
This residual effect lasted to some noticeable extent for two days. 
This was not to say that this curious effect is only present in extended 
periods of adaptation. It was reported that as little as one hour was necessary 
to detect the curvature after-effect. Gibson conducted an experiment of this 
nature, to evaluate the amount of the negative after-effect, and to measure 
the adaptation while subjects were wearing the prism glasses. The results 
surprised him. He expected that having subjects run their hand along a meter 
stick, or any straight edge, would coax the adaptation of the perceptual 
system towards the new, curved, environment, but instead he found that 
as long as a subject was watching his hand move along the meter stick, the 
curved visual perceptual system completely dominated the tactile perceptual 
input by indicating to the brain that the stick was in fact curved. This 
effect ceased if the subject's eyes were closed or looking away. It would 
seem, based on these experiments, that perception is highly adaptive and 
also that it cannot synchronize itself to more than one orientation system. 
After removing the prism glasses all subjects reported an after-effect which 
was opposite to the experience they had just encountered. These results 
all pointed Gibson towards a theory of perception which should be relative 
to each individual. If one individual experienced an accident in which the 
perceptual system was altered, it should stand to reason that any complete 
theory of perception would be able to accommodate any changes. 
Other conclusions drawn from the experiments in this paper, include that 
all negative after effects only occur in places where the perceptual system had 
begun to adapt to new input, and that the periphery of the field of vision 
shows a greater adaptation and stronger after effect than does the midpoint 
on the fovea. Also, this type of after effect differs, in fact, from the after 
effect of colour, in that the after effect of colour does not carry from one 
eye to the other. When focusing on colour, after effect is only present in 
the stimulated eye, whereas the after effect caused by focus on a line looking 
through a bending prism, is reported even when changing the perceiving 
eye between looking through the prism, and measuring after effect. It must 
then, be the brain which is mediating the adaptation and after effect with 
respect to curvature, or else the perceptual system has internal processes 
which combine the scene in each eye, and these processes would be the cause 
of the after effect. 
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2.3 Gibson & Gibson (1934) 
Retension and the Interpolated Task [16] 
In 1932, James J. Gibson married Eleanor Jack Gibson, and two years 
later his first article co-written with her was published. It examined the 
problem of how new memories can impact old memories, called retroactive 
inhibition. Action which inhibits a past memory. The authors performed an 
experiment which was intended to identify to what extent engaging in similar 
or non-similar tasks hinders the recall of memorized pairs of consonants. 
Previous work, the authors state, worked with the similarity of material 
alone, and thus did not take into consideration other factors. Little was 
known until this publication, about the relative importance of operational 
and functional similarity on retroaction. 
The purpose of the experiment was to isolate and compare the decrements 
in retention caused by similar material, to the decrements caused by similar 
operation. The four possible cases, plus one further, were used in carrying out 
the experiment. The five groups were asked to memorize a list of ten pairs of 
consonants for two minutes, then each was given a different interpolation task 
for three minutes, followed by 90 seconds to recall the original consonants. 
Group 1 was asked to memorize another list of consonants, so operation, and 
material in this interpolated task were similar. Group 2 was given paired 
digits to memorize, thus having a similar operation (memorization), but not 
similar material. Group 3 was asked to cross one pair of consonants out of a 
long list of different pairs. Here the material was similar, but operation was 
different. Group 4 was asked to cross out a pair of numbers among a long 
list of pairs. Obviously both material and operation were different. A fifth 
group was also used, where these subjects were asked to simply view some 
dramatic pictures. Here the material and operation are certainly different, 
but also subjects were no longer given what could be known as 'work' but 
instead were instructed to simply observe the pictures, and wait. 
The results expectedly showed that the worst recall was in the first group 
which was asked to memorize a second list. Memorizing the second list had 
evidently caused the participants to forget the first list or recall it incorrectly. 
The groups which were asked to engage in a task which was similar in either 
operation or memorization alone did about the same, indicating to the Gib-
sons that each was about of equal importance. It was also clear that these 
two features were interdependent, because the loss in retention due to both 
factors, was more than the summed losses of each of the factors alone. The 
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fourth group, which was asked to perform an activity dissimilar in operation 
and material did better than the first three groups indicating that an inter-
polated task which was not similar to the task provided the best recall. The 
fifth group however, did even better than the fourth, possibly because the 
interpolated task was even more different. The lack of 'work' in the interpo-
lated task for the group which simply viewed pictures, the authors claimed, 
was the cause for the difference. The gain in recall from group four to group 
five was also evidence to suggest that there were other features than the two 
tested here, which influence memory. 
2.4 Gibson (1934) 
Retroaction and the Method of Recognition [19] 
This short article analyzes one simple question of some importance for 
the theory of memory at the time. Can retroaction be demonstrated to 
exist when retention is tested by method of recognition? Gibson specifically 
discusses two German articles written by Heine [37] and Dahl [8]. The first, 
executed an experiment where she tested the extent to which retroaction 
could inhibit memories when the memories are retrieved via recognition, 
instead of recall. She found that no retroaction was present when recognition 
was used instead of recall. Dahl found that retention being better after a sleep 
period than a waking one, also holds when retention is tested via recognition. 
When it comes to the "sleep-effect," recognition and recall testing return the 
same results. Dahl's reasoning explains that given this, and Heine's findings 
that the retroaction effect holds for recall but not recognition, the two effects 
must be distinguished, and superior retention after a sleep period cannot be 
explained in terms of retroaction. Gibson however did not agree with this as 
it would destroy the value of a "Sleep and retention" study carried out by Van 
Ormer [57], and invalidate its evidence supporting the theory that forgetting 
is largely due to interpolated activities. As the whole argument depends on 
the study by Heine, Gibson found it necessary to question the study, and 
re-open the problem to experimental investigation. Especially since he cited 
two other experiments (yielding only partially conclusive evidence) which 
contradicted Heine [37]. 
Gibson then designed an experiment to test for retroaction under more 
favourable conditions than the experiment by Heine. Ten nonsense words 
were printed on cards, shown to participants for five seconds each, under the 
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instruction to look at each word and try to remember as many as possible. An 
interpolated period of five minutes was given, where the experimental group 
learned by successive presentations another series of 10 nonsense words. The 
control group was asked to rest and look through a book with no writing 
except titles. After the interpolated period, all participants were presented 
30 words on cards (five seconds each), and asked to report which they rec-
ognized from the original list. Ten words were from the original list, 10 
had one letter changed, and 10 had two letters changed. A word with two 
letters changed were presented first, then the corresponding word with one 
letter changed, then the original set. A recognition score was calculated, one 
point for correct recognition, and one half point for making an error, but 
subsequently correcting the error. Twenty subjects were in each group. The 
experimental group was inferior in recognition scores by 31%, and also in 
number of errors by 53%. This lead Gibson to conclude his experiment as a 
contradiction to Heine [37]. He concluded with a declaration that "although 
more experimental evidence is needed before the issue can be decided, it is at 
least clear that Heine's results cannot be accepted as proving that retention 
tested by recognition will under no conditions show a decrement as a result 
of interpolation" [19]. 
2.5 Gibson and Hudson (1935) 
Bilateral transfer of the conditioned knee-jerk [32] 
Gibson wrote this article to follow up his experiment[33] of three years 
previous. It showed that if one hand was conditioned to withdraw due to 
electric shock, the other hand reacted based on the same conditioning, even 
though it had received no training. The question here, was if a conditioned 
knee-jerk in one leg forms a similar but latent conditioned response in the 
other leg. The subjects were each instructed to focus their entire attention 
upon reacting as quickly as possible to the stimulus of a combined light and 
buzzer by pressing a grip-key which was held in the hand on the side to be 
trained. After the stimulus began, 0.28 seconds later a blow was delivered 
to the patellar tendon. With the exception of those few who had very long 
reaction times, the hand response occurred slightly before the blow on the 
tendon. The component events of the voluntary reaction were employed as 
the conditioned 'stimulus'. The subjects were first trained or conditioned by 
reacting to the buzzer and light with the hand the grip-key was in, and ex-
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periencing the hammer blow to the tendon on the same side as the grip-key. 
After 5 training trials, a test for conditioning was made where the hammer 
was caught, and conditioned responses by the legs were noted. If no condi-
tioning, 15 more training trials were done, if the subject demonstrated the 
conditioning in two successive conditioning tests, the experimenter changed 
the side of the grip-key, and the hammer. The hammer was caught before 
delivering the blow, and any movement of the legs was noted. 
Sixteen subjects participated and of them, 10 were dismissed after the 
first sitting due to lack of signs of stable conditioning, though 12 gave at 
least one conditioned response in 65 trials. Four of the subjects manifested 
stable conditioned responses from the beginning. Gibson concluded that in 
subjects where the conditioning was strongly established, and equally sta-
ble conditioning of the untrained leg had been set up, and presented itself 
when the subject was told they would now be working on the other leg, 
and changed the hand for the grip-key. The light-buzzer-stimulus was also 
deemed non-essential to the conditioned response as on occasion subjects 
gave a premature hand reaction to the ready signal, and a kick immedi-
ately followed. Trials were redone (five times) with the four subjects who 
showed stable conditioning, which tested for necessary stimuli. First the 
hand-reaction was eliminated so that the subject held the grip, but did not 
react with it, then holding the grip-key was eliminated. A verbal condition 
was then used (the grip-key reintroduced) where instead of a light-buzzer 
stimulus the experimenter commanded "Ready, clench!" Then along with 
the physical clench, the subject verbally reacted by saying aloud, "Ready, 
clench!" The last iteration saw the subjects clenching the grip-key while 
saying the words sub-vocally. Of the total 240 tests, 159 were deemed to 
be positive and interestingly transferred conditioned responses were elicited 
about as often as the original conditioned responses. Gibson & Hudson stated 
that, "no essential difference appears between the two types, which [in] fact 
indicates once more that the transferred responses are essentially similar to 
the original responses." No single component stimuli was found responsi-
ble for the conditioning, though the physical clenching response gave better 
results than any auditory response. Taking into account Gibson's previous 
experiment, an explanation of the transfer of conditioning responses "was 
suggested in terms of a generalized system of avoidance responses, effective 
for various parts of the body, which as a unit might have become conditioned 
to the buzzer stimulus." The subject had essentially been conditioned on a 
particular situation, and mirroring that situation to engage the opposite side 
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of the body did not change the conditioning due to the situation. This early 
explanation by Gibson and his colleague seem to suggest that the body does 
in fact operate in terms of situations. It may store the conditioning in a sim-
ilar manner that we begin to think of food conditioned by the stimulus that 
we are hungry. If some constraints are satisfied, the conditioned response is 
engaged, but the constraints do not have to be minimal, and possibly any 
subset of them may yield the same conditioned response. 
2.6 Gibson (1936) 
A note on the conditioning of voluntary reactions [20] 
James Gibson wrote this discussion as a critique of J.M.Stevens ([50],[51]) 
experiments. "At first sight," Gibson reports, "[the experiments] seem to 
demonstrate that a voluntary reaction can be conditioned." The purpose of 
the experiments goes further but the validity of it rests on this conclusion. 
Subjects were asked to react with the right hand (by hitting a contact with 
a stylus) to one buzzer sound, and with the left hand (a different contact & 
stylus) to another buzzer sound. Subjects were allowed to get accustomed 
to the reaction, and then the buzzers were set to go off either together or in 
close temporal succession. Without warning or notice, tests for condition-
ing were made by only one of the two buzzers sounding. Gibson criticized 
Stephens for lack of 'ready' signal, and an inadequate amount of control over 
variables. Conditioning was determined to have occurred if a subject reacted 
with a hand that had not been signaled. Gibson declared the subject may 
not have been giving conditioned reactions, but only what would be called 
false reactions in the conventional choice-reaction procedure. A reaction of 
a hand for which no signal was given, may mean only that when the subject 
is set to make either of two prepared reactions he may make both or the 
wrong one. The occurrence of such instances "might have been as frequent 
before the conditioning procedure had begun as afterwards. The practice 
trials given before the beginning of experiment," Gibson continued, "were 
not choice reactions and consequently provide no control" [20]. Gibson was 
very precise about his experiments and always provided these key ingredients. 
Subjects were ensured to be prepared to participate, were given notice that 
the experiment was to begin, and every detail was ensured to be controlled 
from one experiment to the next. As well, tests were also taken before the 
experiment and after so as to determine if there was a predisposed type of 
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reaction, or if any conditioning in the experiment was legitimately induced 
during the experiment, and not prior. A voluntary reaction Gibson defined to 
be a reaction which depends on a preparatory set aroused by verbal instruc-
tions. Stephens responded by admitting that to demonstrate conditioned 
voluntary reactions, one should employ some control, and he wrote that he 
would ensure such control in future data so that it will have more bearing 
on the problems he wishes to investigate. 
2.7 Gibson (1937a) 
Adaptation with Negative After-Effect [22] 
This was the first of three articles published at least in part by Gibson in 
the same year all dealing with the adaptation of the perceptual system, and 
the after-effect imposed on it when the change made to perception is reversed. 
He noted that very little time had been spent studying the functional simi-
larities which cut across the sensory categories of our world. Gibson hoped 
that determining similarities which cut across sense departments might point 
to new categories and concepts in sensory psychology, and this was his first 
paper on the matter. It was dedicated to one such principle which he called 
adaptation with negative after-effect or alternatively successive contrast. Of 
course he admits that there are forms of sensory adaptation which do not 
produce any negative after-effect, but he also boldly stated that 'it seems 
certain that there cannot be a negative after-effect without adaptation.' A 
definition of negative after-effect is as follows: 
If a sensory process which has an opposite is made to persist by 
a constant application of its appropriate stimulus-conditions, the 
quality will diminish in the direction of becoming neutral, and 
therewith the quality evoked by any stimulus for the dimension 
in question will be shifted temporarily toward the opposite or 
complementary quality. 
This effect can be see in sources such as prolonged blue stimulation, where 
quality shifts to neutral grey, and any other colour stimulus applied now 
would produce a hue which is shifted toward yellow. 
Gibson examined several notions further: dimension, opposite, neutral, 
appropriate stimulus and shift. Dimension is divided into intensive dimen-
sion, sensory continuums such as pressure, size, or distance which he claims 
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run from an absolute zero to a maximum, and oppositional dimension such as 
temperature (warm-cold), brightness (white-black), or linear shape (concave-
convex) which run from the maximum of one quality to neutral to the maxi-
mum of its opposite quality. Though upon further review Gibson might have 
noticed that distance can be classified oppositionally as near-far (and has no 
maximum), and temperature does in fact have have a continuum of degrees. 
He later identifies this concern by deeming the minimum and maximum of 
temperature as those boundary temperature at which pain is experienced. 
One important notion is the opposition of two qualities, which mandates 
that qualities with oppositional dimension are incompatible (a surface can-
not be both blue and yellow, a line not concave and convex), but when one 
attempts to produce both qualities one operation cancels the other and the 
result tends to be neutral (grey or straight in the examples). A third kind of 
dimensional change is transitive dimension, when a change is made between 
two different but not opposite standard qualities such as red to yellow. A 
thought which comes to mind here is that a transitive dimensional shift may 
be two simultaneous oppositional shifts. When red changes to yellow, it may 
be that red is shifting to neutral, and a grey on a different (yellow-blue) scale 
shifts to yellow. Gibson's thesis stated that, "whenever experimental quali-
ties fall into an opposition series, then adaptation with negative after-effect 
may be expected to occur" [22]. 
The author discusses some instances where this adaptation and after-
effect emerge. Colour, or 'chromatic adaptation' as Gibson cited from Troland 
(1930), manifests by shifting the hue evoked by any stimulus toward the com-
plementary of the adapting stimulus. Though adaptation along one dimen-
sion of colour will interestingly produce a change in all colour-equations. The 
shift may be seen as toward the neutral center of a colour-circle thus shifting 
all points in the circle including non-complementary ones. Brightness is a 
dimension which adheres to the principle. Illustrated quite simply by anyone 
by moving from a dark room to a lit one or vice-versa. It does not however, 
present itself in the form of an after-image, but does nevertheless manifest 
as an after-effect. Temperature is identified as an opposition series. Gib-
son states that the neutral quality is definite, in that temperature which the 
body rests. If a certain temperature feels neutral to the touch, and the skin is 
attuned to a temperature higher than neutral, the pervious neutral will now 
feel cold, and any stimuli will feel colder than they ordinarily would. Gibson 
believed that similar mechanisms are at work on the temperature sensitivity 
of the skin and the brightness sensitivity of the retina. He also discussed 
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formation of lines in the visual field by- delimited objects, concavity of a line, 
tactile shape of an edge citing his earlier research [18], and linear direction 
(tilting) of lines. Other examples Gibson examined are tactile-kinaesthetic 
direction (horizontal/vertical direction), visual movement, tactile movement, 
and even taste. After exposure to sour, distilled water tastes sweet, and sweet 
tastes sweeter. 
Gibson also explains that some of these effects also occur when one di-
mension is perceived on a background of another. For instance, when a 
straight line is seen against a background of curved lines, the straight line 
appears curved in the opposite direction to its background. This effect is 
present in tilted lines as well as curved ones. To explain the negative after-
effect, Gibson wrote that it is "a by-product or incident of the primary fact 
of adaptation to a norm." "A state of adaptation," he continued, "might be 
a state of psychological equilibrium." The process, he supposed is a way of 
keeping the experimental norm or neutral quality in correspondence with the 
norm of external conditions. The hypotheses for a comprehensive theory are 
as follows: the normal quality of any dimension is the most frequent one in 
past experience; the normal quality is correlated with the most stable physi-
ological condition (the one involving the least output of energy); the normal 
quality is correlated in the long run with the most stable and thus frequent 
condition of the external environment. 
This article, combined with Gibson's previous writings, demonstrates that 
Gibson did not hesitate to generalize some properties of a system, to a near-
universal nature where the properties are guaranteed to emerge. He took his 
and other studies on after-effect with regard to qualities such as curvature, 
and colour, and extended the notion to all oppositional dimensions. This 
leap can later be observed when he shifted from studies on visual perception 
in humans to his notion of affordances which can be said to be relevant to 
any animal's perception using any perceptual sense. 
2.8 Gibson and Radner (1937b) 
Adaptation, After-effect and Contrast in the Perception of Tilted 
Lines: I. Quantitative Studies [35] 
This study investigates and confirms that the adaptation and after-effect 
which Gibson proved occurs in the perception of curved lines, also occurs 
in the perception of lines tilted away from horizontal or vertical. The effect 
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was tested to occur in subjects required to look for several minutes at a 20 
cm line-segment drawn on a large cardboard square. The line-segment was 
tilted varying degrees from horizontal and vertical and the impact of the 
after-effect was found to be minimal at 45°, and maximum at 10° though it 
was at least somewhat present at all inclinations. Fixation on the midpoint 
of the line-segment was reported to have a weaker aftereffect than inspection 
of the entire line-segment, and it was also reported that if the lengths of the 
lines used for the inspection and testing were greatly different, the effect was 
diminished. What would not impact the results is if a black line-segment on 
a white background was used or if the edge between a black area and white 
area was used. Also interesting, is that if a tilted rectangular cross was used, 
the effect was present in both lines of the cross. 
Gibson concluded, after repeating the experiments restricting the sub-
jects' vision to looking through a tube, that we as humans possess a 'sense' 
of visual direction which is adaptable. He then repeated the experiments 
using the restricted vision, controlling aspects such as duration of inspec-
tion, and attempting to quantify the expected amount of after-effect based 
on the deviation from the neutral. Subjects were also asked to set the line at 
horizontal, vertical, and 45°, 30°, and 60° from vertical. The errors of each 
inclination for each subject showed that variability of oblique inclinations 
was 3 to 6 times greater than the horizontal and vertical thus our acuity for 
the latter was much greater. Gibson's studies he admitted produced too few 
data, but he cited three other authors who proved our precision for setting 
lines to vertical and horizontal is greater than other angles. Testing subjects 
on 5° tilt from vertical, then horizontal, Gibson controlled duration of fixa-
tion by testing with 1, 5, 10, 20, 45, 90, and 120 seconds. After-effects ranged 
from tenths of a degree after one second, rising rapidly for 5 and 10 seconds, 
up to 1° for 20 seconds. The after-effect continues to rise up to 120°, but 
quite slowly topping out at 1.5°. Tests were run for 5 and 10 minutes, but 
yielded not much higher results. The horizontal axis was deemed to produce 
a greater after-effect than the vertical, a possible explanation I suggest, might 
be the impact that the horizon has on the most prominent human activity, 
locomotion. 
The interdependence of the horizontal and vertical was also examined. 
An after-effect obtained on one reference axis did indeed present itself on the 
other axis (indirect after-effect), though to a smaller extent. The horizontal 
and vertical directions do in fact seem to behave as aspects of a single system 
for visual orientation, or a single spatial framework, but the link is not rigid 
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as shown by the diminished impact of the indirect after-effect. 
Gibson mentions in his introduction of this article that an essential ele-
ment in visual perception is the notion of boundary, edge, or line. He could 
not at this early stage of his career, have known that he would go on to report 
this elementary principle in his books, nor the impact that it likely had on 
his eventual theory of affordances. 
2.9 Gibson (1937c) 
Adaptation, After-effect, and Contrast in the Perception of Tilted 
Lines. II. Simultaneous Contrast and the Areal Restriction of the 
After-effect [21] 
This third (and last) article in the series assumed the reader is familiar 
with the previous two which explain adaptation, and the after-effect which 
follows it, in the frontal visual field. In hopes of proving that, "linear direction 
is functionally akin to a sensory process like that of color," Gibson sought to 
demonstrate the occurrence of simultaneous contrast in perception of linear 
direction, and the process of adaptation is a localized process within the 
visual field. He had already shown from previous reports that direction and 
curvature exhibit successive contrast where perception of something impacts 
what is successively perceived, and was now setting out to prove that like 
curvature, linear direction also manifests simultaneous contrast. 
The apparatus used was described in the first paper, with the new ad-
dition of a grating of parallel black lines 5 cm in front of the white disk 
containing the adjustable black line. Subjects were asked to set the line to 
vertical before and after the parallel lines were superimposed. Three specific 
amounts of inclination were tested: 10°, 20°, 45° in addition to the horizontal 
and vertical control. Results confirmed to Gibson that a contrast-effect was 
definitely present. The effect was most pronounced at 10° (two degrees), but 
still present at 20° (half degree). At 45°, however, the average contrast was 
less than a tenth of a degree. The experiment also revealed that the vertical 
axis provided a similar but slightly stronger contrast effect than the horizon-
tal axis for each inclination, leading Gibson to provide this as evidence that 
the two axes function as mutually related spatial standards with a limited 
degree of interdependence. 
The next experiment involved two cases. Subjects looking at a vertical 
line surrounded by a tilted box or a tilted line surrounded by a vertically 
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aligned box. After adaptation in the first case, the line showed a negative 
tilt, but the square frame appeared normally oriented. It seemed that the 
relationship between the line and its frame had been altered. In the second 
case, the contrasting tilt of the line was reported to increase in amount over 
the adaptation period, along with a decrease in the apparent tilt of the square. 
The after-effect in the second case, s~owed the square frame appearing tilted 
to observers, but only whilst they maintained fixation on the line. If the 
eyes left the midpoint of the line, moving to the edges of the square, it 
appeared normally oriented. Results were similar when the box around the 
line was replaced by two equal length lines on either side of the line. When 
fixation was on the middle line, it appeared tilted, if fixation was shifted to 
an outside line, it appeared tilted, and the others approximately vertical. 
The conclusion drawn, was that the spread of the negative after-effect in the 
visual field was quite limited and the effect was localized. 
Another key question in understanding perceptual processes is why the 
negative after-effect of linear curvature transfers from one eye to the other, 
but the after-effect of colour does not. The tilt effect did indeed transfer from 
one eye to the corresponding region of the other. According to one theory 
at the time, lines and objects in the frontal field of view are seen as upright 
or tilted based on their relation to the horizontal-vertical framework. The 
framework provides a reference base, but more importantly for this study 
is itself determined by the main lines of the visual field. The horizon line 
is an example of a main line. "These main lines of the field, even if ... not 
gravitationally vertical or horizontal, will become so phenomenally because 
they determine the framework." Gibson cited experimental support for this 
theory as coming from a German article by Wertheimer (1912) who asked 
subjects to look through a tube which tilted the image of the room by 45°. 
Wertheimer found after a period of adaptation that the tilted image appeared 
vertical and must have changed subjects' entire spatial framework. Gibson 
did however, deflect this idea as inapplicable to the phenomenon under study 
as the adaptation there was complete rather than partial as it is here, and oc-
curred at 45° while in this experiment 45° yielded minimal if any adaptation 
or after-effect. As well, the tilt effect here was localized, and did not impact 
the spatial framework as a whole, unlike the study done by Wertheimer. The 
effect here, Gibson explained, "behaves like a partial and local adaptation 
process akin in many respects to sensory adaptation." A theory of the phe-
nomenon of tilt adaptation, which would explain the results obtained in this 
experiment should also explain similar results related to other sensory adap-
17 
tation, i.e. colour, brightness, linear shape, skin temperature etc. Gibson 
leaves an attempt at a general theory for another paper. 
This article brought to the surface Gibson's clear belief that different 
senses of the body such as hearing, taste, and touch shared perceptual sim-
ilarities which might be all explained via some meta-theory. Gibson made 
this belief more clear some years later in publishing The Senses Considered 
as Perceptual Systems [30]. What can also be examined due even to this 
early article is the possible existence of some underlying thought or brain 
processes which are common to all senses in much the same way that inheri-
tance and abstraction are now widely used in programming. Finally, Gibson 
concluded with the hypothesis that any perceptual experience which falls 
into an 'opposition series' is subject to adaptation with negative after-effect. 
2.10 Gibson & Crooks (1938) 
A theoretical field analysis of automobile driving [31] 
In 1938 Gibson and Crooks chose to take a practical every day experience 
and analyze it from a theoretical perspective. This article, they footnoted, 
is the result of discussions between a psychologist and a practical student of 
driving. Gibson explains his motivation in writing this paper by reminding 
the reader that driving an automobile is the most important skill demanded 
of us in that mistakes could result in the greatest risk of injury or death. 
This paper was an attempt to write a systematic description of a set of 
concepts needed to drive. The authors attempted first to base his analysis 
on present-day psychology-habits, attitudes, and response-sequence-but had 
little success. The task of driving was instead taken to be predominantly 
perceptual, and the overt reactions involved in it were relatively simple and 
easily learned. Their analysis then had to be performed on a perceptual 
level with suitable concepts "like the 'field' of the driver, 'valences', and the 
general cross-sectional method employed by Lewin (1936)" [31]. 
The authors took driving as a type of locomotion guided by vision, which 
utilizes a tool, unlike walking. The goal state would be presence at the 
destination. The sub-goals are then the perception and avoidance of all 
encountered obstacles, and the prevention of any collision which might stop 
locomotion or produce bodily injury. The visual field is essentially what the 
driver sees during locomotion. What is special about the field is its selective 
nature under which pertinent elements stand out, and non-pertinent elements 
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recede into the background. The most pertinent objects are obviously those 
which could potentially cause a collision, and the least pertinent are distant 
objects to the far right and left. The authors define the "field of safe travel" 
as an indefinitely bounded field lying inside the edge of the road, which 
consists at any time of the "field of possible paths which the car may take 
unimpeded." The boundaries of the field are determined by objects with a 
negative 'valence' in perception while the field of safe travel has a positive 
'valence', higher along the (usually safer) mid-line. Gibson and Crooks mean 
by valence the emotional response which is created in imagining oneself closer 
to, or in contact with, that area or object. Steering then is hypothesized as 
a "perceptually governed series of reactions by the driver ... to keep the car 
headed into the middle of the field of safe travel." 
Collisions are understood to be prevented by shifting the direction of 
motion, or by ceasing motion altogether. Steering controls the former, so 
the authors turn to the latter. Acceleration was deemed to be a function of 
our motivation to arrive at our destination, and its relative urgency. It is 
only possible to accelerate through a field of safe travel. Deceleration on the 
other hand, occurs when the field of safe travel contracts, and like steering 
is primarily an avoidance reaction to obstacles. Another relevant principle 
introduced is the minimum stopping zone which is phenomenally the area 
within which the driver can stop if necessary. The authors note that it may 
not be consistent with reality as it depends on the perceiver, but does depend 
on things like the road surface, and the quality of the brakes, etc. Driving 
was said to feel 'dangerous' when the minimum stoping zone nears the size of 
the field of view. The driver's principle awareness of how fast he is going is 
not measured in miles per hour, but instead related to the minimum stopping 
zone. 
The authors also predict a habitual ratio (for each driver) of depth-of-field 
to depth-of-zone which tends to be maintained in given traffic conditions. It 
may be seen as an index of cautiousness, and may decrease if the driver is 
in a hurry. Accidents may occur if a driver is inattentive to the forward 
field of view, causing the perceived field of safe travel to become incorrectly 
bounded. If a sudden change is made to the field of safe travel (e.g. a couch 
falls off the truck ahead), an entirely new field may open up which did not 
exist an instant earlier. Obstacles such as the shoulder, a curb, or a ditch 
may shift from a negative valence to the only positive valence in the field. 
The authors list factors which limit the field of safe travel. Natural bound-
aries consist of fixed obstacles, amount of light, weather such as fog or snow, 
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or the horizon at the top of a hill. Inflexibility to manoeuver at higher speeds 
prevents acceleration past the point where following a turn in the road would 
be safe. Moving obstacles radiate negative valence from the point where the 
driver estimates that the obstacle will be closest to him, i.e. the potential 
collision point. If the obstacle is moving toward the driver, it will be closer 
than its current location, if it is moving away, it will be farther. Potential 
obstacles are areas where the driver is effectively blind. Areas behind which 
the driver cannot see engage a negative valence due to the uncertainty of 
what is in that location, and the potential for things in that blind spot to 
move into the safe field of travel. This recognition and personal valence de-
pends on the individuals experience as an amateur driver may not recognize 
the danger behind a corner, and a collision may ensue. Legal obstacles and 
taboos modify possible fields of safe travel by restricting the size by means 
of a speed limit. Though no danger necessarily occurs here, the driver may 
encode a negative valence with a certain speed due to the fear of prosecution. 
Gibson and Crooks had a prediction for the cause of a major driving 
statistic. One in twenty people died in the span of one year at the time of 
writing. Their analysis suggested the principle cause was that the drivers 
did not know how to drive properly. The discussion of the problem with 
the public unfortunately began with what not to do, and recognition of ab-
normal driving, rather than what drivers ought to do, and how to drive 
normally. Concepts must be taught which refer to operations the driver can 
understand, and instead of memorizing legal obligations, students of driving 
should be taught a systematic theory of driving, verifiable by observation 
and experimentation. The theory in this paper was described as an effort in 
this direction. 
This article seemed to be the first glimmer of a much larger theory still 
to come. In reviewing the task of driving an automobile, Gibson kept his 
perceptual theories in mind. Jones [42] suggested that this is the earliest 
writing which contains clear precursors to the affordance concept. This can 
be see in the constant references to the safe field of travel, which by affordance 
terms would make that area traverse-able (by car). As well any obstacles 
would afford danger, and a free path, affords safety. Though Gibson did 
not know it yet, this would be another link in his sequence of many very 
influential papers in the field of perceptual psychology. 
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2.11 Gibson (1950) 
Perception of Visual Surfaces [23] 
In 1950 Gibson published his first book. He titled the book, The Percep-
tion of the Visual World; quite telling of the earlier stages of his career in 
which his experiments tested the visual perception of subjects. Though he 
had already predicted that similar processes are involved in some aspect of all 
of the human senses, he would leave the other four senses for his next book. 
The present book was written about how we see. Many contributing factors 
to our accurate perception of reality are indexed and analyzed in this book, 
with the hope of developing a comprehensive theory of visual perception. 
Though it may fall short of this ultimate goal and does not bluntly describe 
how visual perception occurs, it does quite nicely evaluate and explain the 
impact each effect has on what we might perceive. 
Sight is both a vastly important, and quite complex process which most 
people fail to realize as such. Gibson wondered, "How can vision depend on 
the pictures in the eyes and yet produce a scene which extends to the hori-
zon?" He examined how the world can be projected from three dimensions, 
down to two inside the eye, and yet restored again in perception, and em-
phasized that the problem he is writing about is perception, not sensation. 
In describing fundamental properties of the visual world such as it being up-
right, stable, without boundaries, coloured, shadowed illuminated textured 
etc., he states most importantly is that it is filled with things which have 
meaning. He predicted that explaining these properties of the visual world 
would go quite far in explaining the whole panorama of visual experience. If 
the reader is familiar with the theory of affordances Gibson produced over 
20 years after publishing this book, he may identify early components of 
the theory here in the mention of the visual world being filled with things 
containing meaning. 
Early in the book, Gibson put forth initial hypotheses of a "Ground The-
ory" of space perception with the intension of explaining them in later chap-
ters. The first was that, "The elementary impressions of a visual world are 
those of surface and edge" , which was intuitive in its explanation. The second 
was that, "There is always some variable in stimulation (however difficult it 
may be to discover and isolate) which corresponds to a property of the spatial 
world." It essentially states that any perceived quality including distance, 
depth, edge, contour has some stimulus though it may not be easily dis-
covered or isolated. The third principle stated that, "The stimulus-variable 
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within the retinal image to which a property of visual space corresponds need 
be only a correlate of that property, not a copy of it." Some qualities such 
as solidity and depth do not have any replica in the two-dimensional retinal 
image, but may have qualities which are correlated to them through a well 
defined mathematical transformation. The fourth hypothesis (declared as 
most debatable) predicted that, "The inhomogeneities of the retinal image 
can be analysed by the methods of number theory and modern geometry into 
a set of variables analogous to the variables of the physical energy." Simply 
put, the order or pattern of the retinal image or successive images can be 
considered as a stimulus. Fifth and last was the hypothesis that, "The prob-
lem of how we perceive the visual world can be divided into two problems 
and considered separately, first, the perception of the substantial or spatial 
world and, second, the perception of the world of useful and significant things 
to which we ordinarily attend." The spatial world is a background for the 
perception of significant things or things with meaning. Gibson explained 
that the world of these significant things is too complex, so our attention to 
it is selective. He also admitted that this book is primarily concerned with 
the literal kind of perception for the spatial world, and an examination of 
the schematic type, or the 'meaning' would be secondary. 
The second chapter focused on past theories of perception and predicted 
that only through perception are abstract sensations such as colours, sounds, 
touches etc., combined to form an experience. That is, perception yields 
meaningful 'things' from sensations alone and is subjective to the observer. 
Gibson reviewed the empiricist and nativist histories in explaining how the-
ories of perception have evolved. He also discussed the origins of Gestalt 
theory, which objected to sensations being cues for perception, and instead 
predicted that the brain or cerebral cortex was responsible for organizing 
sensations into forms. If everything we are aware of is brought about by 
stimulation of sense organs, and some things have no counterparts in stimu-
lation, they must then be somehow synthesized. Nativism took the synthe-
sis as innate, Empiricism explained it as learned from past experience, and 
Gestalt theory suggested it was produced by the whole central nervous sys-
tem. Gibson explained that the question was not how a percept is organized, 
but on why a percept is always organized like the particular entity the eye 
happens to be pointing at. 
The next chapter was designated to something Gibson had been studying 
particular anomalies of, the visual field. Less familiar than the visual world, 
it is only perceived directly when a great deal of effort is taken to fixate 
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our eyes, and then pay attention to the whole range of what is visible. It is 
characteristically clear, sharp, and fully defined at the center, but becomes 
progressively vaguer away from the fovea. According to Gibson, it is in some 
respects, like a picture, and it is an introspective, analytic phenomenon, the 
experience on which the doctrine of visual sensations is based. It is bounded 
by the limitations of our eyes to perceive that which is not directly focused 
on, but instead perceived peripherally. It is what would inadvertently be 
inspected if one was to attempt to examine the visual world, which unlike 
the visual field, wraps around us 3600 , has no boundaries, and is always clear 
and fully detailed. 
James Gibson had studied the visual field in quite a few articles prior to 
the publication of this book. He explained many of the effects he discovered 
through his studies, including the location, size, and distance, of after-images 
in the visual field, and the apparent convergence of parallel lines at the 
horizon line. A distinction he made is that, in the visual field some areas 
eclipse other ones, yet in in the visual world one object lies in front of another. 
It is a matter of semantics to some, but an important distinction to Gibson. 
The visual field was stated as a "reasonably close correlate of the retinal 
image" (p 43), and fittingly the next chapter was written about the formation 
of retinal images. 
Understanding visual perception starts with physical objects, light, and 
the eye. Essentially the laws of optics. Solids and liquids in our environments 
have surfaces against the gases, and these surfaces reflect any available light, 
which may invariable reach the cornea of the eye, refract to pass through 
the pupil, and fall on the retina. Of the infinite rays of light projected 
to this optical image, the most significant according to Gibson, were those 
originating from the edges of physical surfaces. He outlined the physical 
interior to the eye including the rods, cones, and the strong connection of 
the optic nerves to the occipital lobe, but much about the chemical reactions 
in the eye and brain was not known, and these facts did not seem to lead to 
any useful theories of perception. The retinal image, a correlate of external 
objects, however was worth analysis. In it, borders between colours form 
lines or contours, and areas of colour have visual textures, their culmination 
may be called the distribution or pattern of light rays. The pattern which 
reaches the eye may be defined by either a static arrangement of rays, or by 
the adjacent order of rays. Essentially, each point may either be perceived 
as a unit as a member of an arrangement, or as relative to the other points 
currently, or previously perceived. Tying this back, Gibson declared the 
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visual field's correspondence to the anatomical pattern of excitation. The 
visual world however, corresponds to successive patterns, overlapping each 
other as the eye moves, united perhaps by a sort of immediate memory. 
The retinal image (or visual field) invariably contains some indication of 
the orientation of the horizon. The ground or water outside, or perhaps the 
floor below indoors, provide a reference to the horizontal direction, regardless 
of the orientation of the perceiver. This is one pattern that we universally 
perceive, though Gibson explained that the retina responds "to a differential 
intensity in adjacent order over the retina" ([23], p 64). That is, we perceive 
what we perceive based on the pattern of changes between each successive 
retinal image. The visual quality of texture, he predicts, is elicited by a 
cyclical change in the order of light intensities. Physical surfaces such as 
wood, cloth, or earth have regular structures specific to them which form 
specific patterns on the retinal image, and thus stimulate a texture specific 
to that surface. 
Gibson continued to examine the connection between the objects in the 
visual world, and the retinal image by looking at things such as the gradient 
of texture on the eye when stimulated by a surface parallel to the line of 
sight. In this case textures run from coarse to fine as distance increases. The 
gradient is constant however when perceiving images perpendicular to the 
line of sight. These may be clues to explain exactly how perception works. 
Gibson wrote that the impression of distance in a picture for example, is 
immediate (i.e. it has a definable stimulus) caused by the gradation 'of texture 
elements, while the interpretation of the picture follows as our minds process 
what we are perceiving. The concept of gradient, defined as an increase or 
decrease of something along a given axis of dimension, was quite important 
to Gibson as it appeared to be "admirably adapted for describing the retinal 
image, since both gradients and steps of stimulation can be found within 
it." (p73) Gibson cited an author who found evidence that all living tissue 
is characterized by physiological gradients of metabolism, excitability, and 
growth. Therefore it was not unnatural to consider the proposal that light-
sensitive cells of the retina, and neural tissue in the brain react to gradients 
of stimulation. 
In a quest to identify stimulus variables for visual depth and distance, 
Gibson made two assumptions about the typical physical world. Easy to 
believe, he began that objects tend to be in contact with the ground. The 
second assumption was that objects tend to be distributed evenly over the 
ground. Essentially there is an average number of blades of grass in square 
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centimeter, or trees in a square kilometer of forest which nature does not usu-
ally stray too far from. Gibson postulated a connection between this idea, 
and the knowledge that our eyes can only perceive structures of certain sizes. 
This idea can also be seen in later books where he expresses that the level of 
focus for an organism will be on the scale of the organism under considera-
tion, i.e. no astronomical or microscopic events for macroscopic organisms. 
By first isolating the motion, and only considering a motionless observer with 
fixed eyes, Gibson looked to investigate cues for distance perception, among 
them the density of natural objects compared to the observer's distance from 
the objects. Ordinary surfaces are rarely both physically smooth and chemi-
cally homogeneous, meaning most (unlike glass) will have crests and troughs 
and so with sufficient light may be seen. It must also be noted that a transi-
tion must be possible from objects to textures in the same way that a forest 
is perceived to consist of trees from nearby, but will be perceived as a surface 
from a distance or altitude. Based on an analysis of several basic pictures 
consisting of distributions of simple figures such as circles or lines, on a plane 
(parallel to the line of sight) beginning very close to the perceiver and end-
ing with dots on a supposed horizon, Gibson concluded that a gradient of 
texture is, in isolation, a stimulus for the impression of continuous distance 
on a surface. Though not usually perceived in isolation, this may still con-
tribute to how we perceive depth. He continued this discussion, adding that 
the gradient of density (correlated to gradient of texture) is what yields the 
sense of a continuous third dimension. 
Other perceptual instances were examined such as how images contain-
ing only contour lines, may bring about the perception of a corner (such 
as a valley or hill) or alternatively an edge (such as a step up or down). 
With an edge, the contour lines of the image jump, whereas with a corner 
they bend. Shading which yields the perception of depth, edges, or curved 
surfaces provides other subtle conclusions, and the reversal or inversion of 
images was addressed as well. The direction of the source of light, as well 
as knowledge of an object's concavity or convexity are additional possible 
cues in perception. The remainder of this chapter as well as a majority of 
the next was spent exploring different gradients on the retinal image such 
as those on illumination, convex or concavities in the surface of objects, and 
contours separating objects from their backgrounds, in the hope of deriving 
explanations or rules for cues to perception. While the writer very precisely 
identifies the way in which we perceive, the writing does not seem to elu-
cidate a mathematical formula for perception, but does confesses that the 
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descriptions needed mathematical analysis. While the stereoscopic effect of 
binocular vision was commonly believed to be the only important basis for 
depth perception, Gibson points out the success of one-eyed fliers, and that 
animals without overlapping binocular fields (e.g. rabbits, rats, etc.) seem to 
discriminate depth by their behaviour. The theory of retinal gradients Gibson 
discusses in this book, implies the gradient of disparity between overlapping 
binocular fields is only one of several cues to visual depth. 
With regard to visual perception, even a fixed headed observer provided 
many cases to discuss. Expanding the situation under review to include 
motion of the head and body, likewise expanded the discussion on rules gov-
erning visual perception. The retinal image, Gibson explained is not like the 
film in a camera in the sense that motion spoils the picture. Motion for the 
retinal image enriches the information by registering changes in successive 
images. Motion from head movements, unlike motion from eye movements, 
according to Gibson, is indeed a stimulus for the perception of space, and a 
precise sensory correlate of locomotor behaviour. During a continuous mo-
tion towards the horizon, objects on the ground or below the horizon move 
past the observer, while objects above the horizon remain fixed in place. The 
speed of the objects seeming to move through the retinal image, corresponds 
to a gradient of velocity which decreases proportional to in increase in dis-
tance from the observer. This gradient of velocity as well as that of direction 
were then shown as stimulus correlates for perceived space and perceived 
locomotion. Pursuit and saccadic eye movements were examined each pro-
viding its own conclusions pertaining to its impact on visual perception. It 
was then followed by analysis of the focus of expansion when it lies on a 
surface (indicating impending collision) as opposed to the horizon (where it 
indicates the direction of travel). 
The investigation of motion and its impact on visual perception was at 
the time fueled by research on aviation psychology during World War II. 
Gibson studied perception, pertaining to flying an airplane, for several years 
(1943-1946) employed by the military, and it was that experience that he 
admittedly relied upon while writing this portion of the book ([23]'p.129). 
One important idea Gibson explained was that complex discriminations of 
the direction, altitude, and angle of flight for a pilot are learned, but the 
stimuli for these discriminations are likely as innate. The retinal image would 
be the same for notice or expert pilots, but the different would be how they 
react to variations. Experience, he wrote, allows a pilot to make fine, rather 
than gross discriminations of not only the pilot's own position and direction, 
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but of other objects in the retinal image. It seemed that learning to attend to, 
or explore, features of the world was not understood at the time of writing, 
even if it is at all clearer now. A good correlate would be how beginner 
drivers may observe only the closest of obstacles, but with time and practice, 
learn to watch the distant focus of expansion to optimize safety. They do 
not observe more than a novice, but an expert is attentive to finer details. 
The types of retinal motion caused by ordinary motion rather than loco-
motion through an environment, were distinguished next. A rigid motion is 
one of translation, rotation, or a combination of the two, whereas a defor-
mation is an expansion, contraction, or skewing of all, or part of, the retinal 
image. Motion of the whole retinal image for example, is due to fixed head 
position, and saccadic eye movements. Motion of a delimited part of the 
image occurs due to movement of an object in the physical environment at a 
right angle to the line of sight. The surrounding image will appear to move 
during a pursuit movement of the eyes. Deformation of the total image is 
caused by movement of the head relative to the ground, with eyes fixed on 
the horizon. Deformation of a delimited part of the retinal image occurs from 
stationary head and eyes when an object moves in any direction not at right 
angle to the line of sight. Gibson wrote that all these alternatives coexist 
with each other to yield the seamless experience of visual perception. Any 
of them may be considered alone, or summated with others, and lose none 
of the stimulus function. 
Having considered motion in general, Gibson lightly analyzed stimuli for 
acceleration which are mediated best by stimulation from within muscles, 
and stimulation from within the inner ear. The retina is insensitive to accel-
eration. Gibson tried to convince the reader that the perception of a stable 
upright visual world depends on the co-variation of the visual sense with the 
so called body sense. We experience a stable, upright, and unbounded visual 
world, though neither the retinal image nor the visual field have any of these 
qualities. When we read, successive images do not overlay each other, as the 
words would all blend together. Instead, we unknowingly join the successive 
images into a sort of chain, so that we may read an entire sentence rather 
than be limited to the words we can fit into our fovea. The rules governing 
this process can be discussed by dividing the idea that the movement of the 
eye and the movement of the image are reciprocal, into four categories. If the 
eyeball is mechanically rotated to the right, the scene should appear to move 
left because the compensating shift is absent. If the eye actively rotates to 
the right after a clear negative after image is generated in the center of the 
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field of view, the after image should not appear to move, but will appear 
to be displaced because the compensatory shift is present with no retinal 
motion to be canceled. Thirdly, if the eye attempts to rotate to the right 
but does not due to paralyzed eye muscle, the scene should move to the right 
because of the compensatory shift to the right. Last, if the eyeball is mechan-
ically rotated to the right after a negative after-image has been produced, the 
after-image should not appear to move due to any compensatory effect, but 
the scene will be displaced to the left as in the second case. This discussion 
for Gibson, clearly implied that the directional stability of the visual world 
might be a product of activities which are inverse to one another. 
Considering the upright nature of the visual world next, Gibson asked why 
the world does not tilt when the image does. As one might believe gravity was 
ultimately concluded as the main factor in the upright nature of the world 
as it is sensed through both the inner ear, and the bilateral musculature. 
The environment around us (floor, walls, horizon) being reference-axes was 
examined as Koffka believed it explained the upright nature of the world. 
Gibson, however dismissed the idea as we can escape these reference-axes in 
certain specialized conditions, but we have no compensation for gravity. 
The unboundedness of the visual world lead Gibson to ask why it is 
unbounded when the stimuli consist of fragmentary images. Saccadic eye 
movements, and locomotion are two actions humans use to visually explore 
the world around us. Saccadic movements are successive eye movements 
which must each be on some object of attention. Locomotion is a sort of 
continuous transform of the retinal image. Gibson borrowed an analogy 
from film, where saccadic movements correspond to sudden changes in the 
picture, and movement of the head corresponds to a continuous but changing 
image like when a film pans over a scene. Each alternative was considered to 
be primary, but Gibson concluded that they must be combined. The words 
he uses to describe how successive images overlap and how our brain may 
piece together the images, indicate he does not feel comfortable with the 
traditional view. Those who have read Gibson's work from late in his career 
may observe that the problems he encountered here seem to be resolvable 
under the theory of direct perception he advocated later, as the differences 
between successive images my be stimuli we perceive innately. 
Chapter nine focuses on the constancy of sizes and shapes. Even when 
our perceptual angle to, or distance from an object changes, the shape and 
size of the object seem to remain constant. The traditional view that our 
brains' compensate for variations in size or shape based on our memories is 
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refuted by the simple argument that birds surely do not memorize objects, 
yet can discriminate between large and small objects even when the larger is 
so much farther its image is smaller. The question of why sizes and shapes 
remain constant is proposed as a false question, or a result of the belief that 
perceptions begin as patches of colour in the visual field. In trying to account 
for the perception of the material world, we must recognize that objects have 
significance as well as solidity though the latter must be prior. An inconsis-
tency which arose was in considering a protuberance where both sides are 
physically white, if the left side is lighted and the right side shadowed why 
does each side appear to be the same colour. The answer given was that 
possibly the high-to-low step in brightness yields an impression of depth and 
therefore can't yield an impression of difference in colour. Gibson finishes 
this topic of discussion by stating how colour is indeed affected by spatial 
stimulation. "The innate attribute of extensity which color has been sup-
posed to possess turns out to be not the simplest kind of space by merely 
indeterminate space." ([23], p169) 
Due to an experiment Gibson described, which artificially removed ob-
jects from their backgrounds, and tested observers to determine if two dif-
ferent shapes represent the same object, he concluded that memory does not 
playa part in shape constancy. Even new objects to an observer maintain 
shape constancy. The constancy of shape must then, depend on our abil-
ity to perceive in three dimensions. The experiment also concluded however, 
that constancy is often incomplete in that a judgement of the apparent shape 
of an object requires a compromise between objective shape, and projected 
shape onto a picture plane. Gibson differed to an article written by Kofika in 
1935. According to it, any perception of the stimulus object involves shape 
and orientation coupled together. Neither is perceived in isolation thus we 
suppose that perceived orientation combined with apparent shape yields a 
constant shape. 
Next to be discussed were compression of texture manifested by a slanted 
surface, where texture along one dimension of the projected image is com-
pressed as slant is increased; constancy of size in perceived objects, where 
a chart twice the size at twice the distance appears as the same size as the 
original chart; and then how distance is perceived, regarding factors such 
as adjacency, height in a frame, and visual angle. These topics lead to the 
discussion of a quality called scale. Perception of scale is the process by 
which we understand approximately how large an object is through seeing 
it, and comparing it to other objects being perceived. It seemed to Gibson 
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that apparent size and apparent distance are linked because the size of an 
particular object is given by the scale of the background at the point to 
which it is attached. Through an experiment during the war, Gibson also 
claimed that dimensions of solid objects were judged more accurately than 
dimensions between them though both displayed constancy of size. Another 
wartime experiment was provided as evidence that size of an object does not 
in fact become smaller in perception until it reaches a vanishing point, but 
instead can apparently be seen with approximately its true size as long as it 
can be seen at all. The indeterminacy instead is what changes with distance, 
as it seems to increase as objects move father away. 
Chapter ten picked up on the problem of perception of shape without 
depth from chapter six. How abstract geometrical figures such as square 
or circle relate to visual perception was unknown at the time of writing, 
though Gibson did review Euclid's parallel postulate, and how centuries later 
geometers concluded that parallel lines meet at a vanishing point implying 
a location called infinity. This progress lead to the conception of our visual 
field as expanding from one pole and contracting to another 180 degrees away. 
The progression that still needed to be made was in ceasing to think about 
forms as a set of geometrical entities and instead focusing on transitions 
between them (as had been done for colours). Gibson concluded that all 
experiments where a subject drew a visual pattern from memory or from a 
recent observation (he did many such experiments) yield no reason why the 
subject's response is like the original pattern though they do help explain how 
a person learns to discriminate similar patterns or conceptualize objects. 
Meaning is a very broad topic, but based on his question how early ances-
tors on the Asian plains come to 'know' a tiger, Gibson examined what mean-
ing is associated with concrete objects. Six kinds of meaning were described, 
the most important of which was the symbolic meaning carried by anything 
from flags to words to well known symbols. This type of meaning was said 
to mediate knowledge and form the basis for reasoning, creative imagination, 
invention, and discovery. How much behaviour is achieved through learning, 
and how much arises spontaneously through growth, was examined through-
out the rest of this chapter. Four oversimplifications are present under the 
simple theory, "that the visual world is an unlearned experience, that it is 
meaningless when seen for the first time, and that what one learns is to see 
the meanings of things." ([23],p200) 
The first oversimplification, was the assumption that the parts of the vi-
sual world such as color, surface, edge, and interspace, are meaningless. From 
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his experiments asking subjects to memorize randomly generated forms, Gib-
son claimed that even nonsense forms are only relatively meaningless. Ac-
cording to his wife E. Gibson, nonsense forms like all forms must be differ-
entiable from each other to be memorized, and since memorization requires 
forming a unique response to the stimuli, there must be at least some meaning 
present. Tautologically, Gibson wrote that surfaces, edges, and shapes have 
at least the meaning of surfaces, edges, and shapes. The second oversimpli-
fication is the assumption that meaning is detachable from concrete spatial 
qualities, or that things and events can be separated from their meanings 
through introspection. This cannot be wholly true due to the observation 
that never before seen tools seem to look different once their use is under-
stood. The perception has new properties it did not have before which were 
not aroused through retinal stimulation. The conclusion formed was that 
meaning is sometimes detachable, and in fact becomes more detachable from 
spatial qualities the more it approaches high level concepts. 
Thirdly the implication that all meaning be learned and there are no un-
learned meanings was considered an oversimplification as well. Since every-
one develops a slightly different meaning for things because of their differing 
points of view and experiences, we conclude that everyone learns the mean-
ing of the world independently, and slightly differently. To explain exactly 
what is meant by 'meaning' we review the example given of a nesting bird. 
Any object which causes the bird to clean its surface and sit on it has the 
meaning of an egg. In the first nesting season, birds take objects similar to 
eggs and treat them as such. After the birds have had a chance to learn finer 
discriminations, they can tell the difference between egg-shaped objects and 
eggs. In infants there is a stage between about two and six months where 
they fixate and smile at any face-like object that moves. After that point 
they learn to discriminate recognizable faces such as their parents. These 
facts imply that infants do not begin to learn meaning from nothing. We are 
not born with a set of innate meanings but not all meaning is acquired ei-
ther. The last oversimplification of the theory is that when meaning is added 
to objects, it doesn't modify concrete spatial qualities. Duncker showed in 
1939 that a piece of cloth in the shape of a leaf was judged as noticeably 
greener than the same colour cloth in the shape of a donkey. This effect 
called memory-colour, is where experiences impact the colour we perceive. 
The same sort of effect was shown for coins, where poorer children judged 
coins to be larger, or imagined coins were judged as larger than actual coins. 
This evidence seems to indicate that meaning does indeed impact-at least 
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our perception of-the spatial properties of the visual world. 
Toward the end of the book insight was provided into how behaviour is 
mediated by perception, and what place learning has in seeing. Examining 
cases where cataract patients who were blind since birth, and then surgically 
given the gift of sight, it was clear that perception of the visual world was 
quite simple, but differentiating particular objects in a large scene took some 
patients many months, and needed to be learned. Essentially Gibson con-
cluded that we learn to differentiate between percepts, rather than learn to 
perceive them. 
In the last chapter Gibson made a few key introspective observations. 
Things seem to look as though they are 'for' some action. They look as 
though they are capable of being pushed or grasped, or they appear to resist 
these actions. The visual world seems to invite behaviour. This idea would 
prove to be the foundation for his future work. He also noted, based on 
patients who had lost proprioceptor kinesthetic sense (muscle senses) in the 
lower portion of their body, that since vision could in these patients com-
pensate for the loss allowing them to walk, there must be two forms of the 
kinesthetic sense. It is also not hard to see seeds of his future 'direct per-
ception' work when Gibson wrote, "Retinal motion is automatically linked 
to bodily action from birth onward, so long as the eyes are open and there is 
light to see." What Bishop Berkeley understood was that walking over and 
touching something confirms our visual space. What he missed was that the 
expanding visual field confirms muscular-tactile space. Gibson examines last 
the stimulus-correlates for the perception of oneself. Among them are any 
senses we might imagine that make us 'feel' ourselves from our sense of touch, 
to our inner ear, to the deformation of the whole retinal image. Strangely, 
even our ability to orient ourselves to everything from the sun, to a cup of 
tea, emphasize our sense of being. 
In conclusion, Gibson isolated some factors pertaining to perception, but 
armed with the knowledge that he published two more major books, we may 
correctly infer that his full theory of perception was yet to be completed. 
The book as a whole is a comprehensive overview of the different mechanisms 
involved in visual perception at a low level. The rejection of behaviorism in 
favour of his own new ideas how animals sample information from the ambient 
visual world, was ground-breaking, though his future writings would prove 
to be less specific and more abstract. An extension of the first page of his 
last chapter in this book under the heading 'The Motor Theory of Space 
Perception'. We can tell only now that many mathematical constructions 
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had yet to be scholarly published when Gibson wrote his books, and he 
may well have taken to foreign ideas such as rough sets, situation theory, or 
computer simulations. 
2.12 Gibson (1976/1986) 
Ecological Approach to Visual Perception [28] [29] 
Originally published in 1979, the same year James J. Gibson died, The 
Ecological Approach to Visual Perception was the culmination of Gibson's 
entire life's work on visual perception. He reported in the introduction that 
this was a sequel to The Perception of the Visual World though rather dif-
ferent. Cognitivism, instead of behaviorism was the subject of investigation 
in this book. His preface nicely explained the shift in his investigation of 
vision. At first, his goal was to use physics of light, and the retinal image, to 
master the anatomy of physiology of the eye and the brain. It could then, he 
supposed, be put together into a theory of perception which would be em-
pirically testable. The more he learned about physics, optics, anatomy, and 
visual physiology, the more complex the task became. As he explained, opti-
cal scientists knew about light as radiation, but not illumination; anatomists 
knew about the eye as an organ, but not what it can do; physiologists knew 
about nerve cells in the retina, but not how the visual system works. Though 
scientists could create holograms, prescribe glasses, and cure disease, vision 
could not be explained. 
These facts are not at a level appropriate for the study of perception. 
The basis for vision in this work was the ambient optic array rather than the 
retinal image, as it was in his work in 1950. It examined the possibility that 
neither behaviorism nor mentalism provide a sufficient explanation. Gibson 
wrote, "Why must we seek explanation in either Body or Mind? It is a false 
dichotomy." [29] in his preface and he kept that principle throughout the 
book. Another fundamental principle he began with was to "suggest that 
natural vision depends on the eyes in the head on a body supported by the 
ground, the brain being the only central organ of a complete visual system." 
He went on to provide terms for types of vision from aperture vision, looking 
at a piece of a picture like a telescope, to ambient vision, what we are able to 
detect through eye and head movements in our environment, to ambulatory 
vision, achieved from walking and moving about. These types of vision are 
what we need in life to detect our environments, act in them, and survive. We 
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need to see all the way around objects using different points of observation. 
He uses this as a basis to partition the book. The first part is about the 
environment, what there is to be perceived must be clear to discuss perceiving 
it; the second is about the information for perception, ecological optics as he 
called it examines the information in light which stimulates our receptors; 
and the third is about the aCtivity of perception, "not the processing of 
sensory inputs ... but the extracting of invariants from the stimulus flux." A 
fourth part examines pictures and special kinds of awareness, but will not be 
discussed here. Gibson wrote that contents of this book formed a proposal 
of a radically new way of thinking about perception, and this review should 
reflect that. 
Gibson introduced his ecological approach by explaining the role the en-
vironment plays. Animal and environment for an inseparable pair where 
either term implies the other. It is obvious in one direction, but the notion 
that an environment does not exist without an animal to perceive it might 
be controversial, but Gibson only meant 'environment' in the strictest sense 
of the word, and did not mean that the physical world would cease to exist 
without its being perceived. He restricted the word environment to refer to 
the terrestrial scale of a living being, thus ruling out the physical scale of 
atoms and galaxies, and time scale of nanoseconds and eons. The environ-
ment is nested in that objects are within other objects such as cells in leaves 
in trees in canyons in mountains. Basically the environment will be examined 
at the level of ecology, or a level appropriate to what the organism in ques-
tion (typically humans) may perceive. The environment also contains higher 
order modes of perception from things such as speech, writing, microscopes, 
or pictures, but this review will be brief on these accounts as the focus is 
how Gibson came to his theory of affordances. 
Before discussing the propagation of information, he first ensures this 
propagation is possible. For this, we need a medium, and air fills that role 
nicely, as light can openly reverberate until it reaches a sort of steady state. 
Water is a substance in our medium of air, though if we consider aquatic 
species, water becomes a medium. Mediums are thus taken with reference 
to an organism as we shall see becomes a commonality. 
Physical reality is less considered here than what is considered ecological 
reality as the former does not consist of any meanings while the latter does. 
If we perceived entities of physics or mathematics, meanings would have to 
be imposed, but Gibsons suggested that we perceive entities of environmental 
science and thus meanings can be discovered. Objects tend to have meanings 
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related to what we can do with them. Likewise the environment allows us to 
move within it, take cover from it in shelters, drink it in the case of water, or 
use it in any number of refined ways in the case of fire or other tools. Tools, 
Gibson claimed, extended the body, and perceptual psychology has since 
accepted this proposal[45]. The mind it seems can learn to accommodate 
new tools and incorporate them into our mental model of our body as an 
extension. Since a tool can shift from being a part of the environment to 
being a part of the animal, we notice that the boundary between animal and 
environment can shift, suggesting that the absolute duality of objective and 
subjective is false. Considering the afIordances of things allows us to escape 
the philosophical dichotomy. 
The information available for visual perception is carried by ambient light. 
This type of light is a result of illumination as opposed to radiant light which 
causes illumination. Ambient light carries information, while radiant light 
carries energy. Radiant light originates from atoms and terminates at atoms, 
while ambient light depends on an environment of surfaces. Ecological op-
tics is interested in ambient light, or as Gibson wrote, "light that has gone 
astray." The field of ecological optics was founded by Gibson in an article 
with that title in Vision Research in 1961[26]. It borrows from physical, geo-
metrical, and physiological optics, but goes beyond all of them. A distinction 
between luminous and illuminated, that which emits light, and that which 
is lit by light, is made. An interesting discussion involved Gibson giving two 
contradictory assertions, but each can still be considered true in their own 
right. This is one in a pattern of many instances where Gibson found new 
ways to examine problems that were previously thought to have no solution, 
or an obvious solution. Either we never see light, or we only see light (or 
neither) but both cannot be true. Yet if we consider that we cannot detect 
the light itself, only what it is that the light illuminates, we may accept that 
we never see light. And contradicting this is the idea that we need light to 
illuminate something or we cannot see anything, thus giving weight to the 
idea that we only see light as it carries the information. This debate was not 
in fact resolved, but is interesting nonetheless. The information available 
for perception is said to be carried to an organism only through a flowing 
array of (structured) stimuli, and not through a single stimulus. As well, the 
retinal image registers pattern and change from and in ambient light, rather 
than analyzing a sort of still picture. 
Gibson discussed the ambient optic array, but first found it necessary 
to explain his definition of this. The ambient portion being explained al-
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ready, and optic being quite clear, Gibson noted that an array is implicitly 
somehow arranged, and contains structure. Components of the array can be 
described in terms of visual solid angles, which Gibson reported had been 
clear since Euclid. The components change when the point of observation 
changes, unlike the physical objects themselves which persist. Natural per-
spective according to Gibson, had failed to consider motion of the point of 
perspective, and this shortcoming was quite a large one. The optic array 
changes due to locomotion, but maintains non-changing things as a result of 
the rigid world. Perspective structure changes through displacement of the 
observation point. Invariant structure is also obtained through displacement 
of the observation point, but occurs indirectly by observing the underlying 
consistencies. The invariance in the structure of the ambient optic array does 
not exist except in relation to the variants. The sources of invariants are the 
layout and reflectances of the surfaces in the environment. The sources of 
variant optical structure are moving points of observation and moving sources 
of illumination. Gibson next examined events, and the information specifying 
them. 
Ecological events as we are concerned with them were given by motions 
at the level of surfaces and substances in a medium. Gibson broke events 
down into three categories, changes in the layout of surfaces caused by forces, 
changes in colour or texture caused by changes in composition, and changes 
in existence caused by a change in the state of a substance. The first type, 
mechanical events, covers transforms, what Gibson called rearrangement of 
the furniture of the earth, such as a rolling ball, a walking animal, or the 
breaking of a glass. The second type covers chemical events, where the 
composition of a surface of a substance is altered, such as rust, erosion, 
or even animals changing their colour to indicate their readiness to mate. 
The third type destruction or creation of surfaces, occurs due to changes in 
the state of matter, such as evaporation, destruction, or biolog>ical growth. 
Gibson stated that these events are perceived, but time is not. Time consists 
of events filling it, but does not exist a priori. With respect to affordances, 
some events have them, while other specify a change in them. The actual 
specification of an event, though quite general, is defined as a disturbance 
in the invariant structure of the optic array. It is these disturbances which 
carry the information about events in the environment. 
Self-perception, Gibson wrote, is unique to each individual. It is easy to 
believe that each person gets different information about his/her body. Not 
only visual information is available, because we hear our actions, feel our skin 
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touching objects or the ground, and smell odors around or near us. Visual 
Kinesthesis is the term Gibson gave to the pickup of information due to any 
of the three types of movement; head movement relative to the body, limb 
movement relative to the body, or locomotion of the body relative to the 
environment. What is more interesting is Gibson's claim that information 
specifying the self and the environment are inseparable, or that "the suppos-
edly separate realms of subjective and objective are actually only poles of 
attention." (p116) 
The theory of affordances examined how to go from an environment of 
surfaces to affordances. It will be useful to rewrite one of the most famous 
of Gibson's quotes. 
The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, 
what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill. The verb to 
afford is found in the dictionary, but the noun affordance, is not. 
I have made it up. I mean by it something that refers to both 
the environment and the animal in a way no existing term does. 
It implies the complementarity of the animal and environment. 
Affordances, he went on to write, must be taken relative to an animal, un-
like physical properties. If a surface has physical qualities of fiat, horizontal, 
extended, and rigid that can be discriminated, it will look support-able or 
stand-on-able. If it does look this way, the affordances are visually perceived. 
A note of clarification which Gibson was particular about, was that to per-
ceive an affordance is not to classify an object. We perceive affordances, not 
qualities and we can enact affordances of objects without classifying them. 
Gibson suggested that a set of affordances constitutes a niche. A niche refers 
to how an animal lives rather than where it lives. A niche implies a kind of 
animal, and an animal implies a kind of niche, in a sort of complementarity 
of the two terms. This complementarity is even more striking with respect 
to affordances and individuals. " ... an affordance is neither an objective prop-
erty nor a subjective property; or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts 
across the dichotomy of subjective-objective and helps us to understand its 
inadequacy. It is equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behaviour. 
It is both physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both 
ways, to the environment and to the observer." (p.129) 
Affordances can be simple such as the earth affording support, or much 
more complex. For example, the behaviour of other people affords our be-
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haviour. Places have affordances such as hiding, finding food, or being dan-
gerous. It can be seen that affordances are not only positive. Fire affords 
warming, but also burning. Affordances, Gibson wrote, are invariant combi-
nations of variables and are always there to be perceived. They are specified 
by stimulus information, and are directly perceived. Perceiving an affor-
dance is a process of perceiving a value-rich ecological object. Affordances 
may also be misperceived. A transparent glass door may appear to afford 
travers ability through it, but attempting to engage this affordance will result 
in collision. We thus learn to see the affordances of our environment through 
experience, and learn to adapt to the misinformation of affordances. 
The third part of Gibson's book was devoted to visual perception, or 
more specifically, experimental evidence to support direct perception. Gib-
son argued against the idea that the perception of the environment was based 
on retinal pictures, neural pictures, or mental pictures. "Direct perception," 
he wrote, "is the activity of getting information from the ambient array of 
light." (p.147) The discussion was broken into the perception of three things: 
surface layout, changing surface layout, movements of oneself. The percep-
tion of surface layout was an update to his ground theory from his 1950 book. 
He wrote that he would rename ground theory, the theory of the layout of 
surfaces asserting that perception of surface layout is direct. He did not be-
lieve that perception began from two dimensional form perception and the 
idea that the third dimension was at all 'lost' was taken as ill conceived as 
it was never really in the environment. Old experiments had never allowed 
for the perception of invariants over time. Gibson argued that the eye picks 
up a sequential transform, not forms. 
Gibson used experiments to provide evidence of his theory of direct per-
ception. Some such as the visual cliff, or the optical tunnel emphasized the 
way animals pick up information (and affordances) about their environment 
directly, but did not empirically prove that the perception is direct. One 
interesting example was where subjects were asked to judge the size of a 
wooden stake nearest to a base line of stakes with different heights. Though 
it had previously been supposed that since objects cease to be visible at some 
distance, that was done by way of becoming smaller, Gibson's experiment 
shown conclusively that the size did not decrease. The judgements became 
more variable, but the mean size was still accurate. Gibson took this to be 
because of invariant ratios for example the ratio of the size of the stick to 
the number of texture elements it occluded, or the proportion of the amount 
of stake above the horizon to the amount below. An invariant law of equal 
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texture for equal amounts of terrain was given, showing for Gibson that size 
and distance were perceived directly, as well as the only invariant of ecologi-
cal optics, the horizon. The horizon is a frame of reference against which all 
other optical motion is judged. 
An argument against direct perception is one where a motionless observer 
peers through a window and what is seen could be any of several forms. The 
simple counterargument Gibson provided was that this argument fails to 
consider that observers in general may move about and thus identify which 
of the several forms is being perceived. What specifies an object for Gibson, 
are invariants which are themselves 'formless.' 
Invariants in motion were used as evidence that the perception of a chang-
ing layout is direct. The perception of environmental events seemed to de-
pend on a disturbance in the structure of the ambient optic array. Gibson 
cited experiments by Gunnar Johansson in which light circles are moved on 
a screen in a periodic fashion[39]. It seemed that if circles separated by any 
amount, shared the same periodic movement, observers judged them to be 
part of a rigid structure moving as a whole, yet if the movement ceased, 
the connection was lost. Gestalt theory indicated that we must organize the 
environment in our heads or we would perceive separate individual circles of 
light. Gibson argued instead that the circles were already organized by their 
motion, and we perceived the association between similarly moving circles 
directly. The first experiments to suggest direct perception for Gibson were 
ones in which both humans and animals, (one at a time) were placed close 
to a large screen, and a dot was enlarged from a point, to the size of the 
screen, prompting flinching actions by observers as they reacted instinctively 
to the threat of collision. Results of an experiment on the perception of slant, 
implied a certain change of form could yield a constant form with a change 
in slant, which Gibson pressed into the idea that objects are specified by 
invariants under transformation. 
Gibson relayed what was for him an important experiment performed by 
Johansson in 1964 where circles of light were again moved about[40]. The 
circles first were organized to project the appearance of a square, and when 
it was moved about, or resized maintaining width to height ratios the trans-
forms were rigid. But when he attempted to demonstrate elastic transforms 
by varying the width and height out of phase from each other, instead of a 
changing form, observers noted a sort of three dimensional transform where 
the form was rotating about three different axes. This stunned scientists, 
and helped Gibson to develop his theory of direct perception. Not only the 
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environment is directly perceived, but also the movements of our own bodies 
relative to the environment, and relative to our head. Gibson suggested that 
vision is kinesthetic in that it registers movements of our body in cooperation 
with our other senses. 
Occlusion was a term introduced by Gibson and co-authors in 1969, de-
scribing the process by which one object is hidden behind another[34]. The 
place where the object being hidden, disappears is called an occluding edge. 
Occluding edges and surfaces are a result of perceiving the world under a 
natural perspective. A more accurate depiction of our perception of our en-
vironment results from imagining many perspective points along a path of 
observation. Though Gibson writes that it sounds strange to say that one 
could perceive an environment at no fixed point of observation, it must be 
true if we admit that one can perceive surroundings during locomotion. 
The theory of reversible occlusion was presented as a better explanation to 
how animals find their way, than the theory of response chains or the theory 
of cognitive maps. Essentially to find their way, animals need to determine 
which area to point their focus of expansion at, or which occluding edge hides 
the target. Experimental support came from an experiment where successive 
screens had progressive accretion or deletion of texture or structure from one 
side. Observers unanimously perceived a 'going behind' motion from the 
deletion of structure, and a 'coming from behind' motion from the accretion 
of texture. Only time it seemed, can yield certain impressions. 
Looking around by way of turning ones head was described as having 
the visual field sweep across the array. As we moved the visual field by 
moving our eyes, some things go out of sight, but we are still aware of them. 
They persist. What we pick up in perception according to Gibson, is the 
invariant (persistent) structure of the visual world. This is given as possible 
because what is now hidden to the visual field, what we perceived moments 
ago, is continuous, or connected to the unhidden environment we perceive 
now. Gibson also took it upon himself to explain the functions of the visual 
system such as blinking, in terms of ecological optics. The function of the 
retina, for example, was to register invariants of structure rather than points 
of an image, the saccadic eye movements are exploring what information is 
available for pickup, and the adjustment of the pupil is done to optimize the 
pickup of information. 
The last subject reviewed here is on the theory of information pickup 
and its consequences. Gibson wished to convey to other psychologists the 
fallacy in working with only laboratory experiments which universally fail to 
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account for the perceiver's awareness of being in the world. The new theory 
of information pickup sought to convey several new ideas. First, a new no-
tion of perception, where perceiving is a continuous psychosomatic act not 
performed by the mind or the body, but by a living observer. Second a new 
assumption about what there is to be perceived, namely surfaces and oc-
cluding edges together with the afIordances of the environment, rather than 
colours, points, and forms. Third, a new concept of information for percep-
tion, referring to the specification of the observer's environment. Information 
for perception cannot be defined or measured in terms of bits, and it is not 
conserved like matter or energy. Fourth, a new assumption of perceptual sys-
tems with overlapping functions, explained that a perceptual system includes 
all the senses with actions that make use of them. Essentially a perceptual 
system does not involve solely the eyeball, but the eyes-in-the-head-on-the-
body-resting-on-the-ground as a whole system. The fifth and last idea was 
how optical information pickup entails the concurrent registering of both per-
sistence and change in the flow of structured stimulation. Everything in the 
world, Gibson said, both persists and changes to varying degrees. It is the job 
of the perceiver to separate change from nonchange by extracting invariants 
of structure from the flux of stimulation, while still perceiving the flux. The 
new theory, contrary to stimulus-sequence theory, which assumes the only 
way to apprehend persistence is by comparison and subsequent judgement, 
states that the perceptual system is directly able to perceive the persistence 
by recognizing the transforms (or lack thereof) which have taken place. 
The last section in Gibson's book was devoted to depiction, detailing the 
perception of pictures, movies, and optical illusions, but we leave it to the 
reader to investigate as our primary focus was on afIordances, and our direct 
perception of them. 
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Chapter 3 
Background of Affordance 
Formalizations 
After studying the human perceptual systems for so many years, Gibson 
put forth a new idea: Affordances. Affordances he explains, refer to the 
part of the environment which in relation to an agent (or animal), specify a 
possibility for any agent (or animal) of that type to act. The notion is best 
explained by this famous excerpt from his final work The Ecological Approach 
to Visual Perception: 
The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, 
what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill. The verb 
to afford is found in the dictionary, but the noun affordance is 
not. I have made it up. I mean by it something that refers to 
both the environment and the animal in a way that no existing 
term does. It implies the complementarity of the animal and the 
environment [29J. 
The quotation clearly indicates that an affordance cannot be specified 
without reference to a possible agent which can possibly initiate an action. 
If the animal and environment complement each other to specify affordances, 
we can assume both must be referenced in any formal definition. The idea 
of an affordance itself was officially published in 1977[27J. 
3.1 Turvey (1992) 
Affordances and Prospective Control [56J 
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In 1992, Michael Turvey considered Gibson's affordance concept in the 
context of an animal's Prospective Control. PC, as Turvey writes it, is a way 
of viewing the control of any non-deterministic choice. An animal, is con-
stantly selecting from a seemingly infinite list of possible actions. No animal 
can continue to exist without taking some form of action; with inaction, or 
waiting, considered types of action. Put another way, time persists whether 
we make a decisive choice or no choice at all. The method of selection from 
this list of possible actions, is what scholars in many fields have been studying 
for a very long time. Turvey explains that "conducting an act requires that 
one perceive whether the act as a whole is possible, what subacts are possible 
with respect to the surface layout, and the possible consequences of current 
subacts if current (kinetic, kinematic) conditions persist" ([56], p.174). This 
seems to be somewhat straightforward, because obviously to act, one must 
perceive that act being possible, but the actual process of deriving the pos-
sibility for action must be articulated, and defined with no ambiguity, so 
that one day it might be possible to simulate an animal in its entirety. As 
Turvey mentions in his abstract, " ... research in the ecological approach to 
prospective control is ultimately the search for objective laws," and the same 
I'm sure, can be said of research into the formalism of affordances [56]. 
His aim was to formulate the ontological basis for scientific research into 
the affordance concept, yet he dwelled on metaphysical discussions in his 
article. He decided to examine the reasoning that affordances are real prop-
erties of the environment relative to the animal. He presented the ontological 
position of the ecological approach as follows: 
3.1 There are only propertied things; neither properties nor indi-
vidual things are real independently of each other. 
This lead to several metaphysical points in support of affordances being an 
ontological rather than epistemological category. The metaphysical points 
did unfortunately lead him to his belief that affordances are real parts of 
the environment to be perceived. That premise caused him to present the 
following formal theory of affordances, which while certainly useful as a first 
attempt to be improved upon, would receive criticism for years to come . 
• Let Wpq (a system) = j(Xp, Zq) be composed of Z (person) and X 
(stairs). Let p be a property of X and q be a property of Z. p is said to 
be an affordance of X, and q is the effectivity of Z (i.e. the complement 
of p) if and only if there exists some property r such that 
43 
1. Wpq = j(Xp, Zq) possesses r 
2. Wpq = j(Xp, Zq) possesses neither p nor q 
3. Neither Z nor X possesses r 
The first thing to notice with this definition is that the affordance, as 
denoted by p, is a property of the stairs Z. Gibson himself, states in several 
ways that affordances are not a part of an animal or an environment, but 
rather a method of referring to the complementarity, duality, or polarity of 
the two. Turvey did adhere to the complementarity issue, however in using 
q as the complement of the affordance p, he explicitly placed affordances in 
the realm of the environment. If as Turvey claimed, the affordance rests 
in the environment there would have to be a complementary entity. The 
word effectivity is used to refer to this entity in the same way as Shaw et al. 
(1982) when they introduced the term. Another observation easily made is 
the lack of specification of the function j. Two sections before introducing the 
definition of affordance, Turvey comments on the actualizing of a disposition, 
or the engagement of an affordance. 
7.3 What exhibits an actual or manifest property is the unit 
formed by Z and its complement X. Thing Z with disposition q 
joins thing X with disposition p to form thing Wpq = j(Xp, Zq) 
with manifest property r (j is the joining or juxtaposition func-
tion) 
Though there are missing links to Turvey's formalism, it was a bold attempt 
to bring some formality to the area of affordances, and it triggered many 
responses which have in turn, contributed to work in the idea. 
3.2 Greeno (1994) 
Gibson's Affordances [36] 
James G. Greeno wrote a review of Gibson's Affordances, and the the-
ory's progression, but he did not contribute to the formalism itself. In the 
article he surveys Gibson's work in the field of ecological psychology, begin-
ning in 1954 with "The visual perception of objective motion and subjective 
movement', and concluding with Gibson's final and most well known book. 
Greeno did not argue with, but rather supported the idea that the affordance 
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concept refers to the conditions in the environment which allow an animal to 
both perceive an action as possible, and consequently carry out that action. 
He carries forward the notion that the opposite or 'dual' in some sense of 
an affordance is an 'effectivity', 'ability', or 'aptitude' depending on whose 
notation should be accepted. One paragraph worth noting refers to an ar-
ticle by Neisser [46] in which two kinds of perceptual processes are argued 
for. Direct perception as proposed by Gibson, which provides information for 
dynamic interaction with the environment, and recognition which provides 
information for identifying and classifying objects and events. The idea was 
not investigated, but the thought that Gibson's theory of affordances might 
only apply to occasions when an agent is learning a new action or movement, 
might have merit. 
Each of the empirical studies performed in the development of affordances 
asks participants to perceive some new opportunity for action. These re-
sults could be useful in articulating how exactly an agent acquires a new 
affordance, but the downside to this possibility is that recognition would un-
doubtedly happen more quickly than affordance acquisition, increasing the 
difficulty in measuring it experimentally, as well as leaving us with no exper-
imental data pertaining to recognition. Greeno did not see anything unrea-
sonable with using mental symbols in half of Neisser's proposal. He suggested 
that mental symbols are products of the perceptual process of recognition. 
As well, he claimed that during recognition new mental symbols are created. 
A theoretical understanding of these symbols could provide humans with a 
basis for understanding conceptual entities, such as numbers or the even the 
affordance concept. 
A large portion of the article is dedicated to a discussion of Situation 
Theory and its application to affordances, with focus on the constraints. 
The constraints employed in situation theory may form rules which govern 
the pickup or activation of an affordance. If for instance an animal were 
attuned to the prototypical example constraint 'where there is smoke, there 
is fire,' it would be able to sense that the area which contains smoke affords 
danger. Greeno mentions such constraints as «action by agent»:::::}«good 
effects in situation» in a situation involving a skilled practitioner. These are 
indeed constraints which an agent might be aware of, but the above example 
seems much too general to be of any value. 
If the above constraint were to be useful to an agent, it would also have to 
be attached to information specifying the practitioner and the circumstances 
under which the constraint will hold. For instance, there is no guarantee 
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that the practitioner may take some action that unknowingly to him, does 
not bring about a 'good effect'. Greeno acknowledges that these constraints 
are conditional, but mentions that they will hold whenever participants in 
the situation or conversation are attuned to the same set of constraints. This 
does not take into consideration a situation where all involved have the same 
expectations, yet some new, different result emerges. Overall, Greeno put 
value into Gibson's work and his suggestion to investigate situation theory 
will be investigated in a later chapter, and may prove fruitful. 
3.3 Sanders (1997) 
An Ontology of Affordances [48] 
In this commentary, Sanders follows up some of his previous articles, in 
which he compares Gibson's metaphysical views with Merleau-Ponty and 
Berkeley. Here, he argues essentially that affordances are not properties of 
things in the same way humans might attribute the concept 'coarse' to sand-
paper, but instead that they exist as ontological primitives. An affordance 
is a real thing which is composed of parts of some cognitive agent and parts 
of its environment which allow the agent to act. According to Sanders, an 
affordance is real but also subsumes its real, composite parts, in the same 
way that a human brain exists, but does not prevent us from referring to the 
frontal lobe, the thalamus, etc., as individual parts which also exist. 
Sanders discusses affordances as relative to both the subjective and ob-
jective poles of attention in the same sort of way velocity is relative to the 
frame of reference. The many perspectives of motion, he continued were 
reconciled by the special theory of relativity, which defines the relativistic 
conception of space-time in such a way that each perspective of each indi-
vidual can be mathematically modeled. In terms of affordances, the frame of 
reference would be the ecological scale of the animal in question, or the scale 
under which it may take action. Only under very particular circumstances 
could one consider the atomic or galactic scale as ecological. It must first 
be possible to manipulate some aspect of the atomic or galactic scale, and 
that opportunity for action must be presently achievable for such scales to 
be considered. For the majority of situations, it is only the perceptual sphere 
of the organism-the sum total of everything the organism may perceive with 
its senses-that must be referenced. 
With this in mind, Sanders also takes issue with the notion of effect iv-
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ities, on the basis that Gibson created the term affordance to refer to the 
subjective and objective poles, and the idea of an effectivity was created 
to represent solely the subjective side of an objective affordance. Just be-
cause Gibson states that an affordances is an opportunity for action in the 
environment, some of Gibson's followers took this to mean that some coun-
terbalance must reside in the animal to complement the affordance. What 
Gibson meant however, is that though the opportunity for action rests in 
the environment, the affordance itself references this opportunity and the 
animal together completing the affordance relation. The animal it can be 
said, must exist to be able to perform the action, and so its reference is a 
necessary part of the affordance concept. Sanders concluded by referencing 
relativity theory which he used to illustrate that there is no truth about what 
is in motion, and why different views from different perspectives can be uni-
fied. This can be done in much the same way using an ecological approach 
to ontology, with its reliance upon affordances. With a change in perspec-
tive, what may be regarded as an affordance or event may change as well. 
Sanders claimed that only "by way of the ecological approach that one can 
understand just why both materialism and idealism seem right from certain 
delimited perspectives, and ... why neither was ever capable of refutation." 
3.4 Stoffregen (2000) 
Affordances and Events [52] 
Shortly after focusing on perception of affordances for other people, Stof-
fregen wrote a target article for Ecological Psychology, entitled Affar-dances 
and Events. In it, he compared literature on event perception, to literature 
on affordance perception. He also uses quotations from Gibson's book to 
explore the similarities and differences between affordances and events. Stof-
fregen relays Gibson's belief that both affordances and events are objects of 
perception, and then goes on to differentiate between the two. In much of the 
literature on event perception, Stoffregen explains, events are taken as ob-
jective, in the sense that an actor is not referred to. When event perception 
is empirically studied, no attention is given to entire animal-environment 
system, but instead the event and its successive perception is studied in iso-
lation from other variables. Event perception also takes the assumption that 
properties of the animal are perceived separately from properties of the en-
vironment. This would mean that to derive an affordance, an animal would 
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have to perform some internal operations to compare the sets of properties, 
and this internal representation is an obvious violation of Gibson's direct per-
ception based ecological approach. The definition of an event which follows 
is consistent with the brief and at times ambiguous descriptions written by 
Gibson in his book, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. "Events 
are static (i.e., stationary) and dynamic (i.e., moving) properties of objects 
and surfaces defined (i.e., measured) independent of the perceiver" [52]. 
Affordances, in contrast to events, must be defined as a relation between 
an animal and its environment, that have consequences for behaviour. Stof-
fregen also produced Turvey's definition of affordances and claimed that it 
was equivalent for his purposes. Upon closer inspection though, Turvey's 
definition that affordances are "properties of the environment of an animal 
that have consequences for the animal's behavior" [56], misrepresented what 
is meant by an affordance. This excerpt identifies the specification of an 
affordance residing in the properties of an environment of an animal, which 
Stoffregen examined in his section on the definition of affordances. At the 
time of writing, only Turvey and Sanders had authored anything regarding a 
formal definition of affordances. Stoffregen mentioned his preference to Tur-
vey's attempt, but took issue with the way Turvey represented the affordance 
as a property or properties of the environment. Instead Stoffregen suggested 
that p and q be properties of the environment and animal respectively, and 
the higher order relation r, "constitute[s] the constraint on or opportunity for 
behavior, that is, the affordance" [52]. This revision seemed to more closely 
resemble the true spirit of the affordance concept as proposed by Gibson. 
In support of this revision, Stoffregen cited a study by Mark (1987) who 
examined each participants ability to judge maximum sitting height with 10 
cm blocks on their feet. After 12 trials, the judgement of maximum sitting 
height improved so that the participants could accurately determine these 
heights. In contrast, the participants were asked to estimate block height, 
and the overestimation was consistent at about 30% over the course of all 
trials. These results indicated that when the higher order relation between 
animal and environment is modified, the animal may compensate for that 
discrepancy even without a direct knowledge of its own properties or dimen-
sions. The height of the block on the subject's feet was learned in relation to 
how it modified the subject's affordances, or capabilities for action, but not 
as an objective property in isolation. 
One proposal Stoffregen delivered which I disagree with was that if infants 
begin with a sensitivity to events, and acquire a sensitivity to affordances 
48 
with development of action skills, this would force a cognitivist conclusion. 
In other words, we would have to perform mental processing on our visual 
stimuli of events to derive opportunities for action. A truly Gibsonian view-
point, as rejected by the author, would be that as infants, our perceptual 
systems are advanced only enough to detect events, and as our perceptual 
systems become attuned to the environment around us and our bodies be-
come able to take action, we begin perceiving affordances. This is not to 
say that we must necessarily then cognitively process events to obtain affor-
dances. Stoffregen states that this view would suggest that events are more 
easily detected by novices, but I propose that it may be the case that the 
research Stoffregen cites, may have a different definition of event than ones 
associated with the debated term in affordance literature. In addition to this 
work, Stoffregen also published a 'Theory and Research' section to this paper 
[53]. 
3.5 Chemero (2000) 
What Events Are [3] 
In the same issue of Ecological Psychology Anthony Chemero argues 
against some of Stoffregen's conclusions. He claims that animals do per-
ceive events, but a new conceptualization of them is needed. Instead of an 
event referring to any change in an animal's physical surroundings, Chemero 
proposed that, "events are changes in the layout of affordances of the animal-
environment system." Essentially, when an affordance comes into existence, 
disappears, or is modified, this would be classified as an event. Chemero 
maintained that though Stoffregen's article presented some aspects of Gib-
son's theory which are often forgotten, and it attempted to improve on 
the existing affordance formalism, one conclusion in particular would have 
widespread consequences for ecological psychology and the ecological method 
in general. 
More generally, I have suggested that events may not be per-
ceived; it may be that only affordances are perceived. If so, this 
would raise serious questions about the utility of research in event 
perception in the context of the ecological approach. 
Here, Chemero quotes Stoffregen's article and points out that if the quote 
is accurate, much of the work in the entire journal of Ecological Psychology 
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would be useless. There is a way, he continues, to accept the valuable points 
Stoffregen reenforces, yet reject the hypothesis that humans and animals 
do not perceive events. If events are redefined as an instance in which the 
ambient optical array specifies that an affordance has become possible to 
actualize, or no longer possible, we can conclude that humans do perceive 
events, but the question shifts to whether any are perceived directly or all 
are perceived indirectly. 
Any animal can perceive when actions move from possible to impossible 
or vice versa.Chemero suggests that instead of the traditional experiments 
which have tested affordances in the past, new experiments should emerge. 
Instead of providing subjects with many situations, and asking them to judge 
if an action is performable in each situation, experimenters should allow 
subjects to continuously perceive a situation which is changing, and respond 
with the point at which the action becomes possible or impossible. This 
would be an effective method of studying affordances and events, as this 
critical point (with Chemero's new definition), can be regarded as an event. 
This critical point, in fact, is explored in [5]. 
3.6 Gibson, E.J. (2000) 
Where is the Information for Affordances [15] 
In a third paper in the same issue of Ecological Psychology, Eleanor J. 
Gibson responded to Stoffregen's target article. She reported her belief that 
to perceive an affordance (which humans do regularly) perception of events 
must be possible, perception of the relations between events must be possi-
ble, and it must be possible for the perceiver to acquire the information for 
all of this. The information which specifies an affordance, she writes, is in 
the events both external to, and within the perceiver [15]. It can be clearly 
observed then, that Gibson's widow believed events to exist both completely 
within a perceptual agent, as well as external to the agent. The repercussions 
to taking events in this manner would be that neither Stoffregen's view that 
events are not perceived, nor Chemero's view that events are solely changes 
in the layout of affordances, could be taken as accurate. Yet some portion 
of both ideas is incorporated, even if the beliefs put forth were not depen-
dant on either of them. Stoffregen's belief that events are not perceived is 
bluntly taken as wrong, but his idea that events can be viewed as indepen-
dent of an agent is somewhat accepted. With regard to events which are 
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external to some perceiver, we could classify them as independent, however 
if the event triggered the appearance or disappearance of an affordance, it 
must necessarily be related to a perceiver. If events inside and outside the 
perceiver are taken equally, we presumably would categorize them together, 
though they may have subtle differences. Internal events would refer to bod-
ily changes within an animal, mayor may not alter the layout of affordances 
either. Chemero's description of events is somewhat incorporated, and in 
some sense overloaded. Eleanor Gibson does seem to confirm Chemero's 
description of events as changes in the layout of affordances, but she also 
implies that not every event is necessarily a change in an affordance. 
The following quotation illustrates the authors view of events: "The in-
formation for an affordance is to be found in events that include the relevant 
environmental features, the activity of the organism, and the consequences 
that ensue as well as the relations among these" [15]. If the information spec-
ified for an affordance lies in the events, it would seem to imply that events 
first occur, possibly several of them, and either the culmination of them, or 
possibly the final or most recent event (as judged temporally), may specify an 
affordance if an animal is capable of perceiving and acting upon it. She does 
not however take one step farther. We may accept the structure discussed 
by Gibson here, but she leaves the task of identifying how animals actually 
pickup the information for events, and how this information is specified, to 
future ecological psychologists. 
3.7 Wells (2002) 
Gibson's Affordances and Turing's Theory of Computation [60] 
In 2002, A.J. Wells examined some of the previous models of affordances, 
and then outlined an approach using Turing's theory of computation. "Af-
fordances," according to Gibson, as Wells relates it, "are ecological; they 
are relational; they are facts of the environment and behavior; sets of them 
constitute niches; they are meanings; they are invariant combinations of vari-
ables; and they are perceived directly." All of these components make it quite 
challenging to integrate them all into a suitable theory of affordances, or we 
may discover one day that Gibson left us with exactly what we needed to 
specify affordances accurately. Wells also investigates two of Gibson's ideas 
which can possibly be regarded as contradictory. Gibson clearly believed that 
affordances are relational; that they refer to, or as Gibson put it 'point to', 
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both the environment and the observer. Gibson also claimed that affordances 
are facts ofthe environment, and not dependant on the observer. The second 
claim seems to indicate that the affordance does not in fact 'point to' the 
animal. Wells did not see any contradiction to these claims, and described 
Gibson's view of affordances as asymmetric interdependence. Asymmetric 
because of the heightened importance placed on the environment, and in-
terdependent because the terms are complemented by each other to create 
an affordance. Wells further examined the seven features of afIordances he 
recites at the beginning of his article, then discussed coalitions as models for 
ecosystems from Turvey et al.(1981). 
A discussion of the Thring machine which will write the infinite sequence 
of the natural number, explains exactly how the Turing machine works and 
then reviews of Thrvey and Greeno's input toward the formalization of af-
fordances were given, but I will not reiterate them again here. Wells points 
out to the reader that "every Thring machine has components modeling the 
agent and components modeling the external environment." This is quite a 
keen observation when discussing J.J. Gibson's theories. A Thring machine 
has a read/write head which, according to the ecological approach to percep-
tion, could be an animal or 'agent' which directly perceives its environment 
and behaves according to its perception and intention or 'state'. The tape 
would be the agents environment, and a state is something common to both 
Turing machines and the ecological approach though the latter might prefer 
the words intention or mood to the word state. Wells defines an affordance 
A, and effectivity E as follows: 
(3.7.1) 
(3.7.2) 
A (q, a) 
E - (b,p, k). 
The terms a and b, are environment referential, p and q, are animal 
referential terms, and k refers to both as a representation of the movement 
of an animal relative to its environment. A represents the perception side 
of the affordance, where an animal in state q perceives a, and E represents 
the action side where behaviour b causes the animal to change to state p and 
move in direction k. Because A represents the perception, and E the action it 
is fitting based on Gibson's belief that action and perception are inseparable, 
that instructions for a Turing machine are combinations of configurations 
and action. Wells' Turing machine instruction for affordances has the form 
(3.7.3) (A, E) = ((q, a), (b,p, k)) 
52 
which refers to a situation where an animal perceives an affordance A, and 
performs effectivity E. Thus it is obvious that Wells subscribes to the notion 
of effectivities in opposition to affordances. As well, "a set of instructions 
constitutes the 'machine table' for a Turing machine," so since an instruction 
represents an affordance and its associated effectivity, a set of them, "in 
Gibson's (1979/1986) terms, a machine table specifies a niche" [60]. Wells 
continues to explain, q is a member of finite set Q which enumerates the 
functional states of an animal (not necessarily state of mind), a is a member 
of finite set S of types of entity in the environment. He is also quite clear 
to reiterate just as Turing's states were, Q and S are finite, and the same 
goes for sets pertaining to effectivities. Formally, an effectivity E contains 
p E Q, bE S, and k has been modified from Turing's original work to include 
a set M of possible movements which might include such elements as 'sit,' 
'stand,' or 'grasp.' The movements possible in original Turing Machines were 
only left, right, or no movement, but this was due to the restricted nature 
of the environment as a one dimensional array of tape. An animal in its 
environment has uncountably many possible actions, but the set M contains 
possible movements, and is necessarily finite. 
Wells then runs through the Turing machine which will write the infinite 
list of natural numbers. In it he elucidates the process a Turing machine takes 
and its connection to affordances. Both affordances and Turing's machine 
require no internal processing, independent of the environment. Affordances 
are professed to be this way by Gibson, and a Turing machine only reads 
the tape, and reacts based on what is read, and the state it is in. As Wells 
states, "information is stored by acting on the environment, not by modifying 
the functional states of the machine," which is quite consistent with Gibson's 
writings, though this may need to be revised since animals may be capable of 
both changing and creating new functional states throughout their lifetime. 
The parallels between affordance and Turing machines are quite striking, as 
seen in the agent who acts based on a combination of its state and what it 
perceives about the environment. This could be a reference to either theory. 
One functionality which Turing machines are not capable of is the cre-
ation or modification of the agent's own states. Secondary tapes may be 
permissable, to store states in the environment, but an animal I would argue 
after leaning a task does not store the entire process of say 'breaking a nut 
open with a rock' in the environment, but merely a trigger to such actions 
(i.e. a rock and nearby unopened nut). When a child learns to walk, this is 
a state that has never been encountered before, unless one counts the per-
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ception of another human walking, in which case we take this as the instance 
where the state is introduced. This state is added to the possible actions 
the child has already encountered. A Thring machine however is not given 
the capability to change its current states, so any behaviours which emerge 
from a Turing machine are a result of states initialized before the machine is 
turned on. One could argue that an animal may have all possible functional 
states 'built in' and they are simply 'turned on' when an experience causes 
them to be. This could also be argued against however, that it would mean 
all actions any human takes are in some way innate but inactive, and waiting 
to be activated but surely the ability to weld or fire a bow and arrow are 
not innate. Gibson would claim that even these skills are picked up via some 
tenant of direct perception. 
Wells contrasted further the theories of affordances and Turing machines, 
by reminding the reader that Gibson saw the environment as prior to ani-
mals as the source of perceptual information, and then stating that the tape 
is the source of perceptual information for a Turing machine. "If the envi-
ronment were changed, by specifying a two-dimensional tape, for example, 
the structure of internal states would also have to change" [60]. Thus, the 
states and the structure of the states, that we might talk about in a theory 
of affordances would not even resemble states, and structure of the states in 
a one-dimensional tape Thring machine. 
A configuration consisting of a state and input, is said to be a fact of the 
environment and a fact of behaviour. The times and places a configuration 
was or will be written on the tape are facts of the environment, and the 
state coupled to the input are tied to an effectivity, or a behaviour. This is 
another way affordances seem to integrate smoothly with Thring machines, 
with more proof given in that sets of configurations constitute niches. The 
three components of the niche as given by Gibson, that it specifies the way of 
life of the animal, it contains a coherence across all affordances, and it sug-
gests that different animals that share aspects of their life have affordances 
in common, are all seen in a configuration table. The table specifies how 
rather than where an animal functions referring to its way of life. All config-
urations in a table have the same animal component and some configurations 
may certainly be identical in different animals. Wells argues further however, 
that "a niche, ... ,is a habitat plus a set of affordances" referring to the tape 
or environment of an agent as the habitat. He suggests it 'insufficient' to call 
the set of configurations of a Turing machine a niche, because it neglects the 
Turing machine's dependance on the structure of the tape at initialization. 
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Wells overviewed 'the status of internal states in abstract machine the-
ory,' with the conclusion that contra Gibson, "the notion of an internal state 
does not have to be understood in terms of memory traces, even though the 
history of an organism's interaction with an environment has an impact on 
its structure." The learning of an affordance, he claims, adds to the set of 
internal states such that a new behaviour is added to the learner's possible 
behaviours, but the animal need not have a memory of the learning. An 
interesting proposition, since Turing machines do not have the capability to 
acquire new states, though if a Turing machine were created which was al-
lowed to add internal states post-initialization, it could presumably be run 
on traditional computational hardware, and thus necessarily be possible to 
program as a TM with two internal states. To conclude his article, Wells 
noted the parallels between a theory of affordances, and the theory of com-
putation, and confirmed his support for effectivities because of the way they 
integrate into Turing machines. 
3.8 Steedman, M. (2002) 
Formalizing affordance [49] 
Mark Steedman at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland, saw that the 
notion of affordance lacked a formal expression, and so he proposed one 
possible formalism using Linear Dynamic Event Calculus (LDEC). First, the 
existential, and universal quantifiers are defined as follows. 
(3.8.1) 
(3.8.2) 
n 2: 0 =} [a](y = F(n)) 
n 2: 0 =} (a)(y = F(n)) 
The intended meaning of the first implication is that if initially n is greater 
or equal than 0, then after any possible execution of the program a the value 
of y will be equal to F(n), where F is some function on integers. Notice 
that a can be a nondeterministic program offering multiple possible runs 
depending on internal choice. Furthermore, in the first equation nothing is 
being said about termination of the program a; it might not terminate at all. 
The second statement requires that given the same initial situation there is 
one possible run of a that terminates with y = F(n). 
The third equation, shown below, is a composition of programs such as 
a, named sequence, and is "an operation related to functional composition 
over events, viewed as functions from situations to situations" [49]. The main 
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purpose of the composition is to join behaviour to elicit larger goals. The 
example given by Steedman generates a plan for getting outside, by joining 
push door and go through door, to get push'; go-through' [49]. 
(3.8.3) [a][jJ]P => [a; jJ]P 
Next the author defines a linear logical implication and demonstrates its 
possible use in the simplified example of a door which may be open or shut. 
(3.8.4) 
(3.8.5) 
(3.8.6) 
(3.8.7) 
shut (x) --0 [push(y, x)]open(x) 
open(x) --0 [push(y, x)]shut(x) 
in(y) --0 [go-through(y, x)]out(x) 
out(y) --0 [go-through(y, x)]in(x) 
Linear implication uses up the proposition on the left, so that it may no 
longer take part in any proofs, and adds the proposition on the right. Steed-
man then explains how the rules are interpreted, and further discusses the 
door example. The calculus so far defined is not new as it resembles cer-
tain versions of modal logic. If initially a situation can be modeled by: 
in(you)!\door( d)!\shut( d), then applying the above rules allows for the deriva-
tion of the following situations: 
(3.8.8) 
(3.8.9) 
(3.8.10) 
[push(you, d)]open(d) 
[push(you, d)]door(d) 
[push(you, d)]in(you) 
but not for the situation 
(3.8.11) [push(you, d)] shut (d) 
Preconditions, allowing the conception of these such situations and the plan-
ning of them, are discussed next. Two examples follow: 
(3.8.12) 
(3.8.13) 
door(x) !\ open(x) => possible(go-through(y, x)) 
door( x) => possible (push(y )) 
These examples are indeed as intuitive as they look. Another needed defini-
tion is the transitive property of the possibility relation. 
(3.8.14) possible ( a) !\ [a]possible(jJ) => possible ( a; jJ) 
56 
As Steedman reports: "This says that in any situation in which it is pos-
sible to a, and in which actually doing a gets you to a situation where 
it is possible to do (3, is a situation in which it is possible to do a then 
(3.[49]" This 'event sequence composition' permits the stringing together of 
actions to create higher level behaviour. If an agent is in a world where 
in(you)/\door(d)/\shut(d) is given, (3.8.12) is regarded as a goal which would 
have the agent search for a suitable series of actions to yield the out(you) 
result. One such proof for the existence of such a plan, is the composition of 
push and go-through actions seen here. 
(3.8.15) a = push(you, d); go-through(you, d) 
Steedman suggests backward-chaining from the goal, on the consequents of 
rules, using transitivity, as a way to produce this proof. The result of perform-
ing the action-sequence a, changes two of the three given facts in the factual 
conjunction known about the world. It yields out (you) /\ door(d) /\ open(d). 
The calculus is further developed in another paper. The author now turns 
to formalizing affordances using LD EC. Using a discussion of an experiment 
done by K6hler(1925), Steedman suggests that it be uncontroversial " ... that 
affordances like egress are indexed in such animals by object-concepts like 
door, rather than by end-states like being out, and that planning proceeds 
reactively by forward chaining from what is the case rather than backward 
chaining from the goal. [49]" The following are derived from equations (3.8.4) 
through (3.8.7) with 'V'-t read as 'yields'. 
(3.8.16) 
(3.8.17) 
push(y x) 'V'-t {Shut(x)-oopen(x)} 
, open(x)-oshut(x) 
go-through(y x) 'V'-t {in(y)-oo"!'t(y)} 
, out(y)-o~n(y) 
The affordances of a door, or doors in general, are given through a sim-
ple equation Affordances( door) = {go-f~::ugh} representing a set of functions. 
Steedman then defines the affordance-based door-schema door' as a func-
tion mapping doors into (second-order) functions from their affordances (i.e. 
push, go through, etc.) to their results. 
(3.8.18) 
(3.8.19) 
door' AXdoor . APAffordances(door) . px 
doo"" 'x Tx , - /\ door· 
The second equation is a result of a primitive combinator T or type raising 
which is defined in general by Tx = AP . px, as the operation which turns 
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"an object of a given type into a function over those functions that apply 
to objects of that type." One drawback to the method used by Steedman 
is that 'Aft'ordances(x) , should produce a list of aft'ordances that an agent 
has ever encountered with x, but according to Gibson's views, the available 
aft'ordances are not stored in a list within the agent, but rather in the optic 
array, and processing to access each aft'ordance should not be needed as it is 
in Steedman's formalism. Steedman does recognize that restricting the af-
fordances to those already stumbled across will not allow for new aft'ordances 
to be built. He admits that the aft'ordance-based door-schema door' would 
be much more useful generalized over a wider range of aft'ordances, allowing 
for an agent to view a door as something far removed from normal use such 
as a raft. But human capability for this generalization is quite limited by 
perceptual processes and in the modes of interaction with objects as Gibson 
insisted. Combinatory Categorical Grammars were also examined but are 
quite complex and do not seem to conform to Gibson's notions. 
3.9 Jones (2003) 
What is an Affordance [42] 
In what was essentially a literature review, Jones analyzed the evolution 
of Gibson's aft'ordance concept. Beginning from Gibson's 1938 article on 
automobile driving, Jones claims that Gibson's account of the ratio between 
a minimum stopping zone, and the field of safe travel, is quite similar to 
the concept of an aft'ordance ratio published by Warren[59]. after Gibson 
had already passed away. Jones also noted how Gibson's optical center of 
expansion, first written about in 1947, also evolved into a more complete 
theory of optic flow. It seems that many of Gibson's original works were of 
a much greater value than he or anyone else might have believed at the time 
of writing. Though many of his ideas were used to develop new theories and 
ideas, the original work also provides the academic community with a view of 
the development process, and the ability to apply some of his early ideas to 
new or modern problems. Some ideas, such as the postulation that meaning is 
not detachable from objects seen first in 1950, can still be used in considering 
new formalisms of the aft'ordance concept. One disadvantage to Gibson's 
work, as observed by Jones, is that Gibson never fully "explicated what he 
meant by perceiving things with reference to an animal" [42]. Jones believed, 
as do I, that this lack of specification is what has led to debates between 
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the location of the affordance, and the existence of some animal side duality 
to an affordance, among others. With reference to the lack of specifications 
early on, Jones asks about Gibson: "Was he continuing to formulate his 
thoughts and did not want to commit himself to something about which 
he was unclear? Or could he have been motivated by other factors?" To 
which he responds that Gibsons regard to the concept of affordances was 
still evolving, and if Gibson had been able to publish more, his thinking 
would have changed further. In particular, I would submit that Gibson's 
understanding of the concept was changing to accommodate newly published 
works he had taken an interest in. With this suggestion, it seems clear that 
had James Gibson been able to learn about modern relational algebra, or 
possibly the topics in situation theory (see later), he may well have suggested 
that an affordance can be modeled as a particular relation which stands 
between the animal and environment. He may also have saved us many 
years work in trying to correctly formalize the concept. Jones concluded 
the article citing the symposium he organized at the 2002 North American 
meeting of the International Society for Ecological Psychology, and referring 
readers to four articles in the special issue, which are devoted to affordances. 
A discussion of these articles follows. 
3.10 Chemero, Klein, and Cordeiro (2003) 
Events as Changes in the Layout of Affordances [5] 
Three years after Chemero proposed this new definition of events, he 
published a commentary co-authored by two colleagues. In it, they report 
their findings from an experiment involving affordance and event perception. 
In [3], Chemero described an experiment in which an affordance is slowly 
introduced or removed, and the critical point at which the perceiver detects 
the affordance appearing or disappearing would be an event according to his 
re-conceived notion of events. Now, the authors describe their experiment in 
which participants were asked to report the instant their gap-crossing affor-
dance vanished or was introduced. The participants' leg length, and stride 
length were also measured, and this itself led to a result. Based on correla-
tions between measurements, perceived stepping ability seems more relevant 
than actual step length in detecting the maximum sized crossable gap. This 
would demonstrate that though an animal's perception of its actual ability is 
more important than its proportions. The authors take the results to support 
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"the claim that events can be profitably understood as changes in the layout 
of affordances" [5]. The second result demonstrated by this experiment, is in 
support of using the term event to refer to these appearances or disappear-
ances of affordances. Stoffregen [53] claimed that Chemero did not offer an 
argument for why "event" should refer to these changes, but here the authors 
argue that "conceiving of events as changes in the layout of affordances gives 
ecological psychologists the ability to do empirical work on event perception 
with a good conscience." Lastly, this leads the authors to refute another of 
Stoffregen's claims, stating that if affordances are evolutionarily valuable to 
perceive, the appearance or disappearance of this affordance would also be 
evolutionarily valuable to perceive. Anyone who is familiar with the ecolog-
ical approach would agree that affordances are quite valuable to perceive, 
because this is the basis that Gibson created them on. An opportunity for 
action is certainly valuable, or no actions could ever be taken· and actions 
are obviously necessary for continued survival. The appearance of one of 
these opportunities would be valuable for the same reason, as it signifies the 
presence of this opportunity, and the disappearance of an opportunity would 
keep the animal safe or alive. Indeed, in some ways we could also consider 
the disappearance of an affordance to be an affordance itself which could be 
said to afford safety. 
3.11 Stoffregen (2003a) 
Affordances are Enough: Reply to Chemero et al. [54] 
Having read the article by Chemero, Klein, and Cordeiro before it was 
published, Stoffregen felt the need to restate his previous position. It had 
seemed to him that literature on affordances, and literature on events, "had 
evolved and were continuing to evolve more or less independently," and thus 
his comparison between them yielded them as different, distinct entities [52]. 
In the present paper, Stoffregen continues to reject the application of the term 
event solely to changes in the layout of the animal-environment system, but 
he does put forth an interesting discussion. It seems that both affordances 
and events have affordances. Stoffregen considered a volcanic eruption, in 
which the end points of the eruption have particular affordances, and the 
layout of the affordances might be changed by the eruption and consequen-
tial lava flow. The eruption here, has been shown to constitute an event 
(in Chemero's sense of the word), and yet it definitely contains dangerous 
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affordances. Stoffregen also discusses how walking, can be regarded as an 
event (in Chemero's sense), when it changes the layout of affordances, but 
also as an affordance itself, allowing for exploration. The results of these ex-
amples seem to contradict Stoffregen's previous point about affordances and 
events being distinct. Walking in this case, is regarded as both an affordance, 
and an event. He concluded the paper by reviewing that affordances have a 
nested structure, and using this as an argument that: 
changes in the layout of affordances have no special status in the 
ontology of the ecological approach to perception and action and 
therefore do not constitute a distinct category of perceivables. 
For this reason, changes in the layout of affordances do not need 
a special name (such as event) [54]. 
Stoffregen and Chemero agreed up to this point in time, that events not 
pertaining to an animal, have no motivation for study under the ecological 
approach. They agreed that affordances, and changes in the layout of them 
are perceived. But the term 'event' continued to be a matter of dispute. 
3.12 Chemero (2003) 
An Outline of a Theory of Affordances [4] 
In this outline of the theory of affordances, Anthony Chemero attempts 
to clarify the exact definition of an affordance. Rather than a property of 
the animal-environment system, he declared affordances to be relational. 
That is, the affordance itself is a two way reference pointer to both the 
animal and the environment, though which parts of each is still an open 
problem. Chemero brings up the radical empiricism of James, and uses the 
empiricist notion of perception to illustrate the foundation of affordances 
he is presenting. A radical empiricist would claim that since perception is 
an act which includes the thing perceived, if two animals perceive the same 
object, their minds each include the object, and thus the two minds overlap. 
The name given to this is the two minds problem. This would hold true for 
the perception of an affordance resting solely in the environment. Chemero 
accounted for this problem using the empiricist notion that everything we 
perceive is real, including relations between things. If affordances are indeed 
relations between an animal and an environment, they are real, may be 
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perceived by each animal, and may overlap without any minds themselves 
overlapping. 
The basic logical structure of the affordance is given by Chemero as fol-
lows: 
(3.12.1) , Affords-¢(Environment, Organism) where ¢ is a behaviour 
and is refined by discussing what it is about the environment and organism 
that is referred to. On the organism side of the relation, Chemero acknowl-
edged the many experimenters who identified ratios between body scale and 
the environment. He retaliates however by implying that the experimenters 
have not been studying affordances as they believed. Based on research by 
Cesari, Formenti and Olivato (2003), body scale is, for Chemero, a stand in 
for the ability of the animal, and none of the experimenters measured abil-
ity, but only rather dimensions. The elderly for example, cannot necessarily 
climb stairs that satisfy the 0.88 ecological invariant found by Warren [59] 
because of the constrained 'ability' to lift the leg. Chemero also takes is-
sue with the word properties in terms of the environment. The environment 
contains 'features', not properties, so the new structure is as follows: 
(3.12.2) Affords-¢( feature, ability) where ¢ is a behaviour 
Chemero then defines the ability side of the affordance, to be functional 
properties, rather than dispositions in Turvey's sense. If these abilities 
were dispositions, they would necessarily become actualized in prime cir-
cumstances, which is to say that any time an animal might possibly climb 
a step, it does. This is obviously incorrect, so in regarding abilities as func-
tional properties Chemero allowed for the organism to choose its actions, 
and since functional properties are given to depend on evolutionary history, 
affordances as well are tied to evolution. Chemero claims though, that his 
definition of affordances "does not assume that affordances are resources that 
exert selection pressure." He also claims that if they did, affordance could 
not imply niches or sets of affordances as Gibson defined them, though I 
cannot find any reason why not. 
Chemero places the animal in a 'perceives' relation to the affordance 
as follows: Perceives [animal, affords-¢ (feature, ability)]. The feature and 
ability relata however, are left out when defining what the animal itself will 
perceive. Humans, and perhaps only humans, he writes, have the capability 
to perceive things about their own abilities and features of their environment 
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without perceiving the affordance alone. Most animals have a simplified 
'perceives' relation: Perceives [animal, affords-¢]. 
Three topics remain to be discussed, niches, events, and the existence of 
affordances in the absence of animals. Niches are according to Gibson, the set 
of affordances for a particular animal. Chemero's formal definition follows: 
If S is the set of all possible situations, each ability ai specifies a subset of 
S, Si, where the ability can be enacted. If an animal has abilities ai, . .. ,an, 
that organism's niche will be the union of each subset of S for each ability. 
Based on prior papers ([3],[5]), Chemero takes an event to be a change in 
the layout of affordances. Most events occur as changes in the environment 
which modify the niche for an animal by adding or removing an affordance, 
however breaking a leg will also eliminate the 'climbable' affordance from 
a niche as well. Lastly, Chemero states that "affordances do not disappear 
when there is no local animal to perceive and take advantage of them," but 
also that "affordances do depend on the existence of some animal that could 
perceive them" [4]. Though it is tempting to disagree, considering that an 
affordance is an opportunity for action, and there is no opportunity if there 
is no animal, a simply reference to direct perception forces an agreement with 
Chemero. According to direct perception, no processing is performed on the 
information we acquire from the world. Gibson was clear that affordances 
are directly perceived, and thus must exist prior to being perceived so that 
they may be picked up by an animal. 
3.13 Stoffregen (2003b) 
Affordances as Properties of the Animal-Environment System [55] 
In this article Stoffregen admits his lack of focus on the formal defini-
tion of affordances, because he had been seeking to develop and clarify the 
concept of affordance by contrasting it with the concept event. He critiqued 
Turvey's formal definition of affordance mainly taking issue with attributing 
an affordance to be a property of some environment for multiple reasons. One 
reason was that as a property of the environment, it must have some comple-
mentary side in the realm of the animal. Along the same lines, an affordance 
should be a property of the animal-environment system as a whole, the way 
Gibson described it as equally a part of the animal as part of the environ-
ment. Stoffregen takes issue as well with the notion of an affordance as a 
disposition. Though an affordance is something potential, able to be actual-
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ized as a disposition is, an affordance is not necessarily actualized in suitable 
conditions like a disposition. An animal, or agent, may possibly take a cer-
tain perceived action, but that does not force it to do so. Stoffregen cited 
Turvey's recognition of the problem, and explained that the juxtaposition 
function j was defined to filter affordance p and effectivity q from an array 
m x n of dispositions, but Turvey neglects to elaborate on any method of 
filtering or what precisely j does, so this renders his definition incomplete for 
any real case [55]. One bandage solution Turvey might respond with here, 
might be that the 'suitable' circumstances he listed as a characteristic of dis-
positional properties and thus affordances, might in fact be those conditions 
under which the action is possible, including conditions where the action 
leads to a goal compliant with the intentionality of the animal, and possibly 
even the agent initializing the action. His failure to specify the juxtaposition 
function's capability or methods of filtering cannot be reconciled as easily. 
Another issue Stoffregen takes with Turvey's definition, is that if affor-
dances and effectivities are part of the environment and animal respectively, 
knowledge of the complementarity of the two must be obtained indirectly 
by conjoining the directly (but separately) obtained information about af-
fordances and effectivities. Requiring internal processing to derive an affor-
dance is not compliant with the theory of direct perception, and affordances 
as defined by Gibson were directly perceived so this juxtaposition function 
it seems, will not fit with a theory of affordances. If Turvey's previous def-
inition of affordance was labeled simply a property of the environment, the 
effectivity was labeled a property of the animal, and the term affordance was 
re-assigned to relate these two properties, this objection might fade away. 
Stoffregen investigates affordances as properties of the animal-environment 
system and reworks TUrvey's definition to accommodate just this. 
Stoffregen's new definition of affordance begins in the same way as Tur-
vey's by referring to Wpq = (Xp, Zq) as, by example, a person-climbing stairs 
system, but then p is simply a property of X rather than an affordance of 
X, and q merely a property of Z rather than an effectivity. Instead of a 
juxtaposition function to join p and q, p/q defines a higher order property h 
( of the animal-environment system). Then h is an affordance of the system 
Wpq if and only if Wpq possesses h, and Z nor X alone possesses h. Now, 
Stoffregen states "affordances are properties of the animal-environment sys-
tem, and they exist only at the level of the animal-environment system" [55]. 
Also of significance, the new definition does not refer to or include behaviour 
(i.e. the actualization of affordances) because affordances are only given as 
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opportunities for action, not for an implemented action, though I would re-
gard this as a semantical distinction. Stoffregen also stated that h is a fact 
rather than a potential which I believe to be a matter of semantics as well. 
The emergent property h, should be regarded as a fact of potentiality since 
Stoffregen even wrote that "If h is within a certain range of values, then stair 
climbing is possible; that is it may h~ppen in the future." Clearly this means 
that h (within a set of values) has the potential to be actualized, and if h 
falls outside those values, it is not an affordances, and thus nothing discussed 
here applies. 
It is worth noting that Stoffregen does not constrain affordances to re-
fer to physical properties of an animal. "Any property of an animal can 
bear a relation to some property of the environment that gives rise to an 
affordance, including biomechanical properties such as leg length, and other 
types of properties such as strength and flexibility, skills, beliefs, and emo-
tional states" [55]. All of these are important, though the largest concern 
is finding a way to formally integrate non-numerical properties of animals 
such as emotional states into the affordance definition. Behaviour is de-
fined as well in a similar but definitely different manner than affordances. 
It "happens at the conjunction of complementary affordances and intentions 
or goals." Let Wpq = m(h, i)(e.g. an animal-environment system) be com-
posed of different affordances h, and intentions i, were both are properties of 
the animal-environment system. A given behaviour b (e.g. climbing stairs) 
will occur if and only if (and when) an affordance and its complementary 
intention co-occur at the same point in the space-time continuum, where m 
is a psychological choice function [55]. He later stipulates that he cannot at 
present define m. 
Stoffregen next states that affordances may be specified and detected 
prospectively, but also makes the claim that the existing set of affordances 
in a given animal-environment system determines from the unlimited set of 
intentions, which are satisfiable at any given place and time. This claim that 
affordances select intentions seems inaccurate because an animal is capable 
of an intention which is not possible based on its naivety and also capable 
of intentions which reach far beyond the referenced place and time, possibly 
infinitely. An example might be an intention to one day in the future climb 
a certain set of stairs. 
The implications which his proposed definition might have on the eco-
logical approach to perception and action are examined as well. According 
to the definition, affordances might be perceived without prior perception 
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of required properties of the animal or environment. Accordingly, if proper-
ties of the animal-environment system may be perceived directly, there may 
be no motivation for perception of properties of the animal or environment 
separately. Stoffregen argues that under the ecological approach to percep-
tion and action affordances are perceivable, but nothing else is. He argues 
that there is no reason based on the ecological approach to perception and 
action, for perception of anything which does not have a consequence for 
action. Events are thus not perceivable according to Stoffregen. He also re-
gards effectivities in a similar manner as Warren[59], that they are lower level 
constituents of the higher order relations that constitute affordances. Effec-
tivities in his definition are properties of the animal as they are in Thrvey's, 
but to Stoffregen they are subordinate to affordances. 
Stoffregen revised Thrvey's formal definition of affordances, and explored 
the ramifications for the field of ecological psychology, but he concluded his 
article with an important issue for the ecological approach. His conclusion 
reminds the reader that the detection and specification of what precisely and 
formally constitutes an affordance within the animal-environment system is 
still an open problem. 
3.14 Kirlik (2004) 
On Stoffregen's Definition of Affordances [43] 
The following year, Alex Kirlik produced a commentary, "On Stoffregen's 
Definition of Affordances," directed at revealing a crucial flaw in Stoffregen's 
definition. Kirlik could not find any objection to Stoffregen's[55] definition 
by the presentation of an affordance which the definition cannot handle. He 
instead, examined the other direction of attack by claiming that the lack 
of constraints on properties p and q in the definition allows any relation of 
properties within an animal-environment system to be an affordance. Trou-
ble will arise when we attempt to let the informal definition, "opportunity 
for action" guide us to select properties which will necessarily give way to an 
affordance. 
According to the definition, h should be an "opportunity for action" but 
no restrictions are placed on the selection of p and q except that they be 
properties of an animal and environment. Kirlik thus, suggested an example 
where p is the property "was shipped to the United States from a British 
cathedral in 1894" and q is the property "had diphtheria as a baby." What-
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ever the emergent property plq = h turned out to be (e.g. "a person who 
had diphtheria as a baby is now climbing stairs that were shipped to the 
United States from a British cathedral in 1894") Kirlik did not believe it to 
be "constitutive" of the existence of an affordance. The properties p and q 
here might give way to the precise example relation, but the opportunity for 
action 'climbability' certainly does not depend on when stairs were shipped, 
or having had diphtheria. A stronger example Kirlik used, assigned property 
p (e.g., of Cleveland Browns Stadium) to be " has a capacity of 70,000 fans 
for football" and assigned q to be the property of a person who "is not sitting 
in San Diego." Because Stoffregen's definition did not even require p and q 
to be in spatiotemporal contact, this can be considered a legitimate system, 
and the higher level property pi q = h of the system can be considered an 
affordance. Kirlik voiced his suspicion that Turvey[56] created the 'juxtapo-
sition' operator to deal with the problems above. Turvey did not however, 
actually deal with the problems, but instead, push them into the realm of 
the juxtaposition function which he did not define. 
r now propose some obvious restrictions based on the examples Kirlik 
illustrated. The juxtaposition function in Turvey's definition, or the higher 
order property h in Stoffregen's, must maintain spatiotemporal contact be-
tween the component properties. If the "things" never come into proximity 
to each other, the referred to animal can't act in the referred to environment. 
The properties also, must be simple enough to be directly acquired, so a ca-
pacity of 70,000 or being shipped in 1894 do not qualify as proper component 
properties in an affordance. The authors must remember that affordances, 
as Gibson defined them, are directly picked up via the optical array. 
3.15 ~ahin et al. (2007) 
To Afford or Not to Afford: A New Formalization of Affordances 
Toward Affordance-Based Robot Control [47] 
From the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey, Erol ~ahin, 
Maya Qakmak, Mehret R Dogar, Emre Ugur, and G6ktiirk Ucoluk, co-wrote 
an article which examined the concept of affordances, as well as looked at how 
the concept of affordances could change the way we design the control of pri-
marily autonomous robots. First the authors reviewed the developments in 
the concept starting from Gibson, and with that, provided citations empha-
sizing Gibson's firm belief that an affordance is not simply a property of the 
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environment, but rather that it " ... points both ways, to the environment and 
to the observer" [29]. One criticism provided was that of experiments which 
focused mainly on the perception aspect of affordances. Other cognitive pro-
cesses, such as learning, high level reasoning, and inference mechanisms, they 
report, were not investigated or discussed, so they provide a cursory attempt 
at bridging the gap and an attempt to relate affordances to high-level percep-
tion. Taking an argument from E.J. Gibson, the authors seem to agree that 
learning is not" 'enriching the input,' but discovering the critical perceptual 
information in that input." A process termed differentiation. In past discus-
sion regarding the affordance concept, only the pickup of basic information 
such as 'sit-able' is examined, while the pickup of higher level information 
such as my chair is not considered. The expression of possession, or other 
higher level attributes, is not a capability of the basic affordances. 
With a look at neurophysiology, the authors discuss some researchers who 
had tried to elicit which neurons fire during which activities or actions per-
formed by subjects. The findings that the same neurons fire while performing 
a particular action as when we observe someone performing that action, pro-
vided results which support the idea that an affordance can be acquired by 
observing it being performed. The authors continued to draw parallels be-
tween Gibson's way of thinking and other areas of research. The field of 
reactive or "behaviour-based robotics was motivated by criticism of the then 
dominant robotic architectures, which favored modeling and inference" [47]. 
This is in line with Gibson's creation of the affordance concept in criticism 
of the then dominant theory of perception which also involved modeling and 
inference. One proponent of the behaviour-based approach, Rodney Brooks, 
claimed that "the world is its own best model," and used this notion in de-
signing several robots. They can be said to simulate affordances, in the sense 
that they do not represent the process going on internally, but rather react 
based on perceptual input alone. 
This strand of robotics also supports my belief that for a robot to operate 
autonomously it must be allowed, in real time, to learn how to control its ac-
tuators, how to navigate, and what its purpose is. These capabilities, in my 
opinion, cannot be programmed or built into the robot, but rather the archi-
tectures (representing pickup and control of affordances) must be available 
to allow the robot to construct this control for, and of, itself. There is some-
thing to be said here, about the human life cycle in which, the first several 
years are much less productive than the middle or later years. The authors 
also mention two important aspects of robot control using affordances. A 
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robot must be able to both learn the consequences of certain behaviour and 
also learn to pickup the invariant properties of the environment which afford 
certain behaviour. The consequences can be learned through repetition, and 
gaining an understanding of why results occur from given behaviour. The 
pickup of invariant properties, opposingly, is much more difficult to distin-
guish. Indeed, it is only through a very deep understanding of Gibson's life's 
work that we may begin to formalize the ecological theory of perception, into 
a usable model for a so called behaviour-based autonomous robot. Sahin and 
his co-authors also reviewed the formalisms published by Turvey, Stoffregen, 
and Chemero, as well as Steedman. Each of the first three authors follow 
one thread of ecological psychology literature while Steedman's formalization 
skips the issues of invariance, and instead "focuses on developing a represen-
tation where object schemas are defined in relation to the events and actions 
they are involved in" [47]. None of the reviewed formalisms was sufficient to 
develop an affordance-based robot control architecture, so the authors begin 
to develop their own account of how the affordance concept can be exploited. 
The reason given for previous confusion regarding the placement of af-
fordance, is the existence of not one, but three perspectives of affordances. 
Explicitly differentiating between the agent, environmental, and observer per-
spectives of affordances, is the first step Sahin et al. take. The agent per-
spective includes its possibilities for interaction with the environment. This 
is the most essential perspective to the development of autonomous robot 
control so it is examined further below. The environmental " ... perspective 
attaches affordances over the environment as extended properties that can 
be perceivable by the agents" [47]. In some regard, the authors suggest that 
the environment almost literally, screams out the affordances it possesses, 
though this would make the acquisition of affordances much easier to a robot 
as it would only have to ask or sample the environment to determine what 
actions it affords. It may be somewhat difficult in designing this system, as 
each object in the environment must know what it affords any agent, prior to 
even coming into contact with them. The environmental perspective, in my 
opinion, while valuable, should be regarded as implicitly built up through 
contact with agents. It could be argued that a ball, does not 'say' anything 
until there is some perceiving agent it may communicate its affordances to, 
and even then, only affordances already learned by the agent are truly avail-
able. The observer perspective, however, I believe to be much more valuable, 
just as the authors acknowledge the importance Gibson placed on this per-
spective. Gibson stated that though a child begins by perceiving her own 
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affordances, "she must learn to perceive the affordances of things for other 
observers as well" [28]. The observer perspective is regarded as any situation 
where an agent may perceive a second agent (possibly of the same species) in 
its environment. This is possibly one way in which affordances are acquired. 
If the second agent is observed during the execution of an affordance by the 
first, one might think that the first agent would acquire the possibility to 
attempt this affordance, even if its execution is not yet possible. 
The authors then attempted to extend the basic affordance relation (en-
vironment, agent) by further embedding the affordance in larger relations. 
Instead of the environment and agent, each must be replaced by the relevant 
relata. To ensure clear use of terms, entity is used to denote environmental 
relata as perceived by the agent, behaviour is used to denote " ... the agent's 
embodiment that generates the perception-action loop that can realize the 
affordance," [47] and effect is used to represent the outcome of the interaction 
between the agent and the environment. The formalism progressed in the 
paper first to include this effect, taking the form (effect, (entity, behaviour)), 
though the authors claim that the relation at this point resides in the interact-
ing agent, because "all three components are assumed to be sensed through 
proprioception of the agent" [47]. ~ahin at al. defend the explicit use of 
effect, by observing that even in Gibson's writings, if a lift-ability affordance 
is considered, the expected effect lifted is implied. The addition also eases 
the complexity of generating classes of affordances, if the classes are based 
on the effects they obtain. Equivalence is discussed next with respect to a 
hypothetical humanoid robot trying to discover affordances in its operating 
environment. Given two affordance relation instances, one including a black 
can as the entity, and one including a blue can, the two instances can be com-
bined to yield the relation instance (lifted, ({~~~cc:r;J, lift-with-right-hand)). 
This relation can be compacted using perceptual invariants to determine that 
any can, regardless of colour, can be a part of this relation instance. Thus al-
lowing for the robot to extend instances, to classes of instances based on the 
join of two instances and the extraction of their invariant parts. The entity 
equivalence class would somehow provide information as to what parts are 
invariant, and what parts may change. In the authors example, knowledge 
of (lifted, ((* -can), lift-with-right-hand)) for a robot, refers to the possibility 
that the robot may lift any coloured can with its right hand, and that can will 
become lifted. If, in the example, the robot's right hand is engaged (possibly 
already lifted something), it might use the rule that two affordances with 
the same effect, on the same entities, contain equivalent behaviours. That is, 
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lift-with-left-hand might be substituted because it achieves the same effect, 
and is thus an equivalent behaviour. The same sort of equivalence is also 
defined over affordances and effects. If two entity-behaviour pairs produce 
the same effect, they are equivalent. Similarly, if an agent wishes to join 
multiple relation instances it must be able to discern if the effects generated 
are equivalent, so equivalence classes of four different perspectives must be 
considered. At this point the authors redefine their formalism of affordances 
as follows: 
(3.15.1) ( (effect), (( entity, behaviour) ) ) 
The crucial note at this point is that this relation is between equivalence 
classes. The authors continue to complicate the definition by adding the 
capability of modeling the affordances from an observer perspective. They 
add an agent equivalence class, in direct relation to the entity-behaviour 
tuple though when dealing with only one agent, it is omitted. A version of 
the formalism is also given according to a situation where an animal engages 
in an affordance relation with only another animal, and not the environment, 
so the 'entity' part is dropped. 
In a discussion of the implications of the formalism, the authors admit 
that a crucial part of the formalism which governs how relation instances 
can be generated, and how they may be merged, has yet to be studied. 
They also admit that two control systems would be necessary, the second 
system would complement the first by learning exceptions to general relations 
acquired by the first. Planning is another issue closely related to affordances. 
The authors propose that some notion of planning would be implicit in the 
affordance relation as the effect of each affordance should be known. If then, 
an agent were to desire a certain effect, the corresponding affordance may 
be accessed. Planning is also implicit in actualizing-many affordances, seen 
during the initial parts of the agent's action. To actualize the affordance 
'grasp-able' an agent may have to first traverse to the item to be grasped, 
and this traversal can be seen as implicit in the grasping affordance. If 
traversal to the object were impossible, the grasping affordance would not 
be possible or even necessarily perceived. 
Traversal is a more basic affordance, and is examined further by the 
authors using a trained virtual robot, as well as a real robot. The robot con-
tained seven pre-coded actions ranging from moving sharply left to sharply 
right, and a range scanner granting ~bi1ity to judge distance. The robot was 
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then able to generate relation instances with entity being the raw percep-
tual vector, behaviour being in the range 1-7 of movement behaviour, and 
effect being a 0 or 1 indicating failure or success. An exploration phase al-
lowed the robot time to populate a list of relation instances, then it was 
trained during which time it learned entity equivalence classes, and finally 
it underwent testing. The authors revealed that entity equivalence classes 
were in fact discovered by the trained classifiers after the second half of of 
the training phase. The robot also was able to learn through which sized 
apertures travers ability was afforded. The authors here, take a moment to 
suggest that though traversability is clearly related to the robots width, this 
does not mean that this information is explicitly used by the agent. The 
robot possesses no knowledge of its size so it cannot possibly use that infor-
mation explicitly, yet it could come up with this knowledge by measuring the 
smallest aperture through which it can traverse. This idea is in opposition 
to those who believe there is a ratio or higher order value which is directly 
responsible for determining if an affordance is able to be executed. These 
values are undoubtedly satisfied each time an affordance is performed, but 
the agents do not themselves have any explicit awareness of the ratios, so ob-
viously they are not the crucial determinant in deciding possible affordances. 
Lastly, ~ahin et al. report that their on-going work will allow for continuous 
range of movements, instead of a discrete set, and the effects will not be 
grouped as simply a success or failure. Though they did circumvent Gib-
son's idea that affordances are properties of the animal-environment system 
and are not internalized, the idea that the affordance can be taken from this 
system and projected into the agent, environment, or observer, is quite an 
interesting one. Examining methods behind this projection may prove quite 
useful. 
3.16 Chemero & Thrvey (2007) 
Gibsonian Affordances for Roboticists [6] 
In 2007, after the debate regarding the formalities of affordances had 
relaxed for a few years and at the same time as Sahin et al. [47] pub-
lished, Chemero and Thrvey collaborated to write "Gibsonian Affordances 
for Roboticists." The principal objective was to use hypersets to compare 
Gibsonian([4]' [56]) , and representationalist ([47],[58]) understandings of the 
notion 'affordance'. The most important observation made of the hyperset 
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graphs presented, was that the graphs representing Gibsonian understand-
ings of affordances, proposed by Turvey [56] and Chemero [4], contained 
loops thus creating non-wellfounded hypersets. The representationalist def-
inition, however, as proposed by Vera and Simon [58] and Sahin et al. [47], 
do not contain loops, and are therefore well-founded. "This means that the 
Gibsonian, but not the representationalist, definitions understand animal-
environment systems as complex systems" [6]. The Gibsonian definition 
can also be said to take the animal and environment as a unified system, 
where each is unintelligible separately, unlike the representationalist defini-
tion. The authors take two consequences from these conclusions. First they 
make dynamical systems theory the most natural explanation of action. If 
the animal-environment system is unified, the authors state it all by necessi-
tates explaining behaviour using non-linearly coupled dynamical equations. 
Secondly, the conclusions grant credit to the claim that perception is direct, 
because as one all encompassing system, there is no need for the animal to 
represent the environment. The representationalist view, assumes an animal 
must gather data about an entity external to it, combine that mentally rep-
resented data with mentally represented actions, select an action, and finally 
execute that action externally. The authors claim that taking the animal and 
environment as separate, forces the two main tenets of Gibsonian ecological 
psychology to be incompatible. "In spite of Sahin et al. 's claims to the con-
trary, if affordances are mental representations, perception of them cannot 
be direct" [6]. 
Another noteworthy difference the authors point out between the Gib-
sonian and representationalist perspectives, is that the Gibsonians do not 
subscribe to the notion that cognition is computation. Only representation-
alists are said to be consistent with computationalism. Many mainstream 
cognitive scientists reject Gibson's views, solely on the basis that he and 
his followers reject the computationalist stance. They then attempt to de-
velop a notion of affordances which is computation-friendly, but Gibson and 
those that carryon his beliefs, purpo.sely reject computationalism along with 
representationalism. 
Chemero and Turvey also describe two consequences which cannot be de-
rived from Gibsonian views on affordances. The first is that the complexity 
of the animal-environment system does not take it out of the realm of compu-
tational modeling and simulation. And the second is that the incompatibility 
of Gibsonian affordances and computationalism does not make Gibsonian af-
fordances irrelevant to roboticists. Complex systems are in fact computable, 
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though it may seem unreasonable to expect a computer to be capable of deal-
ing with objects defined in terms of one another. As the authors state, "there 
is no necessary connection between circularity and non-computability" and 
"hyperset membership has been, shown to be Turing-computable in poly-
nomial time" [6]. Google (though it applies to search engines in general) is 
cited as an application where searches must index a web of pages which are 
undoubtedly circularly linked. There are many instances of links on one page 
which lead to another, and links on that page leading back, yet Google is 
still able to navigate circularly linked web pages without getting caught in 
(infinite) loops. This illustrates that defining affordances circularly does not 
imply their inability to be computed or simulated. It may be claimed that to 
be useful to roboticists who use micro-processors, affordances must be taken 
as representations. As a Gibsonian roboticist, one would have to commit 
to constructing robot-environment systems, rather than simply just robots. 
That each member of the system must be built for one other, requires a new 
way of thinking, but does not preclude it from being done. To support this 
claim the authors provide citations ([12],[13]) to several papers (which I re-
view below) which begin a path toward the creation of a robot-environment 
system based on the tenets of Gibson's ecological psychology. 
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Chapter 4 
Ecological Robotics 
4.1 Duchon & Warren (1994) 
Robot Navigation from a Gibsonian Viewpoint [12] 
Though James J. Gibson's work was dedicated to understanding human 
and animal cognition, there is nothing Gibson has written which cannot 
be applied to robots as well. Andrew Duchon and William Warren took 
robot navigation, and programmed Gibson's ideas regarding optic flow into 
it. Citing Rodney Brooks [2] as the first to design a behaviour-based robot, 
the authors reject the "sense-model-plan-act" notion of robots as Brooks did, 
and review ecological psychology principles that might help build a robot. 
The optic array as Gibson[25] referred to it, refers to all rays which converge 
to the point of observation. As the point of observation moves, the optic 
flow will also shift. As an animal navigates its environment, the optical array 
consists of objects moving toward the animal from the focus of expansion, 
and objects moving away from the focus of expansion toward the exterior 
regions of the optic field. These objects moving toward the outer regions of 
the optic field will-if navigation continues toward the focus of expansion-seem 
to move from in front, to beside, to behind, the animal. Objects which do 
not move away from the focus of expansion when navigation is (at constant 
speed) directed towards that focus, are said to have a 'time to contact' defined 
by the equation Tg(t) = r(t)/v(t) with r representing distance to the retina, 
and v representing the velocity. A Law of Ecological Optics is defined by the 
authors as 
(4.1.1) flow = f (Force) 
75 
which means that the flow is a function of the forces acting on the observer. 
The inverse of this law is called the Law of Specification, whereby the force 
acting on an observer is specified by the optic flow, and is defined as follows: 
(4.1.2) Force = g (flow). 
The law of specification however, does not account for displacement of the 
environment or external forces so a Law of Control is defined by equating 
the difference in intended force with a function on the difference in optic 
flow. To remain in a constant position in changing environment, an agent 
provide the forces necessary to cancel out the environmental changes. A fly 
in a rotating drum, must provide the (unequal) forces necessary if it wishes 
to hover above a constant spot inside the drum. According to research by 
Warren(1988) on this subject, we know that a fly can produce these forces 
needed to hover above a moving spot without any training, so the ability to 
move to satisfy optical flow equations seems to be innate. 
Since these control laws are satisfied during an animal's natural naviga-
tion, it seemed of value to Duchon and Warren to make use of them. All 
that is needed for a robot to register the optic array and optic flow is a 
CCD camera and a computer. So the authors constructed such a robot, and 
programmed two possible navigation strategies. This was the first time that 
the fields of ecological psychology and mobile robotics crossed over into each 
other. The first control strategy, called the Balance Strategy, "acts to equate 
the rate of optic in the left and right halves of the visual field, as observed in 
some insects" [12]. It is defined with regard to b:.R as the amount of relative 
rotation from the current heading in degrees, w the magnitude of optic flow 
on that side of the visual field as, and a constant k. 
(4.1.3) 
One situation the authors note where this strategy would be useful is moving 
down a hallway. If an agent moved closer to one side of the hallway, that 
side's flow would increase, and it would move to equate flow to both sides, 
by moving away from the closer wall. This balance strategy, however, would 
not allow for an agent to navigate through a cluttered environment. If an 
agent with this strategy were placed in such a situation, it would likely have 
difficulty trying to balance the many objects moving around it. 
The alternate strategy employed by Duchon and Warren, is called the 
Avoid-Closest Strategy. Here, the agent turns away from the area of the 
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optic array with the lowest time to contact. The A void-Closest control law 
is defined as follows: 
(4.1.4) D..R = k (_1_ x 1 ) 
T min pOS( T min) 
where T min represents the lowest time to contact in the visual field, and posO 
specifies the visual angle relative to the current heading. The minimum 
time to contact is found from the average time to contacts given for each 
of the columns in the optic array. The amount of rotation is best described 
by this quotation: "The shorter the time to contact, and the closer the 
column is to the heading direction, the more the agent will turn away." A 
complementary strategy called Seeking-Farthest was described, but thought 
to have unfortunate consequences when the visually farthest point is adjacent 
in the scene to the visually closest point. In addition to the· two control 
strategies, other actions were programmed into the robot. It was found that 
if the average illumination fell below a certain threshold, the robot could not 
detect its environment and perform accordingly. So to fix this little bug, 
the authors added an emergency reflex of stopping, turning 900 and then 
resuming the main control strategy, whenever the optic array became too 
dark. The other practical difficulty was in regard to the balance strategy. 
When directed straight toward a uniform wall, both sides of the optic array 
are balanced, so the agent had no action to correct. This would unfortunately 
lead the robot to collide with the wall, so one additional emergency procedure 
was included. If the time to contact was below a threshold of, for example 4 
frames, the robot stopped, and turned 900 before resuming the main strategy. 
The last practicality issue that was run into was attributed to the robot 
having no sense of its own size. The camera's visual field was 600 wide yet 
the base was 12 inches wide, so at times, the robot anticipated safe passage, 
but only the camera, and not the base itself were able to pass through. This 
issue was not compensated for. 
The robot's specifications included three computers: one for sampling the 
NTSC standard video information down to a 128x32 pixel array, one to run 
Camus'(1994) optic flow algorithm allowing information to be extracted from 
image sequences in real time, and the last to run the control strategy, and 
physically control the base. The results obtained from this experiment were 
quite promising, but also demonstrated that other movements, or strategies 
should be employed so that certain situations do not require emergency pro-
cedures. Both strategies, it is reported, were effective but susceptible to dark 
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regions where they register no flow. In the balance strategy, if one side of 
the array contains no flow, no possible behaviour can make the other side 
equal. In the avoid closest strategy, it becomes the relatively closest point 
to be avoided and this will always be on one side. The effectiveness of the 
experiment is given in figures illustrating the robot's paths. Several times 
a human hand suddenly appeared in the robots optic array, and the robot 
each time avoided the hand. The authors conclude with their intention to 
provide additions to the control laws to allow a robot to perform actions 
such as pursuit, approach, docking, and escape, using optic flow alone. The 
proposed thought was to include constants in the balancing equation to allow 
a robot to follow walls, or to adapt to new situations in which it might not 
be able to achieve optic flow balance. 
Within the article Duchon and Warren mention the Seek-Farthest strat-
egy, but also disregard it. While it may be true that adjacent near and far 
points is a cause for concern to a robot, if some sort of intention is integrated 
into the robot, it could balance the optic flow sufficiently as not to collide 
with anything, but while doing so, also seek out the farthest point. If the 
robot had 'modes' as some way of representing intention, each behaviour 
could be associated with a mode. In escape or exploration mode, seeking the 
farthest point might be highly prioritized, while docking mode would entail a 
slow steady approach to an object. Also the dark regions in the field of view 
could be programmed as obstacles, or as unknown regions. This 'meaning' 
can be dealt with in its own way. As the robot is given the capability of rec-
ognizing what certain areas 'afford', it can act accordingly. Unknown regions 
for instance could be explored, or avoided. Attaching a light to the robot 
or using a less cluttered environment, might also allow the experimenters to 
focus on the issue of optic flow based control strategies instead of hard coding 
emergency behaviours which distract from the main task of the experiment 
which was to test the Gibsonian approach to visually guided navigation. 
4.2 Duchon, Warren, and Pack-Kaelbling (1995) 
Ecological Robotics: Controlling Behavior with Optic Flow [13] 
The next year, 1995, Andrew Duchon and William Warren teamed up 
with Leslie Pack-Kaelbling to produce a paper which more closely examined 
the intersection between the fields of behaviour-based robotics and ecological 
psychology, specifically control laws based on optic flow. First they review 
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what optic flow is, and explain a few equations. If an observer is moving 
toward its focus of expansion (FOE) which has distance r from the observer, 
at a constant velocity v, time-to-contact or more strictly, time-to-passage, 
is "specified by 79 = r/v where 79 is the 'optic variable' tau-global" [13]. 
Immediacy is defined as the inverse, 'f7 = 1/79 , 
Laws of Control are equations which remain satisfied throughout any 
movement which relies on optic flow. It is said that animals utilize the 
information in the optic array by acting to achieve a desired type of optic 
flow. The changes in the internal forces of the animal such as forces caused 
by wings, legs, etc. is equal to a function of the change in the optic flow . 
( 4.2.1) .6.Flnternal = 9 (.6.flow) 
This equation is inspired by research on flies which the authors report utilize 
a balance strategy particularly when placed in a rotating drum where they 
will produce the differential thrust needed to track one side of the drum as 
it rotates. This however, is one of many equations that the fly will follow. 
The control law being satisfied at anyone time will depend on the goal, 
intention, or 'mode' of the fly. Only one set of affordances will be utilized 
or perhaps even perceived by the fly at one time, and that set is dependant 
on the fly's 'action mode'. The authors example is that a foraging fly will 
seek only affordances of nourishment and landing, and anything else would 
afford avoidance. A fully nourished fly in contrast, will seek somewhere that 
affords safe landing, while a flower may even afford avoidance. 
The authors admit that their previous work [12] may not be sufficient 
for survival of an agent. The Avoid-Closest strategy while advantageous 
as a component, by itself will only cause an agent to wander around, not 
hitting things. This hardly allows for goal states unless there is a task to 
perform while not hitting things. One task particularly related to survival 
of an agent is the game of tag. Either as a predator attacking its prey such 
as a lion attacking a herd, or some prey escaping the predator, such as a 
zebra which avoids being taken down, the game of tag is one which is closely 
related to animal behaviour and evolution. The game of tag then, was used 
in the design of new optical flow based control strategies for a robot. This 
robot also contained four 'action modes' which acted somewhat like goals or 
intentions. The 'watching' mode was used as a ground state during which 
the robot was sensitive to, while waiting for, certain optical flow patterns to 
be detected. If the target is detected, the robot centers it in its field of view, 
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and will track it until the trial is over. If the target approaches the robot 
(given by 'f/ > me), it will flee until it escapes or is caught. If the target 
moves away from the robot (given by 'f/ < -me) the agent will chase it. The 
chasing behaviour consists of 'shadowing' where it attempts to match speed 
with the prey, and then, when optical flow is balanced or constant, 'docking' 
where a controlled approach is made until distance falls below a threshold 
indicating the prey being caught. If the target appears, and subsequently 
recedes out of the field of view, it is considered an escape. After any of the 
modes is completed (i.e. robot is caught, escapes, catches the target, or fails 
to) the process stops, and begins again. 
Fixating on the target was a task that was active whenever the target was 
detected. Obtaining a clear view and centering the target was the first task 
of fixation upon detection. Equations are given to allow the robot to rotate 
its left and right sides based on the optical position of the target relative 
to the center of the field of view. A more complex agent, the authors state, 
could take into account the optical velocity of the target allowing it to predict 
where the target will be after its own rotation is made. 
The authors quote James Gibson's work which describes how the expan-
sion of a textured contour in the optic array may trigger a flight or attempted 
escape response of a prey animal, and also how the contraction indicates 
something moving away and possibly safety from that thing. They use the 
expansion as it is, but suggest also that contraction might trigger pursuit by 
a predator. These two actions form the basis of the robot upon which this 
paper is based. In each of these higher level actions than fixation, only the 
sum of the change in force needed to be considered because the rotational 
acceleration (the difference in left/right forces) is taken care of by the control 
laws for fixation. Escape is done by retreating backwards from the incoming 
target until either the agent is captured by the target coming within a cer-
tain distance, or the agent escapes by getting a certain distance away from 
the target. A chase however, consists of two parts, each of which may be 
functional components to other larger behaviour than chasing. The first ac-
tion is shadowing, which is as the name suggests, keeping a constant distance 
behind the prey target. This may occur even when an animal has no inten-
sion of fighting or chasing, but is simply following its mother, or watching its 
territorial boundaries. Once shadowing is successful, indicated by matching 
the speed of the target (possibly zero velocity) the agent begins a docking 
sequence. A soft contact is the objective during docking rather than a hard 
contact representing an attack. The threshold between hard and soft contact 
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is said to lie with the derivative of time to contact at 7- = -0.5. Values less 
than -0.5 will result in hard collisions while values greater than -0.5 will yield 
soft collisions. According to cited references the authors state that human 
subjects use the strategy implemented to control braking during an approach 
to a stop sign in a closed-loop display. 
The experiments done in this paper were divided into two groups. Those 
in which the robot performed segmentation during the perception process, 
and those in which it did not. Segmentation is the process of simplifying an 
image by partitioning it into sets of pixels. In this experiment segmentation 
was done by summing the optical flow vectors in each column of the array, 
and subtracting the sum of previous column, to get dist(j) for column j. A 
self moving target should have the highest distO values because its motion 
on the two boundary sides should be in completely opposite directions, so 
the two columns with the highest values were taken as the boundaries to the 
target. 
The equipment used was the same as the robot from their previous ex-
periment, with three computers each running their own task, and feeding the 
results to the next step in the sequence. The first, subsampled the field of 
view to a 128 x 32 pixel array, the second performed Camus'(1994) real-time 
algorithm for optic flow, while the third performed the control laws and sent 
actions to the base. The algorithm by Camus is not reviewed except to say 
that the real-time is accomplished by a time-space tradeoff forgoing a search 
over all pixels, for a search in a 1 pixel radius, over several frames. The target 
was either a 4x12, or 3x5 inch piece of cardboard coloured randomly, or the 
first author's legs. The target was introduced to the robot's field of view, 
as either approaching or retreating, with speeds limited to those appropriate 
given the robot's capabilities. The trials were then divided up based on the 
distance the target started at, whether the chase or escape was successful, 
whether the choice to chase or escape was correct, and of course those done 
using segmentation and those without. 
The results of the experiment seem to indicate that segmentation made 
no large difference in performance, but a robot guided by optical flow alone is 
quite a promising prospect. The authors state that "it is difficult to compare 
the performance of the control laws with and without segmentation," because 
the robot's behaviour is actually a reaction to the experimenter's behaviour 
which was not constant throughout the trials. The authors may want to 
keep in mind with future experiments that a comparison is only viable if 
the input is the same for each experiment, or each type of experiment. The 
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chases were claimed to be one viable indication of performance, depending 
on what type of contact was made with the target. While segmentation did 
not change the percentage of hits and misses (for the real, hard, far, chases 
on day 2), with segmentation, more successful chases resulted in physical 
contact with the target, while without segmentation more were successful 
docks using T. Segmentation seems to be useful in hunting, but tracking a 
mate, might be more successful using a slower 'docking' type approach. The 
authors express that performance without segmentation may be a result of 
a simple environment, which may be advantageous where the prey composes 
of a majority of the field of view. Segmentation would be an asset however, if 
prey will be passing behind objects, so that "information about the accretion 
and deletion of texture" can be made use of [13]. 
To conclude their paper, the authors relate that knowing which control 
law to use, may be the largest concern when trying to navigate based on 
optic flow. A few concerns I have are that the authors program the robot 
to center the target in its field of view whenever it is detected, but in a 
true chase, the predator is usually concerned with where its prey will be 
when it gets to it rather than where it currently is. Aiming in the direction 
which the prey is headed would be a more accurate representation of the tag 
or chase scenario (a formula for this is given but not implemented because 
of complexity). Alternately, when the robot acts as the prey, it is able to 
continuously detect the predator which also does not accurately represent a 
life or death hunt as the prey is not usually running backward. One final note 
to make is that the authors do manage to integrate at least two control laws at 
a time, since fixation was done continuously, even while other behaviours were 
active. This is the wayan animal might interact with its environment, when 
it for instance, stalks its prey, while also avoiding collisions with obstacles. 
Learning to nest control laws will definitely be of large concern in ecological 
robotics. 
4.3 Duchon, Warren, and Pack-Kaelbling (1998) 
Ecological Robotics [11] 
After three papers, and a poster, on topics concerning robotic control 
using optic flow, Andrew Duchon and William Warren co-operated again with 
Leslie Pack-Kaelbling to write a paper which leaves no ambiguity based on 
the title 'Ecological Robotics'. After a review of Gibson's principles of optic 
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flow and direct perception, the authors discuss some optic flow control laws 
and one source of inspiration which came from studies of how flies control 
their movement. A summary of the principles behind ecological robotics 
illustrated the authors' views within the ecological approach to perception 
and action. Agent and environment are treated as a system, and the agent's 
behaviour emerges from the dynamics of this system. The agent's task is to 
map available information to the available control parameters to achieve a 
desired state of the system. The environment provides enough information to 
allow for adaptive behaviour, and the environment need not be represented in 
the agent by a central model. Task-specific memory and learning are allowed 
however. This experiment, it is then explained, will involve implementing 
optic flow control laws as taken from [12], as well as actions programmed in 
[13], and exploring their culmination, and limits, both in reality as well as a 
simulation. 
The authors cite Gibson[30] as having referred to mechanisms such as 
their balance strategy as "the principle of symmetrical stimulation in orien-
tation." The balance strategy dictates that when an agent is translating, 
closer objects move faster across the retina, than farther objects, and take 
up more of the field of view as well. Accordingly, the optical control law has 
the agent turn away from the side of greater flow while taking into account 
the other side of the field of view to ensure it does not collide with anything 
on either side. 
There were two robots used in the experiment, the smaller of which, now 
named Louie, was used in previous experiments, ([12],[13]), had a 30.5 cm 
base, a camera 75 cm off the ground, and a 60° field of view. The larger 
robot, named Ramona, had a 61 cm base, a camera 120 em off the ground, 
and a 120° field of view. The runs were performed in an atrium containing 
tables, chairs, and a few trees, with mostly textureless surfaces. Ramona, 
because of its height, had its camera tilted down 45° . Due to a capability of 
faster speeds it also had a speed function programmed which reduced speed 
in a cluttered environment (when more flow was detected), and allowed for 
maximum speed in an open setting. 
The robots were implemented in such a way that rotational velocity which 
was obviously controlled, was subtracted from translational velocity. Only 
optic flow due to translation was used as input to the control laws. Compared 
to the other two cited attempts to control a robot with optic flow, this 
experiment used normalized sums of the optic flow for the entire left and right 
halves of the scene, while the other two experiments used maximum values of 
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optic flow within the left and right halves instead. Two justifications are that 
a normalized sum is less susceptible to noise, and it incorporates information 
from more distant objects as well. 
Simulations were also performed by placing a simulated robot in a sim-
ulated environment designed to demonstrate behaviours such as "avoiding 
a small object, going through a small aperture, negotiating a corner, going 
down a hall, and interacting with other agents" [11]. The agent was simu-
lated as a point with a field of viewable to vary from 5 to 360 degrees, but 
a triangle was drawn around it for other agents to perceive. When a single 
agent was placed in a fixed environment and given a fixed speed, there was 
an emergent behaviour observed. The agent first wandered around avoiding 
the walls, but settled into a circular path around one of the few walls. A very 
small aperture could only be traversed once gaussian noise had been intro-
duced to the system. It was also determined that a small field of view such 
as 60 degrees gave rise to much worse behaviour than an 120 or 150 degree 
field of view, but there is some upper bound, because 200 degrees caused 
poor performance. I would expect an optimal value here to be around 180 
degrees so that the agent will not avoid things it has passed, but will take 
into account as much of the scene in front of it as possible. 
Another simulated environment had an agent navigate a square passage, 
with walls blocking half of the hall on both sides at varying distances apart. 
The "best" path was either the safest path, taken by keeping a larger distance 
from walls (184.58 units), or the shortest path (147.93 units). Duchon et al. 
determined that their 'balance strategy' lead to a balance of the safest and 
shortest paths. The average length was 164.85 which was approximately 
half way between the safest and shortest paths. With small amounts of 
noise however (0' = 0.01), the path became shorter on average over ten runs 
to 157.73 units, but increasing the noise to 0' = 0.02 lengthened the path 
to 175.42 units on average, though with this level of noise the agent only 
completed the runs 50 percent of the time. 
The game of TAG investigated in [13] was reviewed explaining the control 
laws behind each of the different states. Fixating on the target involves 
keeping the target centered in the field of view and the target's subsequent 
approach or withdrawal causes the agent to enter either an escape or a chase 
state. The escape involved backing away from the target causing outward 
optical flow, until a certain threshold distance was achieved, and chasing 
involved shadowing, then docking. The shadow component was to match 
speeds with the prey, and the docking was intended as a slow soft contact as 
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opposed to a hard attack. 
The results obtained from the experiment, were varied. More than half of 
the approaches led to false chases, slightly higher without segmentation than 
with it. Across the nine successful escapes in 20 trials, five were reasonable, 
three short, and one long. The approach seems feasible, but is still in need 
of some adjustments to be more robust, and reliable. When the robot was 
chasing the target, 70 percent of the 20 trials resulted in successful chases, 
equal number with and without segmentation. The difference came in the 
type of contact. With segmentation most hits were actual contact, but with-
out segmentation a majority were successful docks using the time to contact. 
Segmentation seems to decrease the odds of the robot incorrectly chasing an 
approaching target, however among successful chases, it increases the odds 
of a 'hard' contact, rather than a dock with the target. I would submit that 
segmentation is only an asset to a robot which must 'bring down' its target, 
rather than track it, or even evade it. The optical flow approach itself was 
shown to be more useful in chasing, or tracking a target (i.e. perceiving it 
visually), than in evading one (i.e. specialized type of avoidance behaviour). 
The authors admit that "the quality of the segmentation algorithm was 
poor," and "the robot would often follow 'ghosts'." This is obviously one area 
which needs to be improved, possibly simply by using newer, faster computers 
to run the real time algorithms. The algorithm does allow recovery from 
this temporary poor behaviour however, because it will usually perceive the 
target to have jumped to a new location in the next time step, and adjust 
its heading accordingly. 
Learning a few things from the runs and simulations on Louie, the au-
thors modified a few control laws when experimenting with their larger robot 
Ramona. In this robot the shadowing then docking, was reduced to a sin-
gle control law where the robot increased its speed until it catches up with 
the target, then slows down gradually. Because of this change only a dock 
or failure can result from a chase. The robot was equipped with a possible 
1800 field of view when watching, but this was narrowed to 900 upon moving 
(analogous to attention). 
An interesting observation was that when the target wandered at an angle 
to the watcher's heading, one side of the target was closer, causing more 
outward flow on that side, which in turn caused the robot to underestimate 
time to contact, and slow down. The authors suggest that evidence for the 
utility of such a behaviour can be seen in prey animals who have developed 
zig-zagging as an escape tactic to enable them to both see their predator, 
85 
and to fool the predator into believing it is doing better than it is. They 
also provide reference to a study that suggested that humans have separate 
'what' and 'how' pathways in the brain, claiming that humans just like the 
robots tested, do not need to model what an object is to maneuver around 
it. These robots accordingly model only the 'how' pathway and still function 
usefully. The authors finally suggest neural networks as a means of satisfying 
the many soft constraints of affordances to choose a single output or action. 
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Chapter 5 
Situation Theory 
Situation Theory is concerned with mathematically describing the meaning 
of a situation, or the information conveyed. The concept of information 
is not definitely defined in that it is quite difficult to discuss quantities of 
information or to generalize types of information. Classical logic is concerned 
with only one type of information: truth. Only the truth of a statement, or 
validity of an argument can be identified, unless the configuration of the 
environment in which the truth takes place can somehow be represented. 
Situation Theory uses nine basic types to lay a foundation towards a 
comprehensive theory of information. We will describe each of them below 
using definitions from [9] and [10] though only seven will be used in my thesis. 
The three types, time, space, and individual, are simple types which are used 
to specify the temporal and spatial locations, and the participatory agents. 
They can be self-referential such as 'now' or 'here', or they may be precise 
such as 'Brock University J block' or '12:02 pm'. Individuals are usually 
represented by some reference which conveys the intended knowledge. An 
individual might be given by name, title, or reference and may be as specific 
or general as one wishes such as 'Professor Michael Winter', 'Dean of Science' , 
'my father', or simply 'Peter'. 
• TIM: the type of a temporal location 
• LOC : the type of a spatial location 
• IN D : the type of an individual 
The relation type must reference the number of parameters suitable to 
use it. If we consider the use of a relation such as 'giving' if it was given 
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as a 3-place relation referencing the giver, the receiver, and what is being 
given, it would be invalid to apply giving to Paul, Adam, Walrus, and gift 
as it contains too many parameters and does not make sense. By the same 
reasoning we cannot have a 3-place relation 'giving' without it being applied 
to 3 objects as it would not convey any information at all. Some relations 
have more than one possible arity. The name alone ('giving') does not specify 
the relation, but a name coupled with an arity does, i.e. (giving,3). The 
relation might possibly have two places or three, and the items which fill 
the roles may have different restrictions in different scenarios. For example, 
it might be 2-ary, one reference to the giver, and one to the receiver, or it 
may have one for the giver, and one for the item being given. Minimally, a 
relation must have a name, a number of components equal to the arity (and 
of suitable type), and a polarity to identify its truth value. The type of a 
polarity is the most simple type, consisting of values of either zero or one. 
A polarity of zero indicates the relation is not true, while one indicates the 
relation and its components hold true. The inclusion of the polarity could 
seem possibly redundant, though the functionality given from being able to 
represent false items of information may outweigh any performance benefit 
from reducing the size of the definition . 
• RELn: the type of an n-place relation 
• POL: the type of a polarity 
One of the more important types in situation theory is that of infons. 
Situation Theory, as an attempted beginning toward a way to represent any 
and all information, attempts to do so in terms of basic building blocks 
it calls infons. Inspired by physics-based particles such as photons, and 
neutrons, the infon is described as the most fundamental or basic of the 
representational components. Infons are important as they emphasise the 
study of information as an empirical science, though this does not imply the 
physical existence of an infon. Each infon contains several values, each is one 
of the types listed below, or else of a higher order defined type constrained 
to the situation. Each infon is an object of form: «r, al, . .. ,an, c » where 
r is an n-place relation, aI, ... ,an are objects appropriate for the respective 
argument places of r, and c is a polarity of value 0 or l. 
Any situation will involve at least implicitly a time, a. place, and an 
individual. These may not be definite, and they may even make the statement 
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that nobody was or will be in a situation, that the time was in the past, 
or that the place is on earth. The situation type is also used to specify 
generalities among different situations. For example s could be defined as 
any situation where a person is running. 
• IN F: the type of an infon 
• SIT: the type of a situation 
As an example of infons consider the following two simple infons: 
« 'less than', 2, 7f, 1 » 
« 'sum of', 7, 3, 5, 0 » 
We can see that 2 and 7f stand in the 'less than' relation, and 7 does 
not fall in the 'sum of' relation with 3 and 5. Note that there is nothing 
preventing an infon from representing an incorrect piece of information. The 
object « 'sum of', 7, 3, 4, 0 » is indeed an infon, but it is not modeled by 
our world since in our reality 3 + 4 = 7. To be modeled in our reality c 
would have to be 1 instead of o. When we write 'modeled' we mean that 
if s is some situation and (J is some infon, s F (J denotes the fact that (J is 
true in s, s supports (J, or s models (J. Any situation will have at least 1 but 
arbitrarily many infons which it supports, showing that the information the 
infon conveys is true in that situation. 
For any abstract situation s, (supporting a set of infons) it will be con-
sidered coherent if and only if for no r, aI, ... , an are both of the following 
valid: 
Thus all situations in our reality are coherent as something cannot both be 
true and untrue at the same time. To allow for many states to be supported 
by one situation we allow for a situation to model an entire set of infons. If I 
is a set of infons, and s is a situation, we say that s F I if and only if s F (J 
for all (J E I. Another name for an infon we will use later is a 'state'. 
As we've mentioned any situation will involve (at least implicity), a time, 
a place, an individual, and some relation between them. If any of these 
components is unknown, a parameter type can take the place of an unknown 
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value. Parameters, usually denoted with dots above them, are introduced 
for making reference to arbitrary objects of a given type. For each basic 
type T (other than PAR), there exists an infinite collection ti, T2 , .•• of basic 
parameters used to denote arbitrary objects of type T. For the purposes of 
explaining Situation Theory we have included a description of parameters, 
but for simplification they will not be used once we work with a model. 
The basic types also include a type type, so the theory allows for arbitrary 
levels of focus or abstraction depending on the situation and agents referred 
to, and the current intentionality of the agent. It also allows for the following 
to hold true: "For any object x in the theory, there is at least one type such 
that x is of that type" ([10], p51). This simply states that every object is of 
some type. For example, every person on the earth is the type of a person 
which might be defined like this: 
[IND1Iw p« person, IND1, LOCi, TIMi , 1 »]. 
This represents all individuals subject to a restriction that the world w, 
models some infon, in which the individual is a person associated with some 
location and time. 
• PAR: the type of a parameter 
• TY P: the type of a type 
Situation Theory also has methods to assign values to parameters which 
we will briefly discuss here, but will not factor into my thesis. To give the 
parameters values we use anchors. An anchor for a set A of basic parameters, 
is a function defined on A which assigns each parameter Tn in A an object 
of type T. If 1 is an anchor for A and Tn is a parameter in A then this is a 
fact: w p« of-type, I(Tn ), T, 1 ». 
If p is to be a parameter for a person, it should be restricted so that 
whenever 1 anchors p to an object a in situation s, then in s, a is a person 
(Thus parameters restrict anchors). Roughly, a parameter p results from 
tagging a parameter IN Di E PAR with 'condition' C of being a person 
writing p = IN Di r C. The parameter can be anchored like so: l(p) = 
1(1 N D i ) r C. For a description of C the reader may refer to above where 
the type of all persons is given. 
If a is a parametric infon, and 1 is an anchor for some/all free parameters 
in a: a[J] will represent the (parameter-free) infon that results from replacing 
each v in the domain of 1 that occurs free in a by its value 1 ( v ). 
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If I is a set of parametric infons, and 1 is an anchor for some/all free 
parameters in infons in I, we define 1[1] = {CJ[J]ICJ E I}. 
These are more developed notions than we will be able to accommodate 
in this thesis, but we will now introduce some mathematical terminology, 
and then work with a toy version of Situation Theory which does not make 
use of types, parameters, or anchors, and infons are called states. 
5.1 Mathematical Preliminaries 
In this chapter, we will introduce and discuss a toy version of Situation 
Theory. Most of the following was derived from Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science: Situation Theory and its Applications, Volume 1, By Robin 
Cooper. The focus was on the first chapter "Replacement Systems and the 
Axiomatization of Situation Theory," written by Peter Aczel [7]. After its 
introduction, we will extend the model using the notion of affordance in order 
to provide a new formal description of affordance relations within Situation 
Theory. 
5.1.1 Sets, Classes, and Categories 
Before diving into signatures, algebras, form systems, and ontologies, we will 
provide a cursory overview of some of the concepts needed. 
We first distinguish between sets and classes taking the definition of sets 
from [14]. In set theory, only two concepts are considered primitive in that 
they are not defined in terms of other concepts. Essentially a set is a collection 
of objects or members to be regarded as a single entity. The other primitive 
concept is membership. Any single object is an element or member of a set 
if that object is in the set. We denote that an object x is a member of set 
X by writing x EX. One important notion on sets will be the concept of 
subset. A set A is a subset of set B if every member of A is also a member 
of B. To identify this we write A ~ B. 
Another operation on sets we will use is the union operator. If we are 
given any number of sets, and wish to extract the union of them, we construct 
a set which includes all elements from each set, but in the event of an element 
being a member of two or more sets, we simply include it once. Algebraically, 
91 
given sets {AI, ... } we define the union of them as follows: 
UAi = {xix E Ai for some i E I}. 
iEI 
A similar operator may be used called the disjoint union symbolized by l±J. 
When the normal union is taken over many sets which contain an identical 
element, that element is only found in the union once. When the disjoint 
union is taken over many sets with an identical element, each element carries 
the information of which set it is from. 
I±JAi = {(i,a)la E Ai,i E I} 
iEI 
To refer to a collection of all sets, we do not call this collection a set, but 
instead a class. A class is a collection of objects like a set is. Every set may 
also be called a class, but a class which may be considered a set is called a 
small class. These classes which are considered sets as well are defined by 
the property that we can eventually list all members of it. A proper class 
however, is one which is too big to be called a set. A particular class which 
will be utilized in the following sections is the class of all sets. This class 
(and only this class) will be represented by the variable V. 
We find it necessary to introduce ZFC- formally. Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) 
set theory with 'C' the axiom of choice, will be what we will work with here. 
In the ZFaxiomatization, eight axioms are given. We refer the reader to the 
literature to review them. 
It will be necessary to assume the Anti-Foundation Axiom (AFA) to ac-
complish some of our goals, so we provide a definition. The axiom was 
published by Peter Aczel in 1988[1]. It essentially allows sets to contain 
themselves as members, so that every collection of objects (even a collection 
which contains itself as a member) may be considered a set. The smallest 
non-well-founded set is the Quine Atom which may be represented like so: 
x = {x}. Thus the set contains only one object, namely itself. 
A notion on sets and classes which we will need is the power set. The 
powerset of a set X, written pow X is the set of all subsets of X, including 
the empty set, and the set X itself. powX = {xix ~ X}. The power-
class of a class also uses the notation powA for class A and is defined by: 
pow A = {x E Vlx ~ A}. [1] 
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A relation is a collection of ordered pairs described as a subset of the 
product of the two classes which it relates. R is a relation if R ~ V x V. If 
R is a relation we may write xRy to indicate (x, y) E R. 
A function F is a relation that is total and univalent. A total relation 
is one where for all x there is some y such that (x, y) E F. That is, every 
x from the source class is related to some element y in the target class. A 
univalent relation is one where for all x, y, z if (x, y) E F and (x, z) E F then 
y = z. Essentially, any value may only be related to one single value. 
Functions of relations which we will need are the domain and range. 
The domain function, written dom, may be applied to a relation, and will 
return the set of all possible input values. Formally, domR = {xlxRy for 
some y}. The range, written ran, when applied to a relation will return 
the set of possible output values otherwise called the image of the function. 
ranR = {ylxRy for some x}. The range is a subset of the codomain which 
refers to the entire set the function is mapping values to, even if some values 
are not mapped to. The membership relation E is the class {(x, y)lx E y}, 
and for each class A we have that EA=E n(A x A). 
If A is a class, and I is a set, AI will represent the class of all functions 
from I to A. The set I however is not-necessarily-finite. We will see in the 
next section how we will regard AI if I is finite. 
Originally a branch of mathematics, category theory has branched into 
theoretical computer science, abstracting the notions of sets, and functions. 
A category C is defined by the following properties: 
• a collection Obc of objects, denoted by a, b, . .. 
• a collection M or c of morphisms (arrows) denoted by f, g, ... 
• two operations dom, cod assigning to each arrow f two objects respectively 
called domain (source) and codomain (target) of f 
• an operation id assigning to each object b a morphism idb (identity of b) 
such that dom(idb) = cod(idb) = b 
• an operation 0 (composition) assigning to each pair f, g of arrows with 
dom(f)=cod(g) an arrow fog such that dom(j 0 g) = dom(g), cod(j 0 g) = 
cod(j) 
• identity and composition must also satisfy the following two conditions: 
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1. identity: for any arrows f, 9 such that cod(f) = b = dom(g) it must 
hold that idb 0 f = f and 9 0 idb = 9 
2. associativity: for any arrows f, 9 such that dom(f) = cod (g) and 
dom(g) = cod(h) it must hold that (f 0 g) 0 h = f 0 (g 0 h) 
A morphism f with source a and target b will be denoted f : a -+ b. 
When dealing with two classes, say A and B, a function or morphism from 
one to the other f : A -+ B is also a relation f ~ A x B such that for each 
a E A there is some unique bE B (also written f(a) E B) such that afb. If 
we are given two objects a and b, the collection of all morphisms from a to 
b will be denoted C[a, b]. 
A category is called small if both the class of objects, and the class of 
morphisms, are actually sets and not proper classes. A category with either 
a proper class of objects, or a proper class of morphisms will be called not-
small, or large. If we call a category superlarge, not only is the category not 
small in that it is not a set, but it is much larger than a set in that it may 
be unbounded. 
In category theory, a functor is a mapping (or morphism) between cate-
gories. If we have categories A and B, a functor F : A -+ B will associate 
each object x E A with an object F(x) E B. As well, it will associate with 
each morphism f : x -+ yEA a morphism F(f) : F(x) -+ F(y) E B so that 
the following two conditions hold: F(idx ) = idF(x) for every object x E A 
and F(g 0 f) = F(g) 0 F(f) for all morphisms f : x -+ y and 9 : Y -+ z. 
Functors will preserve identity morphisms, and composition of morphisms. 
As well we will mention initial objects and so should provide a definition 
of them. If we are given a category C, an object 0 is initial if and only if for 
any b E Obc there is a unique f E C[O, b]. Essentially there must be a unique 
function with the initial object as a source, which terminates at every other 
object in the category. 
Initial Algebras are also of interest. Taking the definition from [1], an 
Initial Algebra is an initial object in the category of F-algebras. It is defined 
relative to a fixed functor F : C -+ C where C is a category. 
1. A = (A, a) is an algebra if a : FA -+ A in C. The algebra will be 
called full if a : FA +-+ A is a bijection. 
2. Given A = (A, a) and B = (B, (3), 7r is a homomorphism from A to 
B written 7r : (A, a) -+ (B, (3), if 7r : A -+ B such that the diagram 
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commutes. 
Obviously, id: A -+ A is a homomorphism from (A, a) to (A, a) for 
every algebra (A, a). Moreover, if f is a homomorphism from (A, a) to 
(B, (3) and 9 is a homomorphism from (B, (3) to (C, "(), then 9 0 f is a 
homomorphism from (A, a) to (C, "(). i.e. F-algebras with homomor-
phisms form a category. 
3. A = (A, a) is an initial algebra if and only if for every algebra B = 
(B, (3) there is a unique homomorphism A -+ B. 
5.1.2 Signatures and their Algebras 
A signature is a class of symbols usually labeled as O. Each of the symbols 
w in the class has as an arity the set vw. A signature is finitary if for every 
symbol w, vw is a finite set, and standard finitary if for every w, vw = 
{I, ... ,n} with n E N. In the case of a standard finitary signature, w is 
called an n-place function symbol. 
If we take 0 as a signature, an O-algebra A = (A, wA)WEn consists of a 
class A and a map wA : AI -+ A for each symbol w of arity I. If we are dealing 
with a standard finitary signature, I = {I, ... , n} for n E N, and then AI 
n 
~
can be read as an n-fold cartesian product like so: An = A X ••. X A. The 
map wA can now be identified with an n-place operation on A. In addition, 
if n = 0, then AD is a singleton set. These operators with arity 0 can be 
identified with elements of A. 
An O-algebra homomorphism is defined to be a map between two 0-
algebras. 
5.1.3 Class Operations and F -Algebras 
Associated with each signature 0 is an operation O[] that associates with 
each class A a new class OrAl = {(w, f)lw E 0 & f E AVW}. 
Note the class T of terms is the smallest class such that O[T] ~ T and 
in fact T is a fixed point of O[]; i.e., O[T] = T. O[] is an example of a set 
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continuous class operation and it is this fact about O[] that implies that the 
class T exists. A class operation F is set-continuous if it is monotone, i.e., if 
A ~ B then F A ~ F B and set-based; i.e., if a E FA then a E F Ao for some 
Ao E powA. The proof for the following can be found in Aczel (1988). 
Theorem 11 If F is a set continuous operation then there is a smallest 
class A such that F A ~ A and a largest class B such that B ~ F B . Both 
are fixed points of F. 
Consider the category of classes and functions between them. For any 
class operation F, a functor on the category of classes, call (A, a) an F-
algebra if A is a class and a : FA -+ A. We call an F-algebra (A, a) full 
if a : FA rv A is a bijection. Also, every fixed point A of F determines 
the full F-algebra (A, idA). If 0 is a signature and A = (A, WA)WEn is an 
O-algebra then it determines the O[]-algebra (A, a) where a(w, I) = wAf for 
(w, I) E OrAl· 
By reading the above equation from right to left as a definition, given the 
map a, of each operation wA , it is clear that every O[]-algebra (A, a) arises 
in the above way from a unique O-algebra A. Moreover A is full if and only 
if (A, a) is full. This one-one correspondence between O-algebras and O[]-
algebras suggests a generalization of the theory of signatures and algebras to 
suitable F and F -algebras. To get a smooth generalization we need to make 
some assumptions about F. 
5.1.4 Standard Functors and Full Algebras 
If 0 is a signature then the signature operation O[] can be made into a functor 
on the (superlarge) category of classes by defining, for each map h : A -+ B 
the map O[h] : OrAl -+ O[B] where, for (w, I) E OrAl, 
O[h](w, I) = (w, hoI). 
It is easily checked that this gives us a functor. It is in fact a standard 
functor. A functor F on the category of classes is standard if it is set con-
tinuous as a class operation and preserves inclusion maps, i.e., if A ~ Band 
iA,B : A '----+ B is the inclusion map, with iA,Ba = a for all a E A, then FiA,B 
is the inclusion map iPA,PB : FA '----+ FB. The latter property map also be 
expressed by saying that if f : A -+ B then F f depends only on the class 
{(a, fa)la E A} and not on the codomain B of the map f : A -+ B. It 
implies that if f: A -+ B and A' ~ A then FUIA') = (FI)I(FA'), i.e., that 
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F preserves restriction. 
We have defined the notion of an F-algebra for any class operation F. 
In order to have a suitable notion of homomorphism between F-algebras we 
need to assume that F is a functor. 
If (A, a) and (B, (3) are F-algebras, where F is a functor on the category 
of classes, then a map 7r : A --+ B is a homomorphism from (A, a) to (B, (3), 
written 7r : (A, a) --+ (B, (3) if the diagram below commutes .. 
i.e., 7r(aa) = (3(F7ra) for all a E FA. Note that if (A, a) and (B, (3) are 
the O[]-algebras associated with the O-algebras A and B then 7r : A --+ B is an 
O-algebra homomorphism if and only if 7r : (A, a) --+ (B, (3) is an O[]-algebra 
homomorphism. 
With this general notion of homomorphism for F-algebras we get the 
category of F -algebras and hence the notion of an initial F -algebra, which is 
necessarily unique up to isomorphism if it exists. 
Theorem 12 (The Initial Algebra Theorem) For any Functor F 
on the category of classes any initial F -algebra is full. If F is standard then 
an initial F -algebra exists. Moreover the least fixed point A of F determines 
the initial F-algebra (A, idA). 
We have excluded the Final Coalgebra Theorem and a discussion of 
Strongly Standard functors, as they are not needed for the work that is 
done here, and their descriptions can be found in [7]. 
5.1.5 Form Systems 
A form system is defined to be comprised of three parts: A class A of objects, 
a mapping C : A --+ powX called the 'component' map, which assigns to 
each element in A a subset of objects (referred to as Ca) from the class X 
of components, and a 'dot' operation used to combine a form and a map, 
to obtain a new form. The system however, is also taken 'over' a class X. 
By restricting X we can obtain replacement systems or ontologies as we will 
see in the next two sections. If we take X to be the same class as A, the 
form system is called a replacement system but if X is defined as the class 
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V of all sets, we call the form system an ontology. The class X in any case, 
contains all items possible to fill component roles of objects. If a mapping 
operation a : Ca -+ X will map each component t E Ca of object a to a 
new component tnew EX, then the dot operation combines the map with the 
object to get a· a which is a new form. This new form is obtained from a by 
replacing each of its components using a. 
To illustrate a form system, we use the example of the absolute function. 
If we take A to be the class of all integers, X would refer to the set of 
natural numbers, and the mapping C would be the absolute function itself. 
An integer taken from A has a single component, namely its absolute value. 
We define one possible al to map any component number to that number 
plus one. Therefore, al is defined for all natural numbers and can always be 
applied to the components of an object. If we take an example object -2 in 
our class A of integers, and perform the component map we yield its single 
component C( -2) = 2. The 'dot' operation in our example yields a different 
effect for values of a < 0 and a ~ O. al joined to a positive a will map its 
component to its component's successor thus increasing the integer object by 
one. If a was negative however, increasing the value of its component, would 
decrease a. In our example a· (-2) = (-3) and a· 2 = 3. 
To illustrate further we provide another example. If we consider as objects 
lists of elements, or any stack, or queue data structure, we can imagine 
that the components of a list are the elements within that list. We may 
then assign any arbitrary mapping of elements to new elements through the 
sigma operation. As a concrete instance, consider the list of numbers: L = 
[1,2,2000]. The component map C(L) would yield the three numbers in the 
list. The dot operation on elements in the list may be defined in any way 
we wish. For instance we might give that: a· 1 = 27, a . 2 = 603, and 
a· 2000 = 11. The object a· L will be constructed by replacing each element 
in the list with the newly mapped element like so: [27,603,11]. This is all 
that is required to define a form system. 
Two further rules for form systems follow. The form a . a is equal to a if 
performing a on a component of a yields that same component. The form 
which results from a' applying the dot operation to a . a is to be referred to 
as a' . (a . a). This form is equal to (a' 0 a) . a if a' can map each of the 
components of a . a to an element in X. 
Formally, (A, C, .) is a form system over class X if A is a class, C : A -+ 
pow X and for each a E A, if a: Ca -+ X then a· a E A such that: 
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(5.1.1) 
(5.1.2) 
(5.1.3) 
C((J"·a) {(J"Xlx E Ca} 
a if (J"X = x for x E C a 
((J"' 0 (J") • a if (J"' : C ((J" • a) -+ X 
A replacement system and ontology as we shall see below, are formally 
defined simply by giving the restriction of X where a replacement system 
assigns X to be the same class as A, and an ontology restricts X to the 
universal class V. In a replacement system, the (J" function accepts parameters 
just as it does in a form system, but instead yields forms from the class A, 
while (J" in an ontology yields forms from the universal class V. 
To see how to get a full algebra (A, a) for ontology U review section 5.1.7 
on ontologies, specifically the syntactic examples. In addition, that para-
graph will explain how using the forms of the ontology U we can determine a 
replacement system U (A, a). To examine the Representation Theorem which 
would show how each replacement system has the form U (A, a) for some full 
algebra (A, a) for some ontology U, please review [7] for the details. 
5.1.6 Replacement Systems 
One of the two basic ideas in the model of Situation Theory which we are 
concerned with here, is replacement systems. A replacement system is com-
prised of objects, where each object has components which are themselves 
objects in the system. Those components may be replaced by other compo-
nents to yield a new object. For example, consider as objects, terms built 
from integers, and the binary operation of addition and multiplication with 
the usual precedences. A typical object a might be represented by 2 x 3 + 4. 
The components of a term are its subterms, or in this example, break down 
the equation by the least significant operation. The components of a thus 
are {2 x 3, 4}. Replacement can be modeled by a function (J" mapping terms 
to terms. For example if (J"(2 x 3) = 1 and (J"(4) = 5 then the object (J" • a 
is obtained from a by replacing the components using (J", and results in the 
object 1 + 5. 
Set Theoretic Examples 
If V is the class of all pure sets, i.e. V is the largest class A so that A = powA, 
then (V, C,·) is a replacement system, where for a E V, Ca = a, and if 
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CJ: a --t A then CJ· a = {CJxlx E a} 
In fact any fixed point A of pow would give a replacement system in this 
way. More generally any fixed point A of any subpowerclass operation P[J 
would give a replacement system. To define these operations let us call a 
class P of sets image closed if for any function !, dam! E P::::} ran! E P. 
An image closed class P determines the subpowerclass operation P[], 
where for any class X, P[X] = {u E Plu ~ X}. 
It is not necessary for A to be a fixed point of prj. It suffices to have a 
bijection a : P[AJ rv A. 
This determines a replacement system Up(A, a) = (A, G, .), where for 
each a E A, if a = au then Ga = u and if CJ: u --t A then CJ· a = a({CJxlx E 
u}). 
This last most general family of set theoretical examples determines all 
the replacement systems (A, G,·) where G : A --t pawA is injective. Note 
that for any replacement system (A, G, .) there is an image closed class P 
such that P[AJ = {Gala E A}. In fact we can let P be the class of all sets 
ran! for! a function with dam! = Ga for some a E A. 
It is easy to give a complete survey of the image closed classes P. First, 
note that a class P of sets is image closed if and only if P U {0} is image 
closed. So we need only consider those classes P with 0 E P, the remainder 
being obtained by taking 0 out. 
Image Closed Class: A class P of sets, with 0 E P, is image closed 
if and only if either P = pawV or else P = {a E pawVlcard(a) < ,.,;} for 
some cardinal number ,.,; > O. In other words, a class of sets is image closed 
if either it is the set of all subsets of the universal set, or if it is all elements 
with an upper bound on cardinality,.,;. 
Syntactic Examples 
The variable 'free terms' of a signature determine a replacement system. We 
will generalize this example so as to apply to any full algebra of a signature. 
We will use a general notion of a (single-sorted) signature where there can be 
a proper class of symbols and any set can be used as the arity of a symbol, 
i.e., as the set indexing the argument positions of the symbol. So a signature 
n consists of a class of symbols, each symbol wEn having some set vw as 
its arity. The result of 'applying' a symbol w of arity I = vw to a family 
of arguments, with ai filling the argument role having index i E I, will be 
written w(· .. ai ... )iEI. 
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We can assume that this is really the ordered pair (w, f) where f is the 
function with domain I such that fi = ai for i E I. In the case when 
I = {I, ... ,n} then it is natural to write w(al' ... ,an). The class of variable 
free terms of the signature is the least fixed point of the operation O[], where 
for any class X, O[X] = {w(··· Xi··· )iEIlw E 0 & I = vw & Xi E X for 
i E I}. 
If A is the class of variable free terms or more generally if A is any 
fixed point of O[], then (A, C,·) is a replacement system, where for each 
a = w(··· ai··· )iEI E A, Ca = {aili E I}, and if (J : Ca -1- A then (J. a = 
w(· .. (Jai· .. )iEI. 
More generally from any (A, a) such that a : o [A] rv A we get a re-
placement system Un(A, a) = (A, C,·) where for each a E A, if a = a 
(w( ... ai··· )iEI) then Ca = {aili E I} and if (J : Ca -1- A then (J. a = 
a(w(···(Jai··· )iEI). 
5.1. 7 Ontologies 
The other basic idea in this model of Situation Theory is that of ontologies. 
An ontology, like a replacement system, contains objects. Contrary to a 
replacement system however, the components of an object are not necessarily 
objects themselves, but instead may be any arbitrary objects. We notice the 
two kinds of examples of replacement systems display a common pattern. 
In each case there is a class operation F, and given a pair (A, a) with a : 
FA rv A, we can obtain a replacement system (A, C, .). Below, a common 
generalization is given. The key observation is that in each of our examples 
the class operation F is what we call an ontology operation U[]. If U = 
(U, cu, ·u) is an ontology then its ontology operation defined as follows. For 
each class X let U[X] = {u E UICu ~ X}. 
Set Theoretical Examples: If P is an image closed class then Up = 
(P[V], C,·) is an ontology where Cu = u for all u E P[V], and if (J : u -1- V 
then (J . u = {(Jxlx E u}. Now Up [] is the subpowerclass operation prj. 
Note that V = (V, cv , ·v) where Cu = u and (J. u = {(Jxlx E u}, can 
also be taken as an ontology when it is applied to itself like so: V[V] = {u E 
Vlu ~ V} which is equal to V itself. 
Syntactic Examples: If 0 is a signature then Un = (O[V], C,·) is a 
signature ontology where for u = w(· .. Vi· .. )iEI E O[V], Cu = {viii E I} 
and if (J : Cu -1- V then (J . u = w( . .. (JVi· .. )iEI. 
Now Un[] is the signature operation O[]. 
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Let U = (U, Cu, ·u) be an ontology. Then we define (A, a) to be the 
U-algebra or simply an algebra (for U) if A is a class and a : U[A] --+ A. It 
is full if a is a bijection a : U[A] rv A. Each full algebra (A, a) determines 
a replacement system U(A, a) = (A, C,·) where for a E A, if a = au then 
C a = Cuu and if a : C a --+ A then a . a = a (a ·u u). 
Call replacement systems U(A, a) obtained in this way U-replacement 
systems. 
Discrete Ontology 
A discrete ontology is one in which no element has components. Formally, 
if we have an ontology (At, C,·) where Ca = 0 for each atom a E At, we 
call the ontology discrete. Any class of objects can be defined as a discrete 
ontology by regarding the objects in the class as objects in the ontology, and 
defining all component maps to be empty. 
Generalized Signature Ontology 
Here we must generalize the definition of signature ontology given in [7] so 
that we may extend it. The generalized version of signature ontology has 
components which are restricted by the ontology U. If we choose the set 
theoretic ontology induced by V as U, we obtain the signature ontology 
as defined above. Here, define a generalized signature ontology as UfI"U = 
(O[U], C,·) where 0 is a signature, U = (U, Cu, ·u) and U is a subclass of V 
(which as we have seen can be taken as an ontology itself). The component 
map is defined to accept an element from O[U] and return a set of elements 
from U. The components of this ontology are given by Cu = f(vw) where 
u = (w, f) with f E UVW. To create new elements a . u = (w, g) where 
g(i) = a(f(i)) for i E vw. If we are given a standard signature (i.e. 1= vw 
where 1= {1, ... ,n} and n E N) the following definitions work as welL The 
components can be seen like so Cu = {- .. Xi· •• } if u = w(· .. Xi· •• ). For 
new elements, the a operation works by performing a on each component of 
the form like so: a· u = w( . .. aXi· .. ). 
The components themselves are members of the class U, thus any set of 
components satisfies: { ... Xi •.• } E U ~ pow V, as long as U ~class V. 
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Product Ontology 
We define a product ontology as follows: assume we have two ontologies 
U1 = (U1 , G 1 , '1) and U2 = (U2 , G 2, '2)' Their product is then defined by the 
following three definitions: 
(5.1.4) 
(5.1.5) 
(5.1.6) 
U1 xU2 
where G( U1, U2) 
and CJ· (U1' U2) 
(U1 X U2 , G,·) 
G1U1 u G2U2 
(CJ/Ul '1 U1, CJ/U2 '2 U2) 
where CJ/Ul represents the restriction of CJ to U1 (but if x rf. U1 then CJ/ U1 is 
not defined), or more formally: 
(5.1.7) 
The product ontology has universe of objects represented by the cross 
product of U1 and U2 , a specialized component map, and a dot operation 
used to create new forms. The specialized component map takes a pair 
(U1' U2) with the first term U1 from the universe U1 and the second term U2 
from the universe U2• It will then retrieve the components of the first term 
using the component map G1 from U1 , the components of the second term 
using the component map G2 from U2 , and it will then return the union of 
these components. 
The sigma operation works in a similar way in that it works over one 
ontology, then the other, then merges the results. If we wish to obtain a 
new object pair, CJ is performed on an object pair (U1' U2) and the resultant 
object will contain a new pair of two new terms. The first term would be 
the result of performing CJ on Ul in ontology U1, but the operation must 
be robust enough to work on any object U not necessarily in universe U1. 
We thus restrict CJ to the universe of objects U1, and define this restriction 
to mean that CJ/Ul is only possible on objects from U1• The operation CJ/Ul 
performed on an object in U2 would simply be invalid. The operation CJ/U2 is 
defined in the same way. 
Sum Ontology 
It will also be necessary to have defined a sum ontology so that we may create 
one ontology from many. We begin with the ontologies we wish to sum, each 
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referred to as Uk = (Uk, Ck, 'k) for some k. The ontology we wish to compute 
will look like this: U = L,k=1...n(Uk) where n is the number of ontologies to 
be summed. 
(5.1.8) 
(5.1.9) 
(5.1.10) 
U 
where C(u) 
and (J. u 
i=1...n 
Cku if u E Uk 
(J'kuifuEUk 
The sum ontology has a universe of objects which is simply a disjoint 
union of the universes of the subontologies. The component map for the new 
ontology is defined based on the component maps for the subontologies. The 
component map from the ontology the object came from is used, and the 
dot operation also takes its definition from the subontology the object came 
from. 
5.2 Toy Version of Situation Theory 
We utilize the toy version of situation theory taken from the lecture notes 
cited above. In its current format, the theory contains four types of objects: 
Atoms, Sets, States, and Situations. These will be described below, and then 
an ontology for each is defined. 
• Atoms by definition have no components. An atom may be an n-
place(n 2 0) atomic relation (from the set REL). 
At = REL l±J IN D l±J (TIM l±J LOCl±J) ... 
• Sets are objects of the form {tl' t2 , •.. } where t l , t2 , ••• are elements of 
the set A of objects. The collection of elements is always small, and 
for every small collection of objects there is a set with those objects as 
elements. The notation for sets will be traditional, where x E X will 
mean that the object x is in the set X. 
• States are objects of the form « r, al,' .. ,an, c » with r as an n-place 
atomic relation of the state, all ... , an as objects called arguments, and 
c E {O, I}. 
• Situations are objects which have states 'holding' in them denoted by 
S F w for state w holding in situation s. For every set of states, there 
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exists a situation with exactly these states holding in it. If all the states 
which hold in situation Sl also hold in S2 we denote this by Sl c::: S2. 
We also say that Sl is a subsituation of 82, and 82 is a supersituation 
of 81. 
Sl c::: S2 ~ if Sl 1= w then 82 1= w for all w 
At this point we wish to define a set containing as elements each of the four 
types. Define T to be the set of types such that T = {atom, set, state, sit}. 
We will now define an ontology for each type. 
For the toy version of Situation Theory we are using here, an ontology U 
will be outlined by the definition of a subontology for each type. Assume we 
are given a class At of atom names and pairwise disjoint subclasses (empty 
intersection) Rn ~ At of n-place atomic relation names for n E N. As 
described in [7], we define four ontologies with the intention of unifying them 
via summation to create a single ontology. In a formal manner, we define Ut 
for t E T having already defined T as the set of the four types. 
• Uatom is the discrete ontology (At, C,·) where Ca = 0 for each atom 
a E At. Also notice that this ontology can be regarded as a sum 
of ontologies over the subcategories of atom including the relations, 
individuals, times, places, etc. 
• Uset is the set theoretic ontology Up where P is the image closed class 
powV (image closed _ contains all limit points). 
• Ustate is the signature ontology Un where n is the signature having the 
class of symbols Un>o (Rn x {O, I}) with each symbol in Rn x {O, I} 
having arity {I, ... ,ri}. 
• Finally Usit = powUstate, where for any Ontology U = (U, Cu, ·u) the 
ontology powU = (powU, c, .) with Vu E powU : Cu = U{ Cuu'lu' E u} 
and if a : Cu ---+ V then a . u = {(aICu) ·u u'lu' E u} 
Now we can define a sum ontology U = L,tETUt i.e. U is the ontol-
ogy (U, Cu, ·u) where U = {(t, u)lt E T & u E Ut} and if (t, u) E U then 
Cu(t,u) = CUtu and if a: Cu(t,u) ---+ V then a·u (t,u) = a ·Ut u. 
If A = (A, a) is any full algebra for U then we get a U-replacement system 
which can be viewed as a universe of objects for the toy situation theory. This 
will need to be redone if new types are needed, so that their ontologies may 
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be included in the sum ontology. The class is partitioned into four classes 
At, one for each type t, where At = {a(t,u)lu E Ut[A]}. Such a class A is 
called a model of the situation theory. 
To see how the full algebra will be needed we look at the atoms. The syn-
tax of an atom is somewhat imprecise. People may be syntactically referred 
to with any name, but in this example we will look at the name 'Peter'. Syn-
tactically 'Peter' is an object with a name, but in the model the object must 
have some meaning. Within the model, our atom 'Peter' can be given a su-
perscript full algebra (like so: PeterA) to indicate that we have one such full 
algebra and we are referring to a semantical person, rather than a syntactic 
name. Now, using the homomorphism of the algebra we can make reference to 
the semantical 'Peter' object. We form the following definition which would 
hold true if we substituted any atom for Peter: PeterA = a(atom,'Peter'). 
Formally: 
• The atoms (given A) have the form atA = a(atom, at) for at EAt. 
They make up the class Aatom which itself consists of a summation 
of relations, and other atomic objects such as times and places for 
instance. 
• The sets have the form a(set, a) where a E powA. The symbol E will be 
interpreted by the membership relation EA~ A x Aset which is defined 
by b EA a( set, a) ¢:> b E a E powA for all b E A. The sets form the 
class Aset = {a(set, a) la E powA}. The interpretation (by the algebra) 
of sets is as follows: {tl, t2 , ..• }A = a(set, {tf, tt, ... }). 
• States are objects which have the form a(state, (r, .s)(tl' ... , tn)) for 
t l , ... ,tn E A, r ERn, and .s E {O, 1}. The interpretation for r, the 
n-place atomic relations of A will follow the form of atoms. We define 
« r, t l , ... , tn,.s »A= a(state, (r, .s)(tf, ... , t:;;)) for tl,"" tn E A, r E 
Rn, and.s E {O, 1}. The states are members of the class Astate. 
• Situations of A have the form a(sit, s) where s E pow(Ustate[A]) (i.e. 
s is a set of states). Expanding situation s to its state components, 
the following is defined: sA = a(sit, {wAls 1= w}). Together all the 
possible situations form the class Asit = {a(sit, s)ls E powAstate}. 
The 1= symbol will refer to the holding relation I=A~ Asit X Astate for 
state w in a situation s. The relation I=A on A is semantically defined by 
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the following: 
(5.2.1) a(sit, s) FA w {::::::} wE s E pow(Ustate[A]). 
Since situations will have states holding in them, we will have a necessity 
for a way to determine if one situation is contained within another. If some 
situation S2 will support states {aI, a2, a3, a4}, and another situation S1 sup-
ports states {a2' a3}, we can obviously see that the states holding in Sl are 
a subset of the states holding in S2. This makes Sl a subsituation of S2, and 
S2 a supersituation of Sl. The component map on situations unfortunately 
returns the objects from within the states which hold in it. Without the c 
value we cannot use the component maps to indicate if one situation is con-
tained by another because the situation supporting more states, may have 
c = 0 for some states. We compute the interpretation of Sl ~A S2 given a 
full algebra A = (A, a) formally. The relation is given by: CA~ Asit X Asit . 
(\fs1 , S2 E POWUstate[A]) : 
a(sit, Sl) c A a(sit, S2) 
{::} a(sit, Sl) FA w =} a(sit, S2) FA w for all w E Astate(by def of C) 
{::} w E Sl =} w E S2 for all w E Astate(by def of FA) 
{::} Sl ~ S2 
So for Sr, S2 E powAstate we have a(sit, Sl) ~A a(sit, S2) if and o,nly if 
Sl ~ S2· 
To make reference to a situation existing in our reality we define a situ-
ation s as actual if and only if there is a model A, i.e., a full algebra of U, 
and for every r E Rn a relation rA ~ An so that 
1. If s 1=« r, t1, ... , tn, 1 », then (tt, . .. ,t~) E rA 
2. If s 1=« r, t1, ... , tn, 0 », then (tt, ... ,t~) tj. rA 
5.2.1 A Preliminary Example 
Note that any object or item which is not given an object type (i.e. hair, 
room, etc.) is implicitly an Atom (i.e. it has type At). 
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Object Types Real Objects in example 
Atoms Peter E IND ~ Atom 
in E REL (2-ary) 
has E REL (2-ary) 
broken E REL (l-ary) 
chair E Atom (O-ary) 
leg E Atom (O-ary) 
States WI =« in, Peter ,room, 1 » 
W2 =« in, chair, room, 1 » 
W3 =« has, Peter, W4, 1 » 
W4 =« broken, leg, 0 » 
W5 =« has, room, stairs » 
W6 =« supports, chair, Peter,l » 
W7 =« has, Peter, ws, 1 » 
Ws =« is, hair, brown, 1 » 
Situations 81 1= WI 
82 1= {WI, W2, W3, W6, W7} 
83 1= {WI, W2, W6} 
84 1= WI, 84 1= W2 
Derived Facts: 81 ~ 84 ~ 83 ~ 82 
In this example, the first atom is the person Peter. The other three 
atoms are simple relations and members of the class REL, a subset of the 
atoms. The first two, 'in' and 'has', are 2-ary relations so they take 2 atomic 
objects each. The last atom, 'broken' is l-ary and thus only accepts one 
object. There are eight states above. The first WI relates the information 
that 'Peter' is in a room. The information surrounding the room is not 
identified, but for the intended information to be conveyed, where the room 
is, or what kind of room it is, may not be necessary. The second state W2 
represents the information that a chair is also in the room. The state W3 
conveys that Peter possesses the information conveyed by the state W4. The 
state W4 claims that the possessor of it, does not have a broken leg, because 
c = 0 in this case. The next state W5 declares that the room has stairs. If 
supported by a situation W6, would lead us to conclude that a chair in that 
situation supports Peter. The second last state W7 would mean that Peter 
possesses the last state Ws meaning that Peter's hair is indeed brown. 
Next we are given four situations. It is also important to recognize here, 
that there implicitly exists a situation for every combination of the above 
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states. Focusing on our named situations, we see that SI supports only WI, 
or more specifically, in the situation SI, Peter is in the room. Any situation 
which supports WI can now be viewed as a super-situation of SI. In particular 
in our example, if some other situation Sx F WI then we can say that SI [; Sx' 
Our second situation S2 supports more states. In S2 Peter and the chair are 
in the room, Peter does not have a broken leg, the chair supports Peter, and 
Peter has brown hair. Of course, nothing is said about Peter's hair in SI, 
but this means it could be anything. It should be noted that S2 supports all 
of the states holding in each of the other three situations. In the situation 
S3, Peter and the chair are in the room, and the chair supports Peter, but 
we do not know for sure if Peter can sit down as nothing is said about the 
state of his legs, nor his capabilities in general. The final situation S4 is only 
slightly larger than SI' In addition to Peter being in the room alone, here he 
has access to a chair as well. 
Observe that sets are not used here. They may be utilized in certain re-
lations which necessarily reference a set. For instance the relation 'ancestors 
of' might be a 2-ary relation between an individual, and a set, where the set 
contains all the ancestors of the individual. 
Semantics of the Example 
What is shown above is simply the syntax for describing the situations. The 
representation however, is still missing. For the representation, we make use 
of a full algebra A = (A, a). Observe the representation for the first situation 
SI. Given the full algebra we represent the semantic object referencing SI with 
a superscript algebra like so: sf. The situation will break down as follows: 
st a(sit, {wt}) 
- a(sit, {a(state, (in, l)(it, roomA ))}) 
a(sit, {a(state, (in, l)(a(atom, i1), a(atom, room)))}) 
5.3 Addition of Affordances as Objects 
This toy version of situation theory lacks an explicit method of describing 
Gibson's concept of affordances. It may be possible to describe affordances as 
specific instances of existent objects, but to allow certain dynamics to emerge, 
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we will define affordances explicitly. It may also be a concern that organizing 
a set of affordances from which an organism must select, deters from Gibson's 
theory that affordances are perceived with no mediating images in the brain. 
If we assume however, that the participatory agents have no knowledge of 
the system, but simply live and act by it, it can preserve the theory of 
direct perception. Agents do not actively choose from a list of affordances, 
but the list of affordances is existent nonetheless, just as there are so many 
opportunities for action on an everyday basis, that we inadvertently select one 
being ignorant of the list of possibilities as a whole. While the affordances 
are in fact in the environment, it should be clear that the individuals are 
also a part of the environment, and do not have knowledge of, or access to, 
anything they do not perceive directly. 
In addition to the four types already given, we define a new type, namely 
affordances. Each affordance, references exactly three objects: an affordance 
name <I> which also describes the affordance (e.g. 'sit-able' or 'supports'), s 
a situation, and i an individual. The affordance action will be from the set 
of affordance actions AFF, which is part of the atoms (AFF C Atoms). The 
syntax for an affordance will be similar to states. The name or action of 
the affordance will be first, the situation the affordance resides in next, and 
finally the individual who might perform the affordance . 
• Affordances are objects of the form ¢ =« <I>, s, i », where ¢ represents 
the identification, <I> the action or name of the affordance from the set 
AFF, s E Asit represents the minimal situation necessary for the affor-
dance, and i E AIND represents some individual capable of performing 
the affordance. The set of full affordances will be referred to as aff. 
When we talk about affordances, we want to include opportunities when 
they may be performed. Instead of allowing affordances (in addition to 
states) to hold in situations, we define 'environments' to make reference to 
a sort of coupling of a situation with a set of affordances. This will not 
however, be made an explicit object type. 
• Environments will have the syntax e and will be defined by their prop-
erties using the relation f-. The set of all environments will be referred 
to as Env. If we are given that e f- W for some state w it will be the 
case that w is true in e. As a shorthand, we may also refer to an entire 
set of states holding in an environment like so: e f- {WI, ... , wn }. This 
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will indicate that each state in the set is true in e. From this, we can 
use the fact that for any set of states, there exists a situation modeling 
exactly those states, to refer to an environment modeling a situation 
directly. If we are given a situation s, e I- s, will stand for s being mod-
eled by the environment, or more precisely, each of the states modeled 
by s hold in e. If we are given an affordance ¢ and the fact that e I- ¢, 
then we may conclude that ¢ is contained in the environment e. Simi-
larly, we may refer to an entire set such as e I- a where a is the set of 
affordances a = {¢1, ... , ¢n}. 
From the above we can see that the following equations hold true: 
e I- s ¢:} s F W =} e I- w for all states w 
e I- {¢1, ... , ¢n} ¢:} e I- ¢1 1\ ... 1\ e I- ¢n 
We need to ensure that affordances in the environment will be performable 
within the situation described by the environment. To do this we will define 
'proper' environments, and for practical purposes, restrict our attention to 
those environments only . 
• An environment e will be called proper if and only if e 1-« <P, s, i »=} 
e I- s for all affordances « <P, s, i ~. The set of proper environments 
will be termed pEnv. 
Next, we define an ontology for affordances which will become a member 
of the set T of separate types, so that it may be incorporated into the ontol-
ogy U. An ontology for environments will not be defined as they will not be 
an object type, nor will they be permitted to stand as components of other 
objects . 
• Uaif is the generalized signature ontology UAFF, UsitXUIND where AFF is 
the signature having the class of symbols <PI, <P2,· .. =AFF ~ Atoms 
with AFF as the affordance names. 
The argument Usit represents the ontology of situations, and UINn repre-
sents the ontology on the class of individuals (currently a subset of atoms). 
These arguments in the generalized signature ontology ensure that the com-
ponents of an affordance are always pairs of one situation, and one individual, 
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together with an action from the set AFF. Note that the situation, and in-
dividual are both the minimal descriptions required for the affordance to be 
'do-able'. For instance, if we consider a monkey in the jungle, we could list 
every possible observable state for that monkey (including the weather, the 
colour ofthe monkey's fur, or the monkey's gender, for example), but a situa-
tion which only describes that a branch is 'grasp-able' is what will be used to 
define the affordance. This means that for any affordance « <P, s, i », either 
s or any supersituation of s will allow for the affordance to be performed. 
Remaking the ontology and replacement system 
N ow our previous definition of an ontology U made of four sub-ontologies 
can be extended to include a fifth sub-ontology, affordances. If U = L,tETUt 
where T = {atom, set, state, sit, aff} we will get similar definitions as above 
for the universe of objects U for U, the component map, and 0", however 
objects will now belong to one of five classes including affordances. 
If A = (A, a) is a full algebra for our new U, we then get a new U-
replacement system which can (again) be viewed as a universe of objects for 
our toy situation theory. The class is now partitioned into five classes (At), 
one for each type t E T. 
To represent the set of possible objects, we now have partitions so that 
A = U{ A atom , A set , Astate, Asit, Aafr}. The set Astate for example would be 
the set of states for the full algebra A. 
Semantics of Affordances and Environments 
Now that an ontology has been defined for affordances, we assume we have 
a full algebra which we will call A = (A, a), to give the semantics. The 
affordance names <PI, <P2, ... E AF F ~ At of A will have the form <pA = 
a(atom, <p) much like other atoms . 
• The affordances (given A) have the form« <P, s, i »A= a(aff, <p(sA, i A )) 
for <P E AAFF C A atom , s E A sit , i E A 1ND. All of the affordances to-
gether make up the class Aaff = {a(aff, a)la E UAFF[A]} . 
• Environments will be members of the class AEnv = Asit x POW(Aaff). 
An environment will be semantically decribed as follows: 
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The 'contained in' relation will have several interpretations since states, 
sets of states, or situations may stand in relation to an environment. There 
will need to be a fourth interpretation for affordances contained in environ-
ments as well. First, we examine the interpretation with only one state. The 
interpretation for our 'contained in' relation on environments and states will 
look like so: f-A~ A Env X Astate. Alternatively, we may refer to a set of states, 
indicating each element of the set holds in the environment. This interpreta-
tion will be defined similar to above, but with the powerset of Astate instead. 
Formally: f-A~ AEnv X pow(Astate). Third, if we wish to determine if a situa-
tion s is contained in an environment (i.e. e f- s), we would need to discover 
if for any state w, if s F w then e f- w. The interpretation for our 'contained 
in' relation f- on environments and situations is given by f-A~ A Env X A sit . 
(a (sit, s), as) f-A w {:} w EsE pow(Ustate[A]) 
For the derived notion e f- s we obtain 
(a(sit, Sl), as) f-A a(sit, S2) {:} S2 ~ Sl 
To show that an affordance ¢ is contained in an environment e, we write 
e f-A ¢ but the superscript algebra will be dropped when there is no confusion. 
Similar to the above equation, f- for affordances is interpreted as follows: 
f-A~ A Env X Aaff• Lastly, we also extend this definition to allow for an entire 
set of affordances to be contained in an environment: f-A~ A Env X POW(Aaff). 
(a (sit, s), as) f-A ¢ {:} ¢ E as 
Furthermore, we must examine the property of an environment being 
called proper. Environment e is proper if for every affordance in the environ-
ment, the situation component of the affordance must be 'co;n~ained in' (f-) 
the environment. The class of all proper environments will be termed A pEnv 
and by the equations below we can see that A pEnv ~ A Env' 
The environment e where e f-A Sl and e f-A a with a = {¢1,"'} as a set 
of affordances, is 'proper' if 
e = (a (sit, sd, as) E pEnv {:} S2 ~ Sl for all a(aff, <1>(S2' i)) E as 
5.3.1 A Full Example 
Note that any object or item which is not given an object type (i.e. hair, 
room, etc.) is implicitly of the type Atom. 
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Object Types Real Objects in example 
Atoms Peter E IND ~ Atom 
in, has E REL (2-ary) 
broken E REL (l-ary) 
chair, leg E Atom (O-ary) 
States WI =« in, Peter, room, 1 » 
W2 =« in, chair, room, 1 » 
W3 =« has, Peter, W4, 1 » 
W4 =« broken, leg, 0 » 
W5 =« has, room, stairs, 1 » 
W6 =« supports, chair, Peter, 1 » 
W7 =« has, Peter, Ws, 1 » 
Ws =« is, hair, brown,l » 
Situations 81 F WI 
82 F {WI,W2,W3,W6,W7} 
83 F {WI, W2, W6} 
84 F {WI,W2} 
Affordances CPI =« sit, 83, Peter» 
CP2 =« see, 84, Peter» 
Environments e I- 82 
e I- {CPI, CP2, ... } 
Known Facts: 81 ~ 84 ~ 83 ~ 82 
Here we would like to simply take the time to describe what a particular 
affordance being present really means. If an individual Peter possesses the 
affordance « sit, Peter, 83 », it means that Peter may 'sit' in the situation 
83 or any super situation thereof. 
Now that the affordances are introduced, possibilities for action are more 
readily accessible. What we cannot yet do however, is claim that an individ-
ual possesses an affordance without the use of a state containing a relation 
such as 'has'. To make identifying actions an individual may take easier, we 
must revisit the notion of an individual. 
5.4 The Niche and the Individual 
With affordances and environments defined, actions and when they may be 
performed are much easier to determine. What we are missing is a method 
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of attributing an affordance, (or set of possible affordances) to an individual. 
We do not want to rely on the relation 'has' (as we began to in the example) to 
indicate that an individual has an opportunity for action, as it would require 
a very large number of states. Any organism, according to Gibson will be 
a member of some affordance relations, which correspond to actions it may 
take. Unfortunately in our toy example of Situation Theory, individuals had 
been placed as a subset of the atoms, which by definition have no components. 
We will require each individual to make reference to a niche which is the only 
concept of Gibson's that has yet to be implemented here. We therefore refine 
the definition of individuals by creating their own object type, so that they 
may contain components, and we define an ontology for niches as well, for 
use in the new ontology for individuals. A niche will contain affordance 
actions only, rather than full affordances. According to Gibson, a niche is 
a group of individuals capable of performing the same actions.· This could 
be modeled in the full Situation Theory by types of individuals placed in 
the environment. This approach requires anchors, parameters, etc. Since we 
are only working with the toy example of Situation Theory in this thesis we 
have chosen a different but equivalent way to model a niche. The type above 
can be defined externally as all the individuals with the same niche, i.e., for 
a given set n we choose {« x, nl, ni »1 nl = n}. Niches in our example 
can be seen as the type of all individuals that can perform the same actions 
though types are not actually used. We believe a niche represented as a set 
of affordance actions, adheres to what Gibson described[29] . 
• A niche represents a set of affordance names. The first set n = {cI>I' ... } 
cI>i E AF F in an individual corresponds to affordance actions which 
the individual is capable of performing according to his/her physical 
ability. This set is not dependent on any situation or even current 
properties of the animal. Even though an eagle may not currently be 
able to fly because of a broken wing, it has the physical proportions, and 
requirements to do so once it has healed, so the affordance action 'fly' 
would be in the eagle's niche n. This set will not change for any given 
individual. We wish to emphasize that niches consist of affordance 
actions or names, but not entire affordances. Membership of affordance 
actions in niches, or in the niche n of an individual, will be defined by 
the E relation . 
• The second niche n' of the individual references the affordances cur-
rently available for enaction. We will be able to see that n' will neces-
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sarily always be a subset of n. It is fairly intuitive that actions you can 
currently perform are a subset of all actions you could ever perform in 
the future. If an eagle breaks its wing, the action 'fly' will be removed 
from n', and when the eagle regains its ability to fly, it will be added 
back. 
• Each individual i will reference three components: a name x, a niche 
set n, and a second niche n', the set of the affordances currently per-
formable. They will appear in the general form, i =« x, n, n' ». Once 
defined we will be able to write ([> E i to mean that the individual i 
possesses the affordance action ([> in its niche n, or ([> E' i to mean 
that i has ([> in its niche n' meaning it is currently able to perform the 
affordance. 
We have now redefined individuals to be their own new object type rather 
than a subset of atoms. The set of individuals will now be referred to as Ind, 
differing from the previously defined IND by two lowercase letters. That is, 
IND will contain individual names, whereas Ind will contain full individuals 
with component niches and names. An individual, according to this new 
object type will be seen like so: i =« x, n, n' » where x E IND is a name or 
reference for the individual, n is the set of all the affordances the individual 
is capable of performing upon ever being in a situation allowing it, and 
having the will to do so, and n' is the set of actions which the individual 
could presently enact due to spatial and temporal restrictions, as well as 
capabilities. 
Once individuals have been given components, particularly the two niches, 
certain affordances might be invalid. While the language allows for an affor-
dance «fly, s, i 1 »with the individual defined as i 1 =« 'Peter',{sit, stand, 
hear, see, walk, ... }, {hear, see, walk, ... } » to exist, we need to ensure 
only certain affordances are valid. The example just given should indeed 
be considered to be invalid since i 1 does not refer to an individual which is 
capable of flight. To be performable, the individual the affordance relates 
to, must possess the action of the affordance in their niche. Syntactically 
an affordance is now expanded to accommodate for individuals with compo-
nents. An affordance will now look like this when the individual is expanded: 
¢ =« ([>, s,« x, n, n' »» where ([> ~AFF refers to the action of the affor-
dance. In a practical application, only affordances which are performable 
in some possible situation need be considered so we restrict our attention 
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to these affordances. They will satisfy the following equation and will be 
termed proper affordances with the set of them being called pAff. 
« <P, s, i» is proper ¢:} <P E' i 
Formally we will need an ontology for the individual but not explicitly for 
niches as only individuals will be an object type. Niches will not be permitted 
to stand in arbitrary argument roles. An ontology for niches will still be 
required though, as it will be used in the specification of the individual, due 
to the restriction of components. 
• For niches, we give the ontology Uniche = pow (UAFF ) where we borrow 
the definition of powU for U from the ontology of situations. UAFF is 
the discrete ontology (AAFF' C,·) where Ca = 0 for each affordance 
<P E AAFF ~ AAtom' 
• U1nd is the generalized signature ontology UIND,UnicheXUniche where IN D 
represents the signature with class of symbols as names of individuals 
and IN D ~ Atom. Individuals will not have arbitrary object compo-
nents, but simply two niche components and a name component. 
After defining the ontology for individuals we need to add the new type 
to the set of types T. Individuals will be the last type we add, so the final 
definition of the set of object types is as follows: 
T = {atom, set, state, sit, aff, Ind}. 
By the same process as before, we define U to be the sum ontology over 
the ontologies for each of the types in T which now includes individuals. If 
A = (A, a) is any full algebra for U we get a U-replacement system which 
we view as our universe of objects. The class A (and the domain of a) is 
partitioned into six classes for the six types. The semantics of the niche and 
the individual which follow must, as usual, be based on a full algebra A . 
• An individual will have the form« x, {<PI, ... }, {<p~, ... } »A= a(Ind, 
x( {<pf, ... }, { <P~ A, ... } )). The class of individuals each with names and 
niches will be called A1nd. 
As well, we interpret the relation E between affordance actions, and indi-
viduals like so: EA~ AAFF X A1nd. Formally: <P EA i ¢:} <P EA n ¢:} <P E n for 
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i =« x, n, n' » where E without a reference algebra is the set membership 
relation. In addition, to indicate that an affordance action is in the niche n' 
of an individual i, we provide an interpretation for E': E,A <;;;; AAFF X AInd . 
Formally, q> E'Ai {:} q>E,An, {:} q> En' for i =« x, n, n' ». 
It will also be necessary to judge if an affordance action is in a niche. Once 
again we must be given a full algebra A = (A, a). The membership relation 
for affordance actions in niches is given in the same way as membership in a 
set and is defined as follows: q>A EA a(Ni, n) {:} q> EnE pow (AAFF ). 
Proper Affordances 
The semantic meaning of proper affordances will be interpreted as follows: 
• An affordance a(aff, q>(s, i)) is proper if and only if q> E,A i. 
Essentially, for an affordance to be proper, the animal which possesses 
the affordance must also have the corresponding affordance action in their 
niche n'. To restrict the scope of possible affordances in an environment, we 
say that to be supported by a proper environment an affordance must be 
proper as well. 
pEnv f- ¢ => ¢ is proper 
Since it is obvious that any proper affordance is also simply an affordance, 
we acknowledge that the class of proper affordances, denoted by pAff, will 
be a subset of the class of affordances. That is: ApAff ~ Aaff• 
5.4.1 Redefinition of our Ontology 
Now that we have concluded our additions to the theory, we can now redefine 
our replacement system U = L.tEYUt. With the addition of the 'individual' 
type, the set T is now defined like so: T = { atom, set, sit, state, aff, Ind }. 
The class of objects A is now partitioned into our six types, and isomorphism 
a will have a different definition for each of the four original types and each 
of the two newly identified types. 
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5.4.2 Updated Example 
Object Types Real Objects in example 
Niches nl = {see, hear, sit, grasp, ... } 
n~ = {see, hear, sit, ... } 
Individuals i l =«Peter, nl, n~ »E AInd 
5.5 Dynamics of the System 
What we have described so far, has made it possible to describe situations, 
their components, and particularly affordances. What is missing is the ability 
to model how a situation changes to another, how one environment changes 
to the next, and how states are formed or modified. 
First, to make the dynamics simpler we remind the reader of the idea of 
an affordance being in an environment. Some affordance cp will be in some 
environment e if it is given that e f- cpo Equivalently for a set of affordances, 
e f- cp {:} cp E a 1\ e f- a where a = {cp, ... }. 
Now we will introduce some dynamics by the introduction of the -+ or 
'yields' relation on environments. It will enable one environment to yield 
a new environment through the enaction of an affordance. If in some en-
vironment, an individual has some affordance (in its niche n'), and if that 
individual chooses to enact the affordance, it will cause the environment to 
shift to a new one. The yields relation is based on a function f called the 
enacting function. Formally, we define 
(el -+ e2) ~ (:3cp)(el f- cp 1\ f(el, cp) = e2)' 
The function f takes one proper environment, and a proper affordance, and 
returns a new proper environment where the affordance has just been en-
acted. This f : pEnv x pAff -+ pEnv is actually a partial function so that 
f (e, cp) is defined if and only if e f- cp, i.e., the affordance cp is enact able in 
the given environment. 
5.5.1 Non-deterministic yields relation 
If Peter is standing in front of a blue chair and a red chair, he may choose 
to sit in either, or neither, thus making the yields relation non-deterministic. 
An algebraic example follows: 
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Object Types Real Objects in example 
Atoms near E REL (2-ary) 
sitting on E REL (2-ary) 
supports E REL (2-ary) 
'Peter' E IND c Atom 
blue chair, red chair E Atom 
Ind i l =« 'Peter', nl, n~ »E Ind 
Niches nl = {8ee, hear, 8it, gra8p, ... } 
n~ = {8ee, hear, 8it, ... } 
n~ = {8ee, hear, 8tand, ... } 
States WI =« near, iI, blue chair, 1 » 
W2 =« near, iI, red chair, 1 » 
W3 =« supports,blue chair,il ,1 » 
W4 =« supports,red chair,il ,1 » 
W5 =« sitting-on,il,blue chair,1 » 
W6 =« sitting-on,il,red chair,1 » 
Situations 8lF{Wl,W3} 
82 F {W2,W4} 
83 F {WI, W2, W3, W4} 
84 F W5 
85 F W6 
Affordances (Pt =« sit, iI, 81 » 
¢2 =« sit, iI, 82 » 
¢3 =« stand, iI, 84 » 
¢4 =« stand, it, 85 » 
Environments el I- 83 
el I- {¢l, ¢2, ... } 
e2 I- 84 
e2 I- {¢3, ... } 
e3 I- 85 
e3 I- {¢4,"'} 
Enacting Functions f(el,« sit, iI, 81 ») = e2 
f(el,« sit, iI, 82 ») = e3 
Known Facts: 81 [::; 83 and 82 [::; 83 
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I I sit E AFF & sit E n1 I 
Our prototypical person Peter finds himself situated near two differently 
coloured chairs, either of which is capable of supporting him. He may sit 
on the blue chair, thus engaging the yields relation e1 ---+ e2, or he may sit 
on the blue chair, engaging the yields relation e1 ---+ e3. The fact that Peter 
is given these alternatives illustrates that the yields relation itself is non-
deterministic. Also note that e1 f-- 83, 81 J;;;;; 83, and 82 C 83 ensuring that the 
affordances are proper and enact able. 
5.5.2 Yields not always confluent 
One question that may be asked of the yields relation is whether or not it is 
confluent. Confluence is a property of rewriting systems which dictates that 
if given two choices, taking either of them still allows you to arrive in some 
situation which was possible to arrive at via the other choice. If the yields 
relation were to be confluent, any action we take would not rule out any 
other action from been taken. Intuitively we know that at least some choices 
we make rule out other choices from ever being possible, but an example is 
provided after the formal definition, to illustrate how yields is not confluent. 
First take ---+* to be the reflexive, transitive, closure on the yields (---+) 
relation. A relation ---+ is called confluent if for all x, Y1, Y2 the properties 
x ---+* Y1 and x ---+* Y2 imply that there is a z with Y1 ---+* z and Y2 ---+* z. This 
definition can be visualized by the following diagram: 
If (Iy'x, Y1, Y2)[(X ---+* Y1) 1\ (x ---+* Y2)] then 
(:JZ)[(Y1 ---+* z) 1\ (Y2 ---+* z)] 
* :Jz * 
A confluent relation will be deterministic in all terminating cases, a prop-
erty that we do not expect from the possible futures. Through an example 
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we will demonstrate that the relation is in fact not always confluent. If Peter 
holds a match, and is sitting in front of two firecrackers, he has several op-
tions. He could light the match, or not, but upon lighting it he might watch 
it burn out, or light one firecracker, or the other. If he lights the match, and 
chooses to ignite the red firecracker, it will burn away, just as the blue fire-
cracker would. When he makes the decision to ignite one of the firecrackers, 
he is entering an environment where it will be impossible to ignite the other 
firecracker. If he lights the red one, he has no other matches to light the blue 
one, and vice versa. Admittedly, he may also watch the match slowly burn 
away, but he still has no manner of igniting either firecracker. This example 
scenario illustrates how the yields relation is not always confluent. 
Object Types Real Objects in example 
Atoms near, grasping, ignite E REL (2-ary) 
burnt E REL (l-ary) 
red firecracker E Atom 
blue firecracker E Atom 
match E Atom 
'Peter' E IND c Atom 
Ind i l =«'Peter', nl, n~ »E Ind 
Niches nl = {see, sit, grasp, strike, ignite ... } 
n~ = {see, grasp, strike, ignite, ... } 
States WI =« near, iI, red firecracker, 1 » 
W2 =« near, iI, blue firecracker, 1 » 
W3 =« grasping, iI, match, 1 » 
W4 =« lit, match, 1 » 
W5 =« burnt, match, 1 » 
W6 =« burnt, red firecracker, 1 » 
W7 =« burnt, blue firecracker, 1 » 
Situations 81 1= {WI, W2, W3} 
82 1= {WI, W2, W3, W4} 
83 1= {WI, W3, W4} 
84 1= {W2' W3, W4} 
85 1= {W5' W6} 
861= {W5,W7} 
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87 1= W3 
Affordances qh =« strike, 81, i l » 
¢2 =« ignite, 82, i l » 
¢3 =« see, 83, i l » 
¢4 =« see, 84, i l » 
Environments el f- 81 
el f- {¢l, ... } 
e2 f- 82 
e2 f- {¢2, ... } 
e5 f- 85 
e5 f- {¢3, ... } 
e6 f- 86 
e6 f- {¢4, ... } 
Enaction Functions f(el, «strike, 87, i l ») = e2 . 
f(e2, «ignite, 83, i l ») = e5 
f(e2, «ignite, 84, i l ») = e6 
Known Facts: 87 C 81 ~ 82 
e2 f- 83 and e2 f- 84 
Here we identify a situation we begin with. Peter is presently holding 
a match, and near to two different coloured firecrackers. In this example 
something such as their distance apart, is such that Peter cannot light both 
firecrackers with the single match he possesses. This can be derived from the 
fact that our functions detailing the shifting of environments, show that after 
lighting one firework, the match is burnt, thus Peter cannot light another. We 
assume all environments and affordances are proper. Finding himself in el, we 
suppose Peter chooses to enact his 'strike' affordance, shifting environments 
to e2. We highlight that el -t e2. He then finds himself in e2 where he 
may now ignite one or the other firecracker. If he chooses to light the red 
one, he will be in environment e5, if he chooses to light the blue one, he 
will be in environment e6. Algebraically: f(e2, «strike, 83, i l ») = e5 and 
f(e2, «strike, 84, i l ») = e6. Once he has made his choice, he will find that 
he has no matches which are unburnt and thus he has no way of igniting 
the other firecracker. In short, environment e2 may yield environment e5 or 
environment e6, but not both. Neither e5 nor e6 can yield any environment 
(call it eimp) in which both e5 and e6 had occurred. 
123 
·················A "" ...... .... 
eimp 
The regular arrows indicate the ability for e2 to yield e5 and e6, but the 
dotted arrows indicate the fact that ey is an unobtainable environment. 
5.5.3 Examining how n' changes 
In the previous examples, the niche n' never changed as the individuals never 
lost any of their affordance actions. Though it is not a relatively frequent 
occurrence, sometimes an animal will either enact an affordance incorrectly, 
or enact an affordance whose result was not expected. To illustrate this we 
extend the previous example. Imagine that when Peter finds himself in e2, 
he cannot decide which firework to light, or else does not wish to light either. 
In any case, he enacts a 'waiting' affordance which allows the lit match to 
burn his finger. The partial function may be applied as it is shown in the 
table, thus leading Peter into environment e7 where most notably, he has a 
burnt finger. The burning of his finger causes his niche of currently available 
actions n~ to change to n~ where strike, and ignite are no longer performable 
due to his burnt finger. Once his burn heals to a point where he may strike, 
or ignite, these affordance actions are replaced into his niche of currently 
available actions. 
Object Types Objects in Example 
Atoms burnt (l-ary) 
has (2-ary) 
Niches n~ = {see, grasp, strike, ignite, ... } 
n~ = {see, grasp, ... } 
States Ws =«has, Peter, Wg, 1 » 
Wg = «burnt , finger, 1» 
Situations 87 1= {W3' W5, ws} 
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Affordances ¢5 =« wait, 82, i 1 » 
Environments e2 f- {¢2, ¢5, ... } 
e7 f- 87 
Enaction Functions f(e2' «wait, 82, i 1 ») = e7 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion and Future Work 
The formalization of affordances provided conforms to the writings of James 
Gibson and thus the notion which he envisioned. By the addition of an 
affordance type, individuals which are no longer atomic, may check their 
niches to decide if certain actions are possible. If the individual is capable of 
performing an action, perceives that the environment surrounding it allows 
for that affordance to take place, and the individual wishes to perform the 
action, he or she may then do so. According to the formalization presented, 
the change of environment and its supported situation is governed by the 
enacting function, and the yields relation. 
The work done in this thesis involves only a toy version of situation theory, 
and thus may be extended to include all notions of situation theory. Here 
types, parameters, and anchors were not taken advantage of because of their 
complexity. Utilizing the 'type' type, higher order types could be devised, 
and representing the type of all people, or the type of any set of objects or 
individuals who can be uniquely identified is possible. Niches in this alternate 
model would be defined differently. In addition, the dynamics provided here 
do not come close to describing all methods of one environment yielding a 
new one. The dynamics could be modified so that instead of an external 
function f, one could have a possible future relation entailing situations or 
environments which are, and which are not, possible futures from a current 
situation. 
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6.1 States which affect Yields Relation 
Since we are attempting to model the real world, we must admit that the 
number of relations, atoms, sets, states, etc., is infinite. New operations 
E REL may be available in the future which do not exist now. If the partial 
function j determines possible source and target environments, an example 
of a relation which might impact j, is the 'possible future situation' relation. 
This relation nested in a state given E = 1, would describe possible situations 
which are attainable from the current situation, while a value of E = 0 would 
indicate the situations which are unattainable. If a state such as « possible 
future situation, Simp, {<PI, ... ,<pn }, 0 » holds in a situation SI it must not be 
possible for SI ---t * Simp. That is, SI cannot yield the impossible situation Simp 
in any number of repeated applications of the yields relation. It must also 
be the case that this state remains valid in future situations which result 
from this one. It is worthwhile to note that the inclusion of the list of 
possible affordances in this impossible situation allows the extraction of an 
environment from the state. 
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Appendix A 
Variable Names 
Table A.1: Naming Conventions 
Variable What it represents 
at/At At = REL 'c!:J IN D 'c!:J ••• 
a, b, ... arbitrary objects in A 
t, t l , ... arbitrary objects in A 
W,Wl,··· states/infons 
8,81," . situations 
e, el,'" sets 
I I n, n, nl, n l ... niches 
cP, CPl,'" complete affordances 
<P, <PI, ... affordance action names 
r, rl,'" n-place relations 
Ax class A restricted to objects of type x 
A=(A,a) full algebra = (class, homomorphism) 
E: polarity (0 or 1) 
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Table A 2' Relations ..
Relation What relation is on 
E 'in' relation to indicate an object is a member of a set 
SFW 'holds' relation used for state W holding in situation S 
e I- w 'contained in' relation for state w in environment e 
el-¢ 'contained in' relation for affordance ¢ in environment e 
el-s 'contained in' relation for situation s in environment e 
q>En 'in' relation for affordance action q> in niche n 
q> E i 'in' relation for affordance action q> in niche n of individual i 
q> E' i 'in' relation for affordance action q> in niche n' of individual i 
Table A 3' Class Names ..
Class Contents of Class 
V class of all sets 
atom atoms 
sit situations 
set sets 
state states 
Ind individuals 
REL relations 
AFF affordance names 
aff full affordances 
Env Environments 
pAff proper affordances 
pEnv proper environments 
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